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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
V. 
ANTHONY A. SADDLER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030439-SC 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, 67 P.3d 1025. cert, granted, 76 P.3d 691 
(Utah 2003). The court of appeals' opinion in Saddler is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the court of appeals 
properly ruled in State v. Saddler, that the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the 
detective's affidavit failed to support probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals. State v. Levva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). The court of appeals 
reviewed the issue here as follows: 
"[T]his court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by the contents of the 
[detective's] affidavit, we therefore need not defer to the trial court's finding ...." 
State v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,1f9, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Instead, "'we make an independent 
review of the trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written 
evidence.'" Id (quoting State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). "However, 'the [FJourth [A]mendment does not require that the reviewing 
court conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^] 
Instead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude "that the magistrate had 
a substantial basis for ... [determining] that probable cause existed.1"" IdL_ 
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Illinois v.Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))). We 
therefore "pay great deference to the magistrate's determination." State v. Vigh, 
871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).[] 
State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^ [7. This Court applies the same standard in assessing 
the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant. See State v. BabbelL 
770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989V cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036 (1992). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following will be determinative of the question presented for review: U .S. 
Const, amend. IV; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The text of the Fourth Amend-
ment is contained in Addendum B, and the text of Gates is contained in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case; Course of the Proceedings; Disposition in the Court Below . 
On August 4, 2000, the state filed an Information against Saddler for unlawful 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and unlawful possession of cocaine, 
both third degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(iii) and (2)(a)(i) 
(1998). (R. 1-3.) On August 15, 2001, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence 
of the controlled substances on the basis that the evidence was obtained with an unlawful 
search warrant. Specifically, the defense argued that the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate judge in support of the warrant failed to support probable cause for the search. 
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(R. 35-57.) A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum D, and a copy of the 
search warrant issued in connection therewith is attached as Addendum E. 
The state opposed the motion and on September 11, 2001, a hearing was held in 
the matter. (See R. 60-69; 127.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied 
the motion to suppress. (R. 127:12-13.) 
On September 25, 2001, Saddler entered into a conditional plea for marijuana pos-
session with intent to distribute, a 3rd° felony, and he reserved the right to appeal the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (See R. 79-84); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) 
(2003). On January 29, 2002, the trial court sentenced Saddler to an indeterminate prison 
term of 0 to 5 years. The court then suspended the prison term and placed Saddler on 
probation for 24 months with community service. (R. 107-08.) Saddler appealed, and the 
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. Saddler, 2003 
UT App 82, %l. The state has asked this Court to review the matter. This Court agreed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 4, 2000, the state filed charges against Saddler for drug possession. 
The charges were based on the following statement set forth in the Information: 
The statement of West Valley Police Detective B. McCarthy that on June 15, 
2000, at 3194 South 4300 West, in Salt Lake County, Utah, a search warrant was 
executed at the residence of the defendant, Anthony Alexander Saddler. Detective 
McCarthy states that defendant was present, and that a search of the residence re-
vealed 277 grams [approx. 10 ounces] of field tested positive marijuana, weighing 
scales, and a quantity of a substance that field tested positive for cocaine. 
(R. 3 (emphasis added).) During trial court proceedings, the defense challenged the affi-
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davit presented in support of the search warrant referenced above. The defense argued 
that the affidavit lacked probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. (R. 127.) 
During a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties looked to the four corners 
of the affidavit. The affidavit stated the following: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by the West 
Valley City Police Department, and is currently assigned to the Neighborhood 
Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been given the responsibility to investigate 
narcotic offenses occurring in West Valley City and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the 
investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has personally purchased 
various narcotics on numerous occasions in relation to police investigations. 
Affiant was previously assigned to the Metro narcotics Strike Force and the Drug 
Enforcement Strike Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of 
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic 
and advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California Narcotics Officers 
Association seminars in drug recognition, identification and investigative 
techniques. Your affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb Technician. 
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and distribution 
of a controlled substances, specifically marijuana and cocaine. Your affiant 
received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. 
Your affiant ask[s] the courts not to require your affiant to publish the CPs name. 
Your affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were published. 
Your affiant was told the following by the CI: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous 
occasions during the last year, 
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being 
within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to 
weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging 
material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside 
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the named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the 
listed premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a 
part time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCI's [sic], 
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to 
afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used by the 
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect, 
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the 
late evening hours, 
The affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his home address 
in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial surveillance your affiant did not 
observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 
hours until 0600 6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed 
some short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant 
had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles 
leaving the listed premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was 
arrested for outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana, 
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of 
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside 
the twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and 
would like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of 
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting 
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the 
subject, Oba Tramel. 
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are first hand, accurate 
and truth full [sic], for the following reasons. CI's observations are first hand and 
from a person that has used marijuana and would recognized [sic] the substance 
when observed. CI has not been promised nor [sic] paid for any of the 
information provided. CI has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and 
desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community. 
CI's observations were over a long period of time, even though the suspect has 
only recently occupied the listed premises, within the last couple of months. CI 
states that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term. 
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named premises and 
the registered owner was [as] described by CI. Your affiant has observed what 
your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term traffic coming and going to the 
listed premises. Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in 
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of cocaine. Further 
the arrested person was not found with any instruments used in the ingestion of 
5 
controlled substances, which your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was 
purchased from the listed premises. 
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently and works at a 
restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was told that the employment is part 
time, your affiant checked on 6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was 
unknown when he was scheduled to return. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for marijuana, 
cocaine and associated packaging material and instruments used to ingest 
controlled substances. Affiant has been told that all these items have been 
observed inside the listed premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should 
be searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and carries controlled 
substances on his person. 
Your affiant prays for any time, announced authority of service. Your 
affiant has been told that the suspect is usually only at home during the late 
evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this. 
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy Salt Lake 
County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben [sic] approved to be 
presented to the courts for anytime and announced authority of service. 
(R. 72-74; Addendum D, hereto.) According to the record, the magistrate issued the 
warrant and McCarthy executed it on June 15. (R. 76-78; 3). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied 
the motion. Saddler appealed the matter, and the court of appeals reversed the ruling on 
the motion to suppress. State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82. The state asked this Court to 
review the matter. This Court agreed to do so. Saddler is not incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
According to the law, an affidavit for a search warrant must support probable 
cause that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. To determine probable 
cause, an affidavit will be assessed under the totality of the circumstances. If the affida-
vit fails to reveal information about the person who provided a tip to the authorities about 
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the purported crime (i.e. the informant), that is not fatal to the probable cause analysis. 
The court will look to other aspects of the affidavit to assess the relative weights of all 
the various indicia of reliability or unreliability attending the tip. .See Gates, 462 U.S. at 
233-34. The court may determine, for example, that the affidavit contains explicit, 
detailed descriptions of the alleged wrongdoing or the officer has corroborated aspects of 
the tip with an independent investigation to support probable cause. 
In this matter, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. It 
was based on vague assertions by an anonymous informant. McCarthy engaged in an 
independent investigation, but failed to reveal any details relevant to that investigation. 
The court of appeals found the affidavit to be insufficient to support probable cause. 
Saddler respectfully requests that this Court affirm that ruling here. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE 
TOTALITY- OF- THE- CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS HERE TO 
DETERMINE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. 
A. THE PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD. 
The Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. IV. An officer's request for a warrant may be made with a sworn affidavit 
presented to a neutral, detached magistrate. The magistrate must determine whether the 
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circumstances identified in the affidavit support "probable cause" that evidence of crime 
will be found in a particular place. If the standard is supported, a warrant shall issue. 
Courts have ruled that probable-cause shall be assessed under the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" set forth in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130-31 
(Utah 1987); State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, [^9. Probable cause is a "fluid 
concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." Gates. 
462 U.S. at 232. The standard does not lend itself to a "neat set" of legal or rigid rules, 
but provides for an assessment of the total circumstances as set forth in the affidavit. 
For example, where an officer has based his affidavit for the search warrant on an 
informant's tip of criminal conduct, several aspects of the affidavit may be explored for 
probable cause. See Gates. 462 U.S. 213; see also infra, subpart B., below. 
Specifically, the magistrate may assess whether the affidavit supports reliability 
for the informant in order that the tip may be deemed credible. If the affidavit is inade-
quate there, that may not be fatal to the analysis. The magistrate must continue the assess-
ment: a deficiency in one aspect of the affidavit "may be compensated for, in determining 
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other [aspects of the affida-
vit], or by some other indicia of reliability." Gates. 462 U.S. at 233; (see State's Brief of 
Petitioner, dated December 29, 2003 ("State's Brief), 19 (stating that reliability turns on 
"whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was credible")). 
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Other indicia of reliability may include the informant's explicit, detailed 
description of alleged wrongdoing as reported in the affidavit. Details in the affidavit 
allow a magistrate to assess reliability for probable cause under an objective standard. 
Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; [the magistrate's] action cannot be a mere ratification 
of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review 
the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Also, the Supreme Court has "consistently recognized the value 
of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work," in the pro-
bable cause analysis. Id at 241. When an informant's tip is supplemented by independent 
investigation, that may give credibility to the affidavit and to the report of criminal 
conduct. See id. at 238: also State v. James. 2000 UT 80, TH[10-11. 13 P.3d 576 (recog-
nizing that information provided by a citizen and coupled with available corroboration 
may constitute sufficient reliability under the totality of the circumstances). 
In this case, the state does not dispute that the court of appeals assessed the affida-
vit in its entirety to determine whether the affidavit supported probable cause. (See 
State's Brief.) Rather, the state seems to argue that the court of appeals has required too 
much from an affidavit under the analysis. Specifically, the state claims that the court of 
appeals has applied "a rigid, excessively technical test" and "insists on more detail than is 
required under Gates" for probable cause. (State's Brief, 16, 18.) 
Yet, in this case, the court of appeals considered the total circumstances as set 
forth in the affidavit. It did not give undue attention to any particular deficiency there, 
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and it did not isolate any one flaw and find it fatal to the analysis. Instead, the court of 
appeals balanced all aspects of the affidavit to determine whether it contained sufficient 
facts to allow an objective magistrate to make a common-sense judgment for probable 
cause. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82. That is what Gates requires. Gates. 462 U.S. at 233-34. 
Where the state seems to construe Saddler to require reliability for every aspect of 
the affidavit (see State's Brief), the Saddler opinion requires indicia of reliability on 
balance for the informant's tip. See Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ^ |27; Gates. 462 U.S. at 
233-34. In this case, the court of appeals applied the analysis in Gates. Its ruling must 
be affirmed, as further explained below. See infra, subpart C , below. 
B. COURTS APPLY THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES 
ANALYSIS IN A COMMON-SENSE FASHION. 
1. The Gates Court Applied the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis. 
In Gates, the Supreme Court introduced the probable-cause issue with a 
"chronological statement of events" set forth in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26. 
According to the Court, on May 3, 1978, police officers received an anonymous 
letter regarding Lance and Sue Gates. The letter identified where the Gateses lived and 
how they made drug buys. According to the letter, Sue drove the family car from 
Chicago to Florida, where she left it to be loaded with drugs, while Lance flew to Florida 
to drive the car back. Id. at 225. The letter specified that the Gateses would be involved 
in the next transaction on May 3, the date of the letter. On that day, Sue would drive to 
Florida. Lance then would fly down "in a few days to drive [the car] back/1 He would 
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have the trunk loaded with more than $1009000 in drugs for the drive to Chicago. Also, 
the Gateses presently had over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their home and the home 
was visited by "big drug dealers." Id. at 225. 
The anonymous letter was written in the present tense, and it "contained a range of 
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the 
tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted." IdL. at 245. 
In connection with receiving the letter, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale 
Police investigated the tip with other agencies. IdL. at 226. He confirmed Lance Gates' 
identification and address through the Illinois Secretary of State and an informant, and he 
arranged surveillance with drug enforcement agents at the O'Hare and Florida airports. 
Id. at 225-26. Officers reported that Lance Gates made a reservation on Eastern Airlines 
to depart on May 5 from Chicago to Florida. IdL. Agents observed Lance board the plane 
that day, and when he arrived in Florida, agents observed him go from the airport to a 
Holiday Inn in West Palm Beach where he went to a room registered to Susan Gates. Id-
Lance's stay in Florida was brief. The next morning at 7:00, Lance and a woman 
left the motel in a Mercury "bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an 
interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area." Id Agents confirmed that 
the plates on the Mercury were registered to another car, a Hornet station wagon owned 
by Lance Gates. IdL at 226. The drive time from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale was 
approximately 22 to 24 hours. Mader submitted an affidavit to the magistrate "setting 
forth the foregoing facts." Id. at 226. He included a copy of the anonymous letter. IcL 
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The magistrate issued a search warrant. Id. at 226. 
In Gates, the officers' investigations substantially corroborated the defendants' 
mode of operation as set forth in the anonymous letter, where the Gateses were involved 
in a pre-arranged drug run in the family car, which was conveniently waiting for Lance 
Gates in Florida with unauthorized license plates. 
On review, the Supreme Court looked to the total circumstances to determine that 
the anonymous tip, supplemented by police investigations, supported probable cause for 
the issuance of the warrant. Id. at 238, 243-44.] The Court first began the analysis with 
1 The Gates Court expressly abandoned application of a rigid "two-pronged test" that 
came to be known as Aguilar-Spinelli. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. That test required the tip 
as set forth in the officer's affidavit to include facts supporting the informant's basis of 
knowledge, and facts supporting reliability for the informant or veracity for the 
informant's report. IdL at 228-29. The test required the tip to be self-verifying. A 
deficiency in one prong would render the affidavit insufficient. IcL at 233-34; Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The "two-pronged test" did not take the officer's 
independent corroborative efforts into proper consideration. 
Specifically, in Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410, officers received a tip from a "confidential 
reliable informant" that an Illinois party (defendant) was conducting gambling etctivities 
in Missouri. In connection with receiving the tip, federal officers observed defendant 
over an 11-day period making 4 separate trips before noon from Illinois to Missouri, and 
returning in the afternoon to an apartment that had two separate phone lines. Id_ at 413-
15. The affidavit stated that defendant was known to the officer and others to be a "book-
maker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers." IcL. at 414. 
On review, the Supreme Court focused on the paragraph in the affidavit relating to 
the confidential informant's tip. Id_ at 416 (considering the weight to be given the infor-
mant's tip apart from the rest of the affidavit); kL. at 415 (stating that the magistrate must 
ask whether the tip, even if corroborated by independent sources, "is as trustworthy as a 
tip which would pass Aguilar ys test without independent corroboration"). The Court 
determined that the informant and tip were not self-verifying. See id. at 415-16. Also, 
the officers' investigation identified only innocent-seeming activity. See id. at 413-14. 
The police investigation did not resolve problems with the tip since the investigation 
failed to uncover criminal conduct. IcL at 417-18 (stating that the officers' observations 
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consideration of the informant and the informant's tip. 
The Court stated that while an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of 
knowledge" are "highly relevant" in determining the value of the tip, they are not exclu-
sive and rigid factors in the analysis. Id, at 230. Rather, an informant's veracity and 
reliability may give credibility to the tip in the overall assessment of the affidavit. Also, 
the informant's trustworthiness is weighed for reliability (or unreliability) with all other 
considerations for a balanced assessment of the matter. See_ Gates. 462 U.S. at 230-34. 
Thus, if there is doubt in an affidavit about the informant and his/her veracity and 
reliability, the balance of the affidavit may nevertheless support probable cause where 
other considerations in the affidavit provide indicia of reliability for the tip. See id. at 
233. Stated another way, if the affidavit is deficient in establishing the veracity and 
reliability of the informant, that may not end the analysis. The court may look to other 
contain "no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves"). The officers' 
report of innocent facts consistent with the tip did not give additional weight to the 
report from the informant. Id. at 417-19; see JdL at 416-17 (approving of officer's actions 
in Drapery. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959), where identified informant described defendant's 
criminal conduct, and predicted future actions with "minute particularity," thereby allow-
ing officer to observe and verify specific facts). The affidavit was deemed insufficient. 
In Gates, the Supreme Court disavowed the Spinelli "two-pronged test" and reite-
rated application of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach for probable cause. Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238. Under that approach, an officer's investigation may give credibility to 
the tip even if the investigation serves to corroborate only innocent facts. See id. at 241-
44. Utah courts also have abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli approach. S.L.C. v. Trujillo , 
854 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Singleton , 854 P.2d 1017, 1019-20 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); s_ee_ 
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, Yi 9, 22 (stating that an officer's investigation may corrobo-
rate illegal activity or other material facts for the tip under the Fourth Amendment). 
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matters, including the officer's investigation to determine if a substantial basis exists for 
finding probable cause. Gatesm 462 U.S. at 233 (a deficiency "may be compensated for, in 
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other [considera-
tions], or by some other indicia of reliability"); (State's Brief, 19 (stating the assessment 
is "whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was credible")). 
In Gates, the veracity and reliability of the informant were unknown. Thus, the 
anonymous letter standing alone "would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determi-
nation" of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. The Court looked to the remaining 
parts of the affidavit for indicia of reliability for the tip. The Court found that the 
affidavit set forth the details of the officers' investigations regarding the Gateses' 
activities. The officers corroborated major parts of the "details set forth in the anonymous 
letter," including the modus operandi: i.e., the prediction that shortly after May 3, Lance 
Gates would fly to Florida and drive a car waiting there for him to Chicago. IdL at 243-
45. Thus, in assessing all relevant aspects of the affidavit, the Court determined that a 
substantial basis existed for the magistrate to find probable cause. Id. 
2. Utah Courts Apply the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis. 
Utah courts applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis have considered 
varying fact patterns in assessing whether the affidavit may contain indicia of reliability 
for the tip. In State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, the court of appeals stated the following: 
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an 
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 
103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. 
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Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances 
may require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge, 
veracity and reliability of a person supplying information in order to establish 
probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, 
if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's 
report, a less strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability 
and veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah 
App.1989), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also 
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's 
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing 
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the 
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by police. See 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
Where an informant is an ordinary, disinterested citizen with no ties to the crime, 
Utah courts may assume the informant's reliability and veracity. See James, 2000 UT 80, 
Tfl 1 n.5 (recognizing that "the inherent reliability of information volunteered by a citizen 
will usually be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a paid infor-
mant" under the totality of the circumstances for the Fourth Amendment); Bailey, 675 
P.2d at 1206; State v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972) (giving greater weight 
to reports from citizen informants); Kaysville v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 237-38 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997), cert denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) (finding reliability where the 
citizen-informer Olsen called in a detailed drunk-driving tip to police); St. George v. 
Carter. 945 P.2d 165, 167, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1998) (finding that Rick Hafen, an uninvolved citizen and restaurant employee, gave a 
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detailed, reliable report of a person at the drive-up window with an open container); State 
v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, 1(14, 40 P.3d 1136. 
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, this Court found that the affidavit for the search 
warrant supported probable cause where the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge were established, as follows: 
In the instant case, the affidavit stated facts which supported the 
informant's veracity. According to the affidavit, the informant had previously 
given truthful information to the police concerning the existence of contraband, an 
accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity. See McCray v. Illinois, 
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), where the United Slates 
Supreme Court held there was a sufficient basis for probable cause of an arrest 
because the informant had a history of giving reliable information to the police. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the informant's statement was "boosted by 
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation" of the 
stolen property and the apartment. State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 719 
(1983). In addition, some weight should be accorded the fact that the informant 
an apparently disinterested person, came to the police and volunteered the 
information. The informant gave his name, phone, address, and place of 
employment. He stated that he was a concerned citizen who wanted to stop 
burglaries and thefts. In State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 
(1972), we held that information from citizen informants who stand to gain 
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed with the same 
rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular police informant. 
Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (emphasis added); see Treadway, 499 P.2d at 847-48 (citizen-
informer Poulsen identified himself and conferred with the officer twice; also, he had no 
personal interest in whether defendant was arrested or not); see. also Brown. 798 P.2d at 
286 (the citizen informant initiated contact, identified self, and volunteered information). 
When an informant's reliability, veracity and basis of knowledge may not be 
obvious from the affidavit, courts have looked to the total circumstances to balance the 
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"relative weights of all various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an infor-
mant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234; kL at 241-45 (considering the anonymous letter and 
its range of detail together with the independent investigation to support probable cause). 
For example, in State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert denied, 
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), Detective Brian prepared an affidavit for a warrant based in 
part on a report from a confidential informant. The informant reported that defendant 
lived in Ogden and supplied cocaine. Id at 641. Although Detective Brian did not iden-
tify the informant in the affidavit, it was plain that he met personally with the informant, 
where the affidavit revealed that the informant took Brian to the area where defendant 
made a drug transaction. Id at 642. 
Also, Brian engaged in an independent investigation. He confirmed that 
defendant lived at the reported address. Id at 642. He received information regarding 
the defendant's conduct from Detective Sweat, who also knew the informant and used 
the informant "during the last 72 hours" in a controlled buy with defendant. Id at 642. 
Brian learned that Detective Shane Minor had seen defendant driving the vehicle of 
"John Balaich," a known drug dealer; and Brian received information from other infor-
mants, who had previously provided accurate information about defendant and Balaich's 
cocaine deals. Id. at 642. The court of appeals considered the affidavit to be sufficient to 
support probable cause. Although the affidavit did not set forth the veracity and the 
reliability of the confidential informant, "the circumstances as a whole supported] the 
truthfulness" of the tip received from the informant. Id. at 644. 
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Next, this Court has applied the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to an affi-
davit for a search warrant. In State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, defendant posed as a police 
officer and approached the victim, K., and 3 friends camping in Millcreek Canyon. IcL at 
989. Defendant requested identification from the campers, and when he learned that K. 
was 19 years old, "he warned the group that K. was violating a curfew." IcL He offered 
to take her out of the canyon to avoid arrest, and she agreed. As K. and defendant drove 
away, the remaining campers noticed that defendant's truck had no bumpers and no 
license plates. They became suspicious and followed the truck until it raced out of sight 
of the friends, who then called police. Id. at 989. 
The defendant took K. to Big Cottonwood Canyon, where he threatened her with 
a knife, forced her to perform sexual acts on him, and raped her. I<L He then threatened 
to kill K. and her family if she reported the crimes. He finally let her go. IcL at 989. 
When police investigated the matter, they obtained a description of the assailant 
and the truck from K. and the other campers. Based on the description of the assailant 
and the modus operandi, an officer suggested Babbell may be a suspect. IcL at 989. 
Thereafter, the officers researched vehicle records and learned that Babbell owned 
a truck similar to that described by the witnesses. The officers later went to BabbelPs 
home and saw a truck there "fitting the description given by the witnesses." IcL They 
spoke with Babbell's mother and learned he was not home, but would return. They 
waited for him. After Babbell did not return, the officers went back to the home and 
obtained permission to look closely at the truck, but not to enter the cab. IcL at 989. 
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The officers observed details inside the truck that matched the description given 
by the victim. IcL (identifying description as a cracked windshield, a stick-pin button on 
the visor with the slogan '55 mph sucks,' yellow-orange seat covers, a cassette player, 
beverage holders, and a shifter on the floor). They left to obtain a search warrant. Id_ A 
magistrate issued the warrant and the officers returned to the home and seized a number 
of items from the truck. IdL 
After Babbell was charged and convicted of several offenses, he challenged the 
affidavit for the search warrant on appeal. This Court began the analysis as follows: 
The first question is whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause. 
The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant is issued on the basis 
of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support a 
determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 930, 94 L. Ed. 2d 758, 107 
S. Ct. 1565 (1987). The affiant must articulate particularized facts and circum-
stances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists. Mere conclusory state-
ments will not suffice. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 
S. Ct. 2317, reWg denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453, 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983). 
BabbeU, 770 P.2d at 990-91. 
This Court then recognized that the affidavit for the warrant included a statement 
by K. describing the crimes, and the affidavit included K.'s description of the truck. "[K.] 
described the interior of the vehicle as having orange seat covers, a cracked [windshield], 
beverage holders on the dashboard, a '55 mph sucks' button on the driver's side visor, 
and a cassette player in the dashboard." LI at 991. Also, the affidavit specified that 3 
other witnesses saw the assailant and described the truck as an "older model Chevrolet 4-
wheel drive pick-up, dark brown in color, with no front or rear bumpers." IcL The 
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affidavit stated that officers recognized the witnesses' description of the assailant and the 
modus operandi as Babbell, and the officers investigated the truck at Babbell's home and 
noticed that it "matched the description" provided by the witnesses. Id. (emphasis added). 
According to this Court, the affidavit "set out specifically and in detail the charac-
teristics of the truck," as originally described by the victim and her friends. Id. at 992. 
Also, the affidavit included facts relating to the officers' knowledge of defendant and 
observations of the truck. IcL at 991-92. Nevertheless, this Court considered the issue of 
probable cause in Babbell to be "a close question here because of the rather sloppy 
drafting of the affidavit." IdL. at 992. The affidavit was "ambiguous in its use of the word 
match fed]"," where the officers simply stated that when they observed the truck at 
defendant's home, it "matched the description" given by the witnesses, without detail. Id. 
at 992 (emphasis added). In the end, this Court permitted certain inferences because the 
affidavit expressly described the characteristics of the truck as provided by the witnesses. 
Id. at 992 (recognizing that the affidavit was sufficiently specific to support that the truck 
in the driveway was that reported by the witnesses). 
The cases identified above illustrate application of the probable-cause standard in 
varying fact patterns. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (identifying varying fact patterns for 
the doctrine). The examples provide guidance as to how far a magistrate may venture in 
issuing a warrant. "An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
determining the existence of probable cause." Id at 239. A "wholly conclusory 
statement" in an affidavit will "fail[] to meet this requirement." Id Also, decisions 
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applying the totality of circumstances analysis "have consistently recognized the value of 
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work." Id. at 241. 
In this case, the court of appeals assessed all relevant considerations before 
determining that the affidavit failed to support probable cause. The court of appeals' 
analysis is correct, as further set forth below. 
C. THE SADDLER COURT APPLIED THE PROPER ANALYSIS. 
1. The United States Supreme Court and the Court in Saddler Recognized the 
Relevance of an Informant's Tip in the Fourth Amendment Analysis. 
The court of appeals complied with Gates in its review of the affidavit in this case. 
Where the United States Supreme Court considered the source of the tip, Gates , 462 U.S. 
at 230, the court of appeals did likewise. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, fflfl 1-19. 
Informants' tips are relevant to police investigations. In Gates, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the following: 
Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different 
types of persons. As we said m Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 
1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), "Informants' tips, like all other clues and 
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One 
simple rule will not cover every situation." Ibid. 
Gates. 462 U.S. at 232 (note omitted). 
Utah courts look to the specific facts of a case to assess an informant. Not all 
informants may be deemed reliable. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205-06 (recognizing that 
an identified, disinterested informant may be accorded more reliability); James. 2000 UT 
80, ^11 n.5 (recognizing that "the inherent reliability of information volunteered by a 
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citizen will usually be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a paid 
informant" under the totality-of-the-circumstances of the Fourth Amendment)2; Purser, 
828 P.2d at 517 (recognizing that an informant's reliability and veracity may vary 
depending on the circumstances of the informant and tip); M ulcahy. 943 P.2d cit 235 
(finding reliability where the citizen informant identified himself to police and was an 
uninvolved citizen who called in a detailed drunk-driving tip); Deluna. 2001 UT App 
401, THJ14-15 (finding that informants were reliable where they were mere witnesses to 
the crime, they implicated a family member in the crime, they provided their full names 
2 Although this Court dealt with "reasonable suspicion" in James., that case is 
pertinent. Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause "are commonsense, non-
technical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Ornelas v. U.S., 
517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (citing Gates). Both standards require the acting officer to 
articulate specific facts to support his/her conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Both 
standards also require application of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The 
standards differ in the burden of proof applicable to the government in justifying the 
officer's conduct. If an officer is able to articulate sufficient objective facts to support 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he may stop a citizen for a limited investigation 
that is strictly tied to the justification for the stop. See State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, IflflO-
11 999 P.2d 7; State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^ 31-32, 63 P.3d 650; James. 2000 UT 
80, f^lO ("Reasonable suspicion may be based on information provided by a citizen if that 
information, coupled with available corroboration, is sufficiently reliable under the 
totality of the circumstances"). The standard of proof for reasonable suspicion is less 
demanding than the standard for probable cause. See. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,^11. 
Notwithstanding the difference in the burdens applicable to the government, 
this Court has recognized the following: "While the required level of suspicion [for rea-
sonable suspicion] is lower than the standard required for probable cause to arrest, 'the 
same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are suffi-
cient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion.'" Kohl. 2000 UT 
35, Ifl 1; see Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, TfflO-11, 22 (considering the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis under the reasonable-suspicion standard). 
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to the affiant, thereby subjecting themselves to the risk of penalty for providing false 
information; and they came forward to the affiant with the information). 
Also, LaFave recognizes distinctions between an informant who is a member of 
the underworld or part of the criminal sector and "the average citizen who by happen-
stance finds himself in the position of a victim of or a witness to criminal conduct and 
thereafter relates to the police what he knows as a matter of civic duty. One who quali-
fies as the latter type of individual, sometimes referred to as a 'citizen-informer,' is more 
deserving of a presumption of reliability than the informant from the criminal milieu." 2 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.3 (3d 1996) (notes omitted). In order to determine 
whether an informant may be deemed reliable, a court must consider the "particular 
factual contexts" of the matter. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Conclusory statements, i.e. that 
the informant is a reliable and credible person, will not do. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. 
In this case, the court of appeals recognized that McCarthy's initial source for the 
information was a confidential informant. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, [^2. 
It is not obvious from the face of the affidavit whether the informant "was a citi-
zen- or a police-informant." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^ [14 (see R. 72-74). The 
informant "used marijuana with [Saddler] on several occasions." Saddler, 2003 UT App 
82, f|14 (see R. 72). Based on that information, "we know CI was part of the criminal 
environment, lowering his veracity and reliability." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^ 14; see 
James, 2000 UT 80, Til In . 5. 
The court of appeals also recognized that the CI provided information "'out of a ... 
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desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community/" and that 
the "CI was '[neither] promised nor paid for any of the information provided/" Saddler . 
2003 UT App 82, Tfl4. The court of appeals correctly stated that such information 
generally will "bolster[] reliability and veracity in citizen-informants". IcL However, as 
the Gates Court observed, "[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation." Gates, 462 
U.S. at 232 (cite omitted). Indeed, the conclusory statements were similar to those that 
the Gates Court cautioned against: "An officer's statement that 'affiants have received 
reliable information from a credible person and believe' that heroin is stored in a home, 
is likewise inadequate." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. The court of appeals continued its 
analysis of the informant. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ffl[14-19. 
The court recognized that the CI was anonymous. As the state asserts, "Detective 
McCarthy did not expressly indicate that he knew the identity of the informant." (State's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated May 21, 2003 ("State's Petition"), at 14; see. also 
State's Brief, 22 & 4 n.l (recognizing that even the informant's gender cannot be 
determined).) Under the totality of the circumstances, "we do not know" whether "CI 
and McCarthy met face-to-face or communicated by telephone or letter", Saddler, 2003 
UT App 82, TJ16; whether CI "told McCarthy his name," id j "whether CI had ever 
provided McCarthy [with] information before and whether this information proved 
reliable." IdL (citing Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206). And where "we do not know" whether 
CI "told McCarthy his name," "we do not know" whether he/she even "subjected himself 
to the penalty of providing false information." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,1J16. 
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In the context of this case, the "CI made no statement against penal interest. 
Although he did admit to using marijuana with Saddler on several occasions, this 
admission means nothing if CI did not reveal his identity, thus subjecting himself to the 
danger of prosecution." Id. }^18.3 In short, like an anonymous letter, the assertions in the 
3 The state has cited to U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), for the proposition that an 
informant's admission against penal interest supports reliability. (State's Brief, 14.) In 
Harris, an officer obtained a search warrant for defendant's premises based in part on 
allegations from an unnamed informant. The face of the affidavit supported the 
determination that the affiant/officer knew the informant. Specifically, the officer stated 
that on the date of the affidavit, he interviewed the informant and obtained a "sworn" 
statement from him regarding defendant's conduct. Harris. 403 U.S. at 575. Also, the 
informant admitted to the officer that he had purchased illicit whiskey for a period of 
more than two years and the informant feared for his life and safety if the officer revealed 
his identity in the affidavit for the search warrant. Id. at 575, 583. 
The warrant was issued, and then reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 576. On later 
certiorari review, the Supreme Court articulated the issue as follows: "We granted 
certiorari in this case to consider the recurring question of what showing is 
constitutionally necessary to satisfy a magistrate that there is a substantial basis for 
crediting the report of an informant known to the police , but not identified to the 
magistrate, who purports to relate his personal knowledge of criminal activity." Id. at 
575 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court stated that a bare statement from the affiant/officer that he 
believed the informant to be truthful would not provide a factual basis for crediting the 
report of an unnamed informant. Id. at 579. Also, "admissions of crime do not always 
lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another." Id. at 584. 
The Court recognized that in the factual context of Harris's case, the sworn state-
ment provided by the informant admitted major elements of a federal offense and was 
against the informant's penal interest. Thus, it carried its own indicia of reliability. Id. at 
583. Under the particular facts of Harris, the affidavit contained an "ample factual basis" 
for believing the informant's assertions, and the assertions were corroborated by the 
"affiant's own knowledge" of the defendant's criminal background. IcL at 579-80. 
The facts in Harris are distinguishable from the facts here. In this case, there is no 
basis for determining whether McCarthy even knew who the informant was. (State's 
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affidavit relating to the CI contained "nothing from which one might conclude that [the 
informant was] either honest or his information reliable." Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. 
Indeed, the state's brief identifies a central problem in the affidavit: the difficulty 
in evaluating the informant. The state refers to the matter as an "exercise" in "futility." 
(State's Brief, 19.) The lack of objective facts relating to the CI or to his or her 
association with McCarthy provides no factual context for crediting the report of the 
unidentified, confidential informant. 
Notwithstanding the "futility" of the matter, the state urges application of its own 
rigid test. The state maintains that if an anonymous drug user claims to volunteer 
information "out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit," then "like 
the majority's 'citizen informant,'" the anonymous informant's "credibility is enhanced." 
(See State's Brief, 20.) In connection with that argument the state has cited to State v. 
Brown. 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (State's Brief, 20.) There, the court of 
appeals assessed the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant based in part on 
information from an identified citizen. IcL at 285. The court stated the following: 
In the instant case, a citizen telephoned Crime Solvers, identified himself and 
volunteered information because he had a particularized interest in one of the 
children who brought marijuana from the described buildings. The informant was 
a concerned citizen, not a confidential police informant expecting some personal 
benefit from disclosing information. Therefore, his veracity should not be subject 
to rigid scrutiny. In addition, the informant claimed to have personally confronted 
Brief, 4 n.l; 22 (McCarthy did not say if he knew the informant's identity).) The CI's 
anonymous admissions of crime in this case do not lend credibility to the CI's 
accusations against another {i.e. Saddler). See. e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 584. 
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the children with baggies of marijuana and thus had personal knowledge of the 
information he supplied to police. Further boosting the informant's reliability is 
the detail with which he described the houses and greenhouse. 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 186-87 (emphasis added). The Brown court recognized that ff[c]ourts 
view the testimony of citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of 
police informers." IdL at 186. The average citizen "is not the type of informant in need 
of independent proof of reliability or veracity." Id^ (citing State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.\ cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987); State v. Harris, 
671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983)). "This is because citizen informers, unlike police 
informers, volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal 
benefit." Brown, 798 P.2d at 186. Brown is not applicable here. 
Finally, the state claims that the court of appeals' ruling in Saddler creates rules 
"that an informant must meet" to qualify for the "favored status" of citizen informant 
before they may be considered reliable. (State's Brief, 18-19.) Yet the court of appeals 
has placed no obligation on informants. In this case, since McCarthy was seeking the 
warrant, McCarthy was required to provide sufficient information to support probable 
cause. See Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ffl[8-9, 27; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 & n.18 
(1968) (requiring specific, articulable facts to support an officer's conduct under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
Surely McCarthy knew something about the CI's communications: McCarthy 
knew when he received the tip from the informant (whether it was the day before the 
investigation or months before), how he received the information (whether it was by 
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anonymous letter, email, or telephone call; or in person in a back-alley meeting or in the 
open), and how much detail the informant either did or did not provide (including 
whether the informant provided his/her name to McCarthy). 
McCarthy knew whether he met the informant in person, or whether the communi-
cation was anonymous. Yet, for whatever reason, McCarthy chose not to include the 
particular factual context of the communication in the affidavit. (R. 72-74); compare 
Harris, 403 U.S. at 575 (the affiant/officer knew the informant; he interviewed and 
obtained a sworn statement from the informant on the date of the affidavit). McCarthy 
did not disclose whether he had prior d ealings with the informant; whether he 
investigated the informant in any way; whether the informant had a history of providing 
false/true reports of criminal conduct; whether the informant had a criminal record of 
his/her own; whether the informant could be found and held accountable if his/her report 
in this case proved to be false; or whether the informant may be arrested/prosecuted as a 
result of the admissions s/he made concerning his/her own criminal conduct. (R. 72-74.) 
The affidavit reveals nothing regarding the communication or the informant. Sometime 
after McCarthy received the tip (the affidavit does not reveal how long) McCarthy 
investigated. The matter is more mysterious than the anonymous letter in Gates. 
McCarthy's decision not to include facts about the informant or the method of 
communication effectively prevented a detached magistrate from making a common-
sense, objective assessment about the matter in the particular factual context of the case. 
In this case, as in Gates, the anonymous information from the CI standing alone 
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could "not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable 
cause to believe contraband would be found" in the home. Gates , 462 U.S. at 227. 
"Something more was required." Id, The court of appeals continued its analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances in this case. 
2. The United States Supreme Court Has Recognized that an Informant's Detailed 
Description of Alleged Wrongdoing May Entitle the Tip to Greater Weight Even 
if There Are Doubts Regarding the Informant's Reliability; the Court of Appeals 
Recognized the Same in Saddler. 
According to the Supreme Court in Gates, an informant's "explicit and detailed 
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed 
first-hand, entitles [the informant's] tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the 
case." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added); id. at 234 (the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of the 
various indicia of reliability and unreliability attending the tip); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 
n.18 (1968) (stating that the demand for "specificity in the information upon which 
police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence"). 
In this case, the court of appeals assessed whether the affidavit contained facts or 
details that would verify the confidential informant's tip. See. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, 
^ 19-21 (recognizing that "an informant's veracity and reliability may be ""boosted by 
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation'" of the 
[crime]'") (citing Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206); see also Brown, 798P.2d at 288 (citing 
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Gates, 462 U.S. at 266, for the proposition that a detailed description and police 
corroboration may support probable cause). 
The court correctly observed that the affidavit lacked details. "We do not know 
the type of relationship CI had with Saddler or how often and for what purpose CI visited 
Saddler. Also, although CI says he saw marijuana, cocaine, packaging materials, and 
scales in the home, we do not know how much marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he 
saw it, or where it was located." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, [^19. Further, the affidavit 
failed to contain any facts regarding the CI's description of Saddler or the home, or of 
Saddler's routine, the hours of operation, his vehicle, clients, or clients' vehicles. Id.; 
see also id. at 1flj2-5, 21; (R. 72-75; State's Petition, 13 (stating that disclosure of 
unknowns "may very well have enhanced the reliability of the informant," but claiming 
that was not required); icL, 18 (stating "more detail may have been useful," but claiming it 
was not critical); State's Brief, 4 (stating "the CI did not describe the precise nature of 
[his/her] relationship with defendant," s/he provided generalities); id, 22 (stating that 
"unknowns" may have enhanced reliability, but claiming they were not required); see 
also id., 24 (claiming information was sufficient even though CI did not reveal "when 
she made these observations"; also stating that court of appeals did not find inferences to 
be reasonable because affidavit "was not as clear as it otherwise might have been").) 
The court of appeals also stated, "we do not know how much detail CI gave" to 
McCarthy because McCarthy failed to include specific facts in the affidavit. Saddler., 
2003 UT App 82, f21. "McCarthy provided a conclusory outline of CI's statement." Id . 
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at ^[21. Also, "we do not know anything about CI's actual description" of matters. IdL. at 
T|19. The conclusory statements in the affidavit fail to support probable cause. IdL_ at ^ |27; 
see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990 (requiring affiant to "articulate particularized facts and 
circumstances" leading to probable cause). 
The court of appeals' analysis is correct. According to the affidavit, at an unspeci-
fied time prior to McCarthy's investigation, the informant disclosed that s/he had known 
the suspect for more than a year (R. 72, Tfl); the suspect and/or informant used drugs on 
unspecified occasions and at the suspect's home (R. 72-73, Tflj2, 3, 7, 9); the CI observed 
the suspect in possession of scales, packaging material and drugs (R. 72, Tflj 4, 5, 6, 7); 
the suspect sold drugs from the home on some unspecified occasion(s) (R. 72-73, ^ 5 , 6, 
8, 12); the suspect recently purchased the home, worked part time at BACI restaurant, 
and drove a vehicle (R. 73, IfljlO, 11* 13); and the suspect was home infrequently, he kept 
"hours of operation," and he "usually" was home late in the evening. (R. 73, Tfl[13, 14.) 
The affidavit failed to indicate whether the informant disclosed how or where s/he 
observed the alleged marijuana in the home, what it looked like, or how it was packaged. 
(R. 72-74.) The allegations raised several questions: what did the CI observe beyond the 
general, unspecified use, possession and distribution of drugs and paraphernalia; when 
did s/he make his/her observations; who was present; how did events appear or transpire 
(i.e. modus operandi)', what was said and what was the CI's involvement; when did the 
CI contact McCarthy; how did s/he make contact; what did s/he disclose to McCarthy in 
detail; and why did McCarthy fail to disclose any of the details in the affidavit? 
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The allegations in the affidavit were written in the past tense, and except for the 
statement that the CI had been to the premises most recently within the last week to ten 
days apparently from the date of the tip — whenever that was — the allegations made no 
reference to time. In addition, there was no indication as to when the informant made the 
disclosures to McCarthy in order that a magistrate may put the information in a "particu-
lar factual context[]." Gates, 462 U.S. at 232; see Sadder, 2003 UT App 82, ^|21. The 
affidavit alleged general conduct under unspecified circumstances. It failed to contain 
details or descriptions of unique events and circumstances to lend credence to the tip.4 
Indeed, even the innocent allegations lacked detail. (R. 73, TJ13 (stating that the 
CI "provided a description of the home," and "a vehicle" used by Saddler)); Gates, 462 
U.S. at 232, 241-44 (stating that probable cause turns on the assessment of "particular 
factual contexts"; and recognizing that corroboration of innocent facts may support 
indicia of reliability for the tip); see Babbell 770 P.2d at 991, 992 (finding that the 
statement, "matched the description," presented the Court with a close question, but 
considering it sufficient since it referenced matters in the affidavit that were "set out 
specifically and in detail" about the truck, including the particular make, color, year, 
4 Also, the assertions in the affidavit at paragraphs 11 and 12 are improper. There, 
McCarthy claimed the informant disclosed the following: "the suspect's only legitimate 
source of income is from a part time waiter's job" at BACI restaurant, and "the suspect 
sells controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of 
income." (R. 73.) There is no indication in the affidavit as to how or why the informant 
would possess such information. The CI did not indicate that s/he learned the facts from 
Saddler or that s/he had personal knowledge of the facts; and McCarthy did not identify 
any relevant source for the information. The statements are plainly insupportable. 
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missing bumpers, cracked windshield, orange seat covers, and a stick-pin with slogan on 
the driver's visor). If the CI had identified any specific facts relevant to his/her 
observations, that may have furnished the tip with indicia of reliability. As it was, the 
observations were ambiguous. 
In the end, the trial judge considered it relevant that CI had been to the premises 
"numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, and [he/she] 
observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." (R. 72, f4; 127:12-13.) The allegation 
read in a common-sense fashion supported that the informant had visited the premises on 
numerous occasions, and during his/her visits s/he had observed 3 to 4 pounds of 
marijuana. The informant's most recent visit was within the last week to ten days prior 
to providing the tip — whenever that was. 
That is insufficient to support the probable-cause standard. See State v. 
Utterback. 485 N.W.2d 760, 767-68, 771 (Neb. 1992) (although informant "had been 
inside said residence within the last five days, and had seen a large quantity of marijuana, 
and lesser quantities of hashish, cocaine, LSD, and PCP," the affidavit was insufficient), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Johnson. 589N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1999). The 
affidavit furnishes no information whatsoever as to when the informant witnessed events 
and when s/he reported the information to McCarthy. 
In State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
stated the following: 
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[T]he unidentified informant's conclusory allegations that "Otto usually keeps the 
drugs in the gas station" and that he "witnessed Otto dealing drugs" are 
unsupported by any specific facts from which a neutral judge could independently 
derive a reasonable suspicion that a search would yield evidence of criminal 
activity. The fact that a police officer may be willing to believe the tip of an 
informant—particularly one who has been helpful on prior occasions—does not 
lessen the judge's duty to scrutinize the substance of the tip in order to weigh its 
sufficiency against the practical standard of probable cause. As Justice Jacobs 
observed in State v. Macri, [39 NJ 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963),] "Before the judge 
is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made 
aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the law was being violated." 39 NJ at 257, 188 A2& 389. 
Here, the informant's tip is a bald conclusion, allegedly based on personal 
observation, but unsupported by any reference to dates, events, or circumstances. 
Id. at 838 (emphasis added). 
Probable cause requires a degree of selectivity and accountability. General state-
ments that the suspect drives a vehicle, lives in a home, and had marijuana there at some 
time does not provide adequate assurance to support the probability that evidence of 
crime will be found on the premises. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "The affidavit must not 
be couched in conclusory terms, since the magistrate must be in a position to know the 
underlying facts in order to render his neutral judgment. Wherever a question indicates a 
factual basis for a warrant, a reviewing court must examine it carefully to determine 
whether the facts were sufficiently specific to assure that the magistrate's judgment is 
more than a rubber stamp of the officer's conclusions." State in the Interest of R.B.C., 
443 A.2d 271, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); State v. Droneburg . 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the action of the magistrate "must not be ca mere 
ratification of the bare conclusions of others'"); BabbelL 770 P.2d at 990. General 
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assertions without necessary detail raise questions and suspicions; they do not support 
"indicia of reliability." 
The state disagrees with the court of appeals' analysis, and maintains that the 
opinion in Saddler imposes "a burden of detail far greater than is required under the 
Fourth Amendment." (State's Brief, 20.) Yet the court of appeals did not impose parti-
cular detail to the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. It did not give any specific 
defect in the affidavit more weight than some other aspect of the affidavit. Indeed, a 
deficiency in one area of an affidavit may be compensated for "by a strong showing" in 
other areas or by "some other indicia of reliability." Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. In this case, 
the court of appeals engaged in a balanced assessment of the considerations supporting 
reliability (and unreliability) for the tip. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82; Gates, 462 U.S. at 
234. In that regard, while the lack of detail would not weigh in favor of reliability, it 
likewise did not end the analysis here. The court of appeals continued its analysis. 
It continued to "conscientiously review the sufficiency of [the] affidavit[] on 
which [the] warrant issued" pursuant to Gates. IcL at 239; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[22. 
3. The Supreme Court Has Recognized the Value of Police Investigations to Lend 
Credibility to an Informant's Tip; the Court of Appeals Did the Same. 
The court of appeals considered McCarthy's investigative efforts. Saddler, 2003 
UT App 82, ffl[22-26. According to the affidavit, CI disclosed that Saddler kept 
unspecified "hours of operation" (R. 73), and Saddler was home "usually during the late 
evening hours." (IdJ Based on the information, McCarthy conducted an unspecified, 
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"intermittent" surveillance. (Id.) According to the affidavit, "During the initial 
surveillance your affiant [McCarthy] did not observe[] anyone at the residence, the 
surveillance was intermittent from 2000 [8:00 p.m.] hours until 0600 [6:00 a.m.] 
6/15/00." (Id.) Based on McCarthy's statements in the affidavit, the court of appeals 
correctly recognized that "[b]etween 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., McCarthy saw nothing to 
corroborate CI's information." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,1J23. 
McCarthy then asserted that he saw "short-term traffic that he believed to be drug 
related." Id at ^|24; (R. 73). McCarthy did not say when or describe what he saw regar-
ding short-term traffic. He did not indicate why he believed it to be drug related. (R. 73-
74.) McCarthy did not reveal "how many vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether 
any of these vehicles arrived during Saddler's alleged hours of operation, [or] whether 
any of these vehicles or their drivers were described by CI". Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, 
[^24. McCarthy provided "conclusory information about his corroborative effort." I JL 
Next, when McCarthy observed an unspecified car "leaving" the home (R. 73 (no 
indication that McCarthy saw the car arrive or that McCarthy observed the driver make 
contact with anyone at the home)), McCarthy requested that officers from West Valley 
City perform a traffic stop on the car. The officers performed the stop and arrested the 
driver, Oba Tramel, on outstanding warrants. At some point, the officers located one-
half ounce of marijuana in Tramefs possession. (R. 73-74.) 
According to the state's brief here, the marijuana was located "on the driver's 
person." (State's Brief, 5, 15, 26.) Yet the affidavit does not specify where the mari-
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juana was located. (R. 73-74 (stating that Tramel was "later found to be in possession of 
marijuana").) McCarthy did not indicate in the affidavit whether he was present when 
officer's discovered the marijuana, and he did not identify — or attach a copy of the 
report from — the officer who made the discovery. (See id.) Thus, for all McCarthy 
revealed, the marijuana may have been sewn inside the lining of a jacket or glued in the 
sole of a shoe; it may have been in a bill fold belonging to Tramel in the glove box or in 
a sunglass case in the console of the car. The affidavit did not say. Also, it did not say 
how the marijuana may be related to Saddler or the house. (R. 72-74.) 
Next, McCarthy stated that he assisted with a search of Tramel's car. "[A] small 
section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appear[ed] to have residue of cocaine 
inside a twist section of the bag." (R. 73.) Although McCarthy apparently discovered 
the plastic section, he did not indicate where it was located or how it related to his inves-
tigation of Saddler. (R. 73-74.) He did not say if it was wedged between the back seats, 
in an ash tray, or in the trunk of the car. (Id.) Since McCarthy did not observe Tramel 
outside the car at the residence, those facts would have been relevant to a m agistrate 
making an objective, conscientious assessment of the affidavit for probable cause. 
Likewise, McCarthy did not indicate whether Oba Tramel was someone who was 
described by the CI as involved in drugs, or whether Tramel was "driving a vehicle 
described by CI, or how long the stopped person was at Saddler's home." Saddler, 2003 
UT App 82, T[24. McCarthy provided only vague assertions. 
Also, according to the affidavit, Saddler worked at a restaurant part time. (R. 73.) 
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As part of the investigation, McCarthy "checked" the restaurant at some point on 
"6/15/00" and determined Saddler was not there. (R. 74.) It is not clear whether 
McCarthy simply drove by the restaurant and perhaps saw it closed, or whether he 
actually spoke to someone. The court of appeals considered the assertion to be vague, 
and stated the following. 
[McCarthy] learned Saddler was not at work and the person he spoke to did not 
know when Saddler was scheduled to work next. With more detail, this 
information may have provided important corroborative detail. However, as is, the 
information is practically useless. Although McCarthy established that Saddler 
worked at BACTs, we do not know who McCarthy spoke to or whether that 
person was in a position to know Saddler's schedule. We also do not know 
whether the person McCarthy spoke to thought it was unusual that Saddler was 
not currently at work or whether the person thought Saddler's work schedule in 
general was unusual. 
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^ |26; (R. 74). Without more information here, it is unclear as 
to whether McCarthy was able to confirm one way or another even innocent information 
relating to Saddler's employment as reported by the informant. 
Also, McCarthy did not indicate why he felt compelled to check for Saddler at the 
restaurant on June 15. (R. 74.) Since the affidavit did not indicate whether McCarthy 
saw Saddler (or anyone) at the house during his surveillance, he likely went to the 
restaurant to determine if Saddler was there. The affidavit in that regard is unclear. 
In Gates, the officers' investigations played a valuable role in the analysis. Gates., 
462 U.S. at 241-45. The corroboration of unique circumstances relating to defendants' 
drug trafficking and to their future activities provided indicia of reliability for the 
anonymous tip. Id. 
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The agencies in Gates confirmed Lance's particular flight arrangements, and they 
observed him along the way as he flew from Chicago to Florida and went to a motel for a 
car that was waiting for him as predicted by the letter. Id. at 226. Agents observed 
Lance as he went to a room that was registered to Susan, and they observed Lance as he 
left with a woman at 7:00 the next morning directly for Chicago, all as predicted in the 
anonymous letter. Id, at 225-26. In Gates, several agencies banded together to check 
innocent facts and to corroborate unique circumstances as particularly set forth and 
predicted in the letter. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-4. Also, the investigating efforts were 
detailed in the affidavit. IcL at 226. The corroboration of innocent facts gave credibility 
to the anonymous tip of criminal conduct. 
The particular factual context of Gates is distinguishable from this matter. In this 
case, the anonymous tip as set forth in the affidavit was vague and conclusory. The affi-
davit does not say whether the informant disclosed particular facts about criminal 
conduct that may be confirmed or particular facts about innocent matters, i.e. a 
description of Saddler, of the house, or of the car, and/or the name of the person it was 
registered to. (R. 72-74.) 
Also, the intermittent surveillance added nothing to the analysis. McCarthy did 
not corroborate innocent or relevant facts to support indicia of reliability for the 
anonymous tip. He did not ascertain if Saddler owned the home, or was at home during 
the surveillance, he did not make any specific observations about the vehicle on the 
premises, except that it was registered "as described," and he learned nothing about 
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Saddler's employment. (R. 72-74); BabbelL 770 P.2d at 992 (considering the phrase 
"matched the description" to be a close question, but approved where the affidavit 
otherwise contained a specifically detailed description of the truck). McCarthy did not 
even say if he observed anyone inside the house during his surveillance. Instead, 
McCarthy made an ambiguous reference to "some short term traffic." (R. 73.) 
With respect to Oba Tramel, McCarthy did not observe him make contact with 
anyone at the residence or even get out of the car. Rather, McCarthy saw TrameFs car 
leave. (R. 73.) That does not corroborate anything about Saddler or the home. The 
conclusory allegations fail to reflect the factual and practical considerations necessary to 
a magistrate in assessing the matter under an objective standard. 
In this case, the court of appeals correctly determined that under the total circum-
stances, the affidavit failed to support probable cause. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, f27. 
4. Other Considerations Relevant to the Analysis Fail to Support Probable Cause. 
Finally, in this case McCarthy chose not to disclose specific facts that were known 
to him about the informant, the tip, and the intermittent surveillance. This Court has 
warned against such affidavits in Babbell. There, it stated the following: 
Although we conclude that the magistrate did not err in finding the affidavit suf-
ficient, we must observe that this is a very close question. If the affidavit were 
more vague, we might well reach the opposite conclusion. Judges should be reluc-
tant to base a probable cause determination on so poorly drafted an affidavit. The 
better approach would be to require that an affiant take the simple but critical 
additional step of clearly and unambiguously stating how the vehicle matches the 
detailed description obtained from witnesses. A few short minutes spent in more 
carefully preparing this affidavit would have ensured the protection of the 
40 
accused's constitutional rights while saving a substantial amount of time for the 
courts and parties. 
Babbell 770 P.2d at 992 n.3. 
In Gates, the officers did not provide vague assertions about the tip or how, when, 
or where it was obtained, Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26; they did not engage in abstract 
investigations with conclusory allegations. Rather, the detective who prepared the 
affidavit specifically included a copy of the anonymous letter, and he revealed in the 
affidavit when he received the tip and the specifics regarding the agencies' corroborative 
efforts. The affidavit contained facts about the investigation, including, for example, that 
officers observed Lance Gates leave the motel in Florida at 7:00 a.m. on May 6 with a 
woman in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates belonging to a Hornet station wagon. 
Id. at 226. The affidavit identified the Mercury's route, and it specifically disclosed what 
officers knew about the events in order that the detached magistrate could objectively 
assess matters based on the particular factual context of the case. IdL 
The same cannot be said of the affidavit that McCarthy submitted in this case. 
Any details about the CI, the tip, or the intermittent surveillance were known only to 
McCarthy. He did not divulge the particular facts; he did not say how, when, where, or 
whether he came into contact with the informant; he did not say whether the informant 
provided any detailed descriptions of criminal events (i.e. a particular modus operandi), 
or of innocent facts (including, e.g., a description of the car used by Saddler, with color, 
year, model, make or license plates). McCarthy did not disclose whether the informant's 
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tip amounted only to vague generalities, or whether there was more to the matter. 
Also, while McCarthy should have been able to provide detail about his own 
intermittent surveillance, he failed to do even that. He did not identify "innocent" facts 
in the affidavit: that is, whether he was able to confirm that Saddler owned the house, or 
even a description of the car. While McCarthy reported "some" "short term traffic," he 
did not specify what he observed, when he observed it or what it entailed. He indicated 
that he believed the traffic was drug related without providing any particular factual con-
text for the matter. (R. 73-74.) He did not indicate whether he observed a "visitor" make 
contact with anyone at the home. (Id.) Indeed he did not say if he could confirm that 
Saddler was at the residence that evening, or if he knew what Saddler looked like. (Id.) 
McCarthy stated that during his intermittent surveillance, he observed nothing, 
and/or he observed a car leave. (R. 73-74.) He did not say whether or when he saw the 
car arrive or whether the driver got out of the car. (Id.) McCarthy stated that the driver 
ultimately was arrested, and during a search marijuana was found. McCarthy did not say 
who from West Valley police arrested Oba Tramel or where they purportedly found the 
marijuana. (Id.) Likewise, McCarthy did not identify — or attach a report from — the 
officer who purportedly made the arrest and discovery. (Id.) 
According to the affidavit, McCarthy ultimately joined in a search of the car. (R. 
73.) He located a section of plastic bag. Surely he knew where he located the bag, yet he 
did not disclose that in the affidavit. (R. 73.) Likewise, he did not say how or whether 
the section of bag or the marijuana could somehow be connected to Saddler or the house. 
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Thereafter, McCarthy further investigated Saddler's whereabouts. He did not say 
why that was necessary. Saddler was not at work during the investigation on June 15; 
McCarthy did not say if Saddler was home. (R. 73-74.) The vague assertions do not 
lend credibility to the matter. 
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is 
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws [the 
officers] can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must 
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular cir-
cumstances." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. An officer must present sufficient facts to a neutral, 
detached magistrate to allow that magistrate to assess the matter under an objective 
standard. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a 
magistrate properly issued a warrant based on an anonymous tip corroborated in relevant 
respects by officers. See Gates. 462 U.S. at 217. There, the tip of criminal conduct 
together with the facts of the corroboration supported probable cause. Here, the anony-
mous tip lacks any corroboration to speak of. McCarthy failed to identify any innocent 
facts that would lend credibility to the anonymous report; he also failed to corroborate 
allegations of suspicious conduct. In the end, the affidavit contains only anonymous 
vague information, and sloppy detective work. That is insufficient. 
The magistrate here failed to demand the particular, objective facts. Instead, he 
abdicated his neutral assessment of the matter to McCarthy's subjective and ambiguous 
43 
interpretation of the matter. That is unconstitutional. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Under a 
practical, common-sense assessment of the total circumstances, the anonymous tip and 
vague assertions regarding McCarthy's corroborative efforts cannot support probable 
cause. The court of appeals' ruling was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Saddler respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the court of appeals' ruling in Saddler. 
SUBMITTED this ^*day of W t o u O ^
 A , 2004. 
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LINDA M. JONES 
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where: (1) there is no evidence to establish a 
causal connection, thus leaving causation to 
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable per-
sons could not differ on the inferences to be 
derived from the evidence on proximate cau-
sation." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 
820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct.App.1991), affd, 
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
[22] 1126 Utah is a comparative negli-
gence state. Thus, "[e]ven though [Rose] 
may have been negligent, [a directed verdict] 
is [ordinarily] an altogether inappropriate 
procedure for assessing [his] degree of negli-
gence against the negligence of the defen-
dants." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
728 (Utah 1985). 
[23] 1127 At trial, Rose testified that al-
though he had previously patronized the Bar-
rientoses' restaurant, he had not ridden 
through the "back" part of the parking lot. 
Rose further testified that he proceeded 
slightly ahead of his wife through the lot at 
about ten miles per hour. Although it is 
unclear from what point, Rose and his wife 
testified that the asphalted planter strip ap-
peared to be a driveway that ran straight to 
the road. Some of the photo exhibits indi-
cate a concrete pedestrian bridge a few feet 
from the driveway, but it is unclear whether 
either Rose or his wife saw the bridge. Rose 
testified that when he approached the side-
walk between the parking lot and the as-
phalted planter strip, he looked left around a 
"blind" corner for traffic. Rose's wife testi-
fied that as Rose was crossing the sidewalk, 
she yelled, "Watch out!" Rose testified that 
he believed a car was coming and continued 
to look left for cars. He testified that he did 
not recall seeing the ditch and he did not 
apply his brakes. Although Rose rode into 
the ditch, his wife testified that she was able 
to turn her bike and stop without riding into 
the ditch. 
U28 Although the evidence may suggest 
Rose negligently failed to keep a proper look-
out, the evidence presented was sufficient to 
raise "[a] question of fact for the jury . . . as 
to whether his distribution of attention was 
reasonable." Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 
224, 265 P.2d 401, 404 (1953). Further, a 
jury could find that a bicyclist could reason-
ably choose to exit over an apparent drive-
way rather than a pedestrian bridge. Be-
cause "reasonable persons could . . . differ on 
the inferences to be derived from the evi-
dence on proximate causation," Steffensen, 
820 P.2d at 487, we conclude proximate cause 
presented a jury question. 
CONCLUSION 
11 29 In sum, we conclude Rose presented 
sufficient evidence on each element to estab-
lish a prima facie case of negligence. We 
therefore reverse the directed verdicts in 
favor of the Barrientoses and the City and 
remand. 
H 30 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge and WILLIAM A. 
THORNE JR., Judge. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Anthony A. SADDLER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20020119-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 20, 2003. 
Defendant pleaded guilty and was con-
victed in the District Court, West Valley 
Department, Terry Christiansen, J., of un-
lawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that 
affidavit based on information provided by 
confidential informant did not establish prob-
able cause to search defendant's home, ab-
sent a showing of informant's veracity and 
reliability. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1026 Utah 67 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
Billings, Associate P.J., dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <S=*1139,1158(2) 
On review of whether affidavit provided 
probable cause to issue search warrant, an 
appellate court is bound by the contents of 
the affidavit, and it therefore does not need 
to defer to the trial court's finding, but rath-
er it makes an independent review of the 
trial court's determination of the sufficiency 
of the written evidence. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
2. Criminal Law ®=>1139,1158(2) 
On review of whether affidavit provided 
probable cause to issue search warrant, the 
Fourth Amendment does not require that the 
reviewing court conduct a de novo review of 
the magistrate's probable cause determina-
tion; instead, it requires only that the review-
ing court conclude that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for determining that proba-
ble cause existed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(2) 
Reviewing court pays great deference to 
the magistrate's determination that probable 
cause existed to issue search warrant. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law <S=>1158(2) 
On review of whether affidavit provided 
probable cause to issue search warrant, the 
appellate court will not give deference to the 
magistrate if there is no substantial basis for 
determining that probable cause existed. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Controlled Substances <^ =>148(4) 
Affidavit based on information provided 
by confidential informant did not establish 
probable cause to search defendant's home 
for evidence of unlawful possession of a con-
trolled substance, absent a showing of infor-
mant's veracity and reliability; it was not 
known whether information was provided for 
pecuniary gain, informant had obtained infor-
mation while engaged in criminal activity, it 
was not known whether police were aware of 
informant's identity, informant made no 
statement against penal interest, affidavit 
contained only a conclusory outline of infor-
mant's statements and alleged observations, 
and officer's surveillance of defendant's home 
did not corroborate informant's information. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures @=>H1 
When a search warrant is issued on the 
basis of an affidavit, that affidavit must cow-
tain specific facts sufficient to support a de-
termination by a neutral magistrate that 
probable cause exists. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures <3=>111 
Utah courts employ the "totality-of-the-
circumstances test" to determine the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit supporting a search 
warrant. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
8. Searches and Seizures < =^>113.1 
Probable cause to issue a search warrant 
is determined by a magistrate who makes a 
practical common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit, there is a fair probability that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
9. Searches and Seizures ^ 1 1 7 
Where information obtained from an in-
formant is the primary support for a search 
warrant, an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances requires the court to consider 
three factors in determining probable cause: 
(1) the type of tip or informant involved; (2) 
whether the informant gave enough detail 
about the observed criminal activity to sup-
port a warrant; and (3) whether the police 
officer independently confirms the infor-
mant's information. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
10. Searches and Seizures <s=>115.1 
Not all informant tips are of equal value 
in establishing probable cause to support a 
search warrant. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
11. Searches and Seizures <3=>117 
Factors to consider in determining 
whether probable cause exists to support a 
search warrant based on an informant's np 
include the informant's veracity, reliability 
STATE v. SADDLER 
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and basivS of knowledge. 
Amend. 4. 
12. Searches and Seizures <s>117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, satisfaction of basis 
of knowledge portion of totality of the cir-
cumstances test does not alone establish 
probable cause in the absence of information 
concerning informant's veracity and reliabili-
ty; while basis of knowledge tells the court 
how informant acquired his information, it 
does not tell whether he was qualified to 
assess the information, whether he relayed 
the information accurately, or whether he is 
trustworthy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
13. Searches and Seizures <3>117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, the basis of knowl-
edge portion of totality of the circumstances 
test is satisfied where the informant speaks 
from personal observation. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
14. Searches and Seizures <3>117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, generally, an ordi-
nary citizen-informant needs no independent 
proof of reliability or veracity when he re-
lates to the police what he knows as a matter 
of civic duty; however, a police-informant 
who gains information through involvement 
in criminal activity or who is motivated by 
pecuniary gain is lower on the reliability 
scale. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
15. Searches and Seizures ^ H S 
Because an anonymous caller's basis of 
knowledge and veracity are typically un-
known, anonymous tips are toward the low-
end of the reliability scale for purposes of 
establishing probable cause to support search 
warrant; informants who give their full 
names, thus subjecting themselves to a pen-
alty for providing false information, are more 
reliable than informants who hide behind the 
cloak of telephonic or other anonymity so 
&at their identities cannot be traced. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
U.S.CA. Const. 16. Searches and Seizures <2>117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, an informant's relia-
bility and veracity are improved where he 
provides information against his penal inter-
est. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
17. Searches and Seizures o»117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, an informant's ve-
racity and reliability may be boosted by the 
detail with which the informant described his 
personal observation of the crime. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
18. Searches and Seizures (3=>111 
A search warrant cannot issue solely on 
the strength of a mere conclusory statement 
that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at 
all for making a judgment regarding proba-
ble cause. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
19. Searches and Seizures <£=>105.1 
Judges should be reluctant to base a 
probable cause determination on poorly 
drafted affidavits. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
20. Searches and Seizures @=*121.1 
Where affidavit offered in support of 
search warrant properly recites facts indicat-
ing activity of a protracted and continuous 
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of 
time becomes less significant. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
21. Searches and Seizures <§=*117 
In an analysis to determine whether an 
informant's tip provided probable cause to 
support search warrant, the independent po-
lice corroboration portion of totality of the 
circumstances test means, in light of the 
circumstances, the officer confirms enough 
facts so that he may reasonably conclude that 
the information provided is reliable. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
22. Searches and Seizures <£=>117 
To satisfy the independent police corrob-
oration portion of totality of the circum-
stances test in an analysis to determine 
whether an informant's tip provided probable 
cause to support search warrant, a police 
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officer may corroborate the tip either by 
observing the illegal activity or by finding 
the material facts substantially as described 
by the informant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
23. Criminal Law <3=>1162 
An error amounting to a violation of the 
federal constitution requires reversal unless 
it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Linda M. Jones and Shannon N. Romero, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and 
Jeffrey T. Colemere, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, Associate Presiding 
Judge, DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
H 1 Anthony A. Saddler (Saddler) appeals 
his conviction for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp.2000). Saddler 
challenges the trial court's order denying his 
motion to suppress evidence and upholding 
the constitutionality of the search warrant. 
We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
112 On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill 
McCarthy (McCarthy) obtained a warrant to 
search Saddler's residence for marijuana, co-
caine, and related items. In issuing the 
search warrant, the magistrate relied on an 
affidavit provided by McCarthy, who pre-
pared the affidavit using information from a 
confidential informant (CI). The affidavit es-
tablished McCarthy's nineteen years of gen-
eral police experience and his specific experi-
ence and training in narcotics investigation. 
It also stated UC1 has not been promised nor 
paid for any of the information provided,'1 
and claimed "CI . . . provided the informa-
tion out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop 
the sales and usage of controlled substances 
into the community." Further, it requested 
"the courts not . . . require [McCarthy] to 
publish the CFs name," for McCarthy l<be-
lieve[d] .. the CI [could] be harmed if CFs 
name were published." 
113 According to the affidavit, CI told 
McCarthy the following: 
CI has known the suspect, Saddler for 
over one year; 
CI has observed the suspect use cocaine 
and marijuana on numerous occasions dur-
ing the last year; 
CI has used marijuana with the suspect 
on several occasions; 
CI has been to the premises numerous 
times, the most recent being within the 
last week to ten days, and observed ap-
proximately three to four pounds of mari-
juana; 
CI has observed three scales inside the 
home, that the suspect uses to weigh out 
repackaged marijuana for resale; 
CI has observed cocaine inside the 
premises, along with packaging material; 
CI has observed the suspect carry mari-
juana and cocaine on his person; 
The suspect has told CI that the suspect 
sells marijuana and cocaine; 
CI has observed the suspect sell and use 
controlled substances, inside the named 
premises; 
CI has been told by the suspect that the 
suspect recently purchased the listed 
premises; 
CI states that the suspect's only legiti-
mate source of income is from a part-time 
waiter's job at a Salt Lake City restaurant, 
BACFs; 
CI states that the suspect sells con-
trolled substances to be able to afford his 
own usage and as a separate source of 
income; 
CI provided a description of the home, a 
vehicle frequently used by the suspect (fe-
male companion of suspect), and hour's of 
operation for the suspect; 
CI states that the suspect is home infre-
quently and usually during the late eve-
ning hours. 
U 4 The affidavit also describes McCarthy's 
corroboration efforts. On June 14 and 15, 
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2000, McCarthy conducted surveillance of omitted), cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. 
Saddler's home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 Instead, " 'we make an independent review of 
a.m. and did not observe anyone. At an the trial court's determination of the suffi-
unspecified time on June 15, McCarthy ob- ciency of the written evidence.'" Id. (quot-
served some "short term traffic," which he ing State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah 
believed was "drug related." West Valley Ct.App.1991)). "However, 'the [F]ourth 
Police stopped one of the vehicles leaving the [Ajmendment does not require that the re-
premises and found the driver in possession viewing court conduct a de novo review of the 
of one-half ounce of marijuana. Police found magistrate's probable cause determination!.] 
no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or on [I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing 
the driver's person, which indicated to court conclude "that the magistrate had a 
McCarthy "the marijuana was purchased substantial basis for . . . [determining] that 
from [Saddler's] premises." probable cause existed." ' " Id. (alterations 
15 McCarthy also "observed vehicles de- i n original) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 
scribed by CI at [Saddler's] premises and the R 2 d 987> 9 9 1 <U t a h 1989> (quoting Illinois v. 
registered owner was a[sic] described by CI." Gates> 4 6 2 u- s- 2 1 3 ' 238> 1 0 3 S - C t 2 3 1 7 ' 
Finally, McCarthy checked BACI's restau- 2332> 7 6 L-Ed.2d 527 (1983))). We therefore 
rant on June 15, and Saddler "was not at "Pay ^ e a t deference to the magistrate's de-
work and it was unknown when he was termination." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 
scheduled to return." «B3 (Utah Ct.App.1994).* 
U6 After obtaining and executing the 
search warrant, on June 15, police seized 
approximately ten ounces of marijuana and 
one gram of cocaine, along with drug packag-
ing material, triple beam scales, and $478.00 
in cash. Saddler subsequently filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence. After the trial 
court denied the motion. Saddler pleaded 
guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, condition-
al upon his right to appeal the suppression 
issue. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-
39 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1-4] 11 7 The sole issue is whether the 
trial court erred by denying Saddler's motion 
to suppress evidence and concluding McCar-
thy's affidavit established probable cause to 
search Saddler's residence. "[T]his court, 
like the reviewing court below, is bound by 
the contents of the affidavit, we therefore 
need not defer to the trial court's find-
ing. . . . " State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,-
19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation 
!• The dissent is concerned that we do not give 
sufficient deference to the magistrate's determi-
nation "We pav great deference to the magis-
trate's deteimination," State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 
1030. 1033 (Utah Ct.App.1994), because " '[a] 
grudging or negative attitude toward warrants is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference tor searches conducted pursu-
ANALYSIS 
[5-8] 118 Saddler argues McCarthy's affi-
davit supporting the search warrant did not 
establish probable cause for the search. We 
agree. 
f 9 The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees that "no 
[wjarrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause." U.S. Const, amend. IV. u[W]hen a 
search warrant is issued on the basis of an 
affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific 
facts sufficient to support a determination by 
a neutral magistrate that probable cause ex-
ists." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990 
(Utah 1989). "It is well settled that Utah 
courts employ the 'totality-of-the-circum-
stances test' articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) to determine the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit supporting a search 
warrant." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 
(Utah Ct.App.1994). Thus, "[p]robable cause 
is determined by a magistrate who *make[s] a 
practical common-sense decision whether, 
ant to a warrant ' " State v. Deluna, 2001 UT 
App 401,11 10, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 
Utah LEXIS 150 (citation omitted). However, 
our preference for warrants does not extend to 
warrants that are not based on probable cause. 
We will not give deference to the magistrate if 
there is no "substantial basis for . [determin-
ing] that probable cause existed." Id. at H 9 
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given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit!.,] . there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.' " Id. (second 
alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 
2332). 
[9J f 10 "Where, as here, information ob-
tained from [an| informant!.] is the primary 
support for the search warrant, an analysis 
of the totality of the circumstances requires 
us to consider the three factors articulated 
by this court in Kaysvdie City v. Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct.App.1997):' 
State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1111, 40 
P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 
150; see State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 
332,111116-17, 37 P.3d 260 (extending applica-
tion of Mulcahy factors to probable cause 
determinations). We now7 consider those 
three factors. 
1. Type of Informant/Basis of Knowledge 
110,111 1111 The first factor is "the type 
of tip or informant involved.'' Kaysville City 
v Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct.App. 
1997). "After all, '[n]ot all tips are of equal 
value in establishing [probable cause].' " Id. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
"Factors to consider in determining whether 
probable cause exists include an informant's 
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge." 
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (other citations omitted); 
see also State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 
1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("Although the ve-
racity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of 
confidential informants are no longer strict 
prerequisites for establishing probable cause, 
they are still relevant considerations, among 
others, in determining the existence of prob-
able cause under a totality-of-the-circum-
stances." (quotations and citations omitted)). 
2. The dissent argues that we dismiss the basis oi 
knowledge poition too quicklv in out analysis of 
the totality of the cneumstances This is not 
true We acknowledge that the basis of knowl-
edge portion of the test is satisfied However, 
the basis of knowledge portion alone does not 
establish probable cause HI the absence oi inioi-
[12,13] 1112 In this case, the basis of 
knowledge portion is satisfied.2 Basis of 
knowledge is satisfied where the informant 
speaks from personal observation. See 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Here, the affidavit 
sets forth information based on CFs personal 
observations. For instance, the affidavit 
notes that CI "observed [Saddler] use co-
caine and marijuana," "observed approx. 3 to 
4 pounds of marijuana," and "observed co-
caine inside [Saddler's] premises." 
[14] 1113 However, the veracity and relia-
bility portions are not satisfied. Generally, 
"an ordinary citizen-informam needs no inde-
pendent proof of reliability or veracity." 
State v. Deluva, 2001 UT App 401,114, 40 
P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 
150 (quotations and citations omitted). A 
citizen-informant is "an average citizen wrho 
is in a position to supply information by 
virtue of having been a crime victim or wit-
ness." State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quotations and citations 
omitted). Such an informant "thereafter re-
lates to the police what he knows as a matter 
of civic duty." State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 2L6, 
219 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (quotations and ci-
tations omitted) (cited for this proposition by 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n. 2). Alternative-
ly, a police-informant (or criminal-informant) 
is "one who gains information through in-
volvement in criminal activity or wTho is 
' "motivated by pecuniary gain," '" and 
thus is "lower on the reliability scale." Mul-
cahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n. 2 (quoting Evans, 
692 So.2d at 219). 
1114 In this case, wre do not know whether 
CI was a citizen- or a police-informant. 
However, we do know that CI "used marijua-
na with [Saddler] on several occasions." 
Thus, we knowT CI was part of the criminal 
environment, lowering his veracity and relia-
bility. We also know that CI "provided the 
information out of a . desire to stop the 
sales and usage of controlled substances into 
the community," and that CI wTas "[neither] 
mation concerning CI's veracity and reliability. 
While basis of knowledge tells us how CI ac-
quired his information, it does not tell us wheth-
er he was qualified to assess the information, 
whether he lelaved the lnlormation accurately, 
or whether he is trustworlhv 
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promised nor paid for any of the information 
provided." Although this information bol-
sters reliability and veracity in citizen-infor-
mants, see Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (assuming 
reliability and veracity for citizen-informant 
who volunteered the information and "re-
ceiveLdJ nothing from police in exchange for 
the information"), we do not know whether 
CI qualified as a citizen-informant or volun-
teered the information to police. Further, 
we fail to see how the conclusory statement 
that CI is providing the information out of a 
sense of guilt and a desire to stop the sale of 
controlled substances significantly bolsters 
his veracity and reliability when he is a par-
ticipant in the criminal environment and has 
not indicated a remorse for his past partic-
ipation or a determination to avoid future 
involvement. See People v. Kershaw, 147 
Cal.App.3d 750, 195 Cal.Rptr. 311, 314 (1983) 
(noting that informants who are "criminals, 
drug addicts or professional 'stool pigeons'" 
may be motivated to volunteer information 
not only for promises or payments, but also 
for "revenge or the hope of eliminating crimi-
nal competition"), superceded by statute on 
other grounds, People v. Burch, 188 Cal. 
App.3d 172, 232 Cal.Rptr. 502 (1986). 
[15] 1115 Also important to veracity and 
reliability is whether the informant is anony-
mous. " 4[B]ecause an anonymous caller's 
basis of knowledge and veracity are typically 
unknown/ anonymous tips are toward 'the 
low-end of the reliability scale.' " Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d at 235 (citation omitted). Infor-
mants who "g[i]ve their full names," thus 
"subject[ingl themselves to a penalty for pro-
viding false information," Deluna, 2001 UT 
App 401 at 1115, 40 P.3d 1136, are more 
reliable than informants who "hid[e] behind 
the cloak of telephonic [or other] anonymity" 
so that their identities cannot be traced. 
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 
(Minn.1990). 
1116 Here, we do not know whether CI and 
McCarthy met face-to-face or communicated 
by telephone or letter. Consequently, we do 
3. The State argues that we should defer to the 
trial court's inference that CI was not anony-
mous See Stale v Babbell, 770 P 2d 987. 992 
(Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affi-
davit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable 
construction ' of that ambiguity) We disagree 
not know whether McCarthy ever, using his 
police training and experience, had the op-
portunity to evaluate CFs truthfulness. We 
also do not know whether CI told McCarthy 
his name/1 Consequently, we do not know 
whether CI subjected himself to the penalty 
of providing false information. Similarly, we 
do not know whether CI had ever provided 
McCarthy information before and whether 
this information proved reliable. See State v. 
Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (not-
ing that information in the affidavit showing 
"the informant had previously given truthful 
information to the police concerning the exis-
tence of contraband" is "an accepted method 
for establishing an informant's veracity"). 
[16] 1117 Next, an informant's reliability 
and veracity are improved where he provides 
information against his penal interest. See 
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 9l 
S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (hold-
ing statements "against the informant's penal 
interest" "carr[ied] their own indicia of credi-
bility"); In re Shon Daniel K, 125 N.M. 219, 
959 P.2d 553, 558 (Ct.App.1998) (noting state-
ments against penal interest are one indica-
tion of informant reliability). 
U 18 Here, CI made no statement against 
penal interest. Although he did admit to 
using marijuana with Saddler on several oc-
casions, this admission means nothing if CI 
did not reveal his identity, thus subjecting 
himself to the danger of prosecution. Fur-
thermore, even if we knew CFs identity, his 
statement would still not be an admission 
against penal interest because there is no 
other evidence against him. See State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 n. 24 (Utah 
1993) (noting the "corpus delicti rule states 
that a person may not be convicted of a 
crime if no independent evidence, outside of 
the defendant's own statement, exists"). 
[17] 1119 Finally, an informant's veracity 
and reliability may be " 'boosted by the detail 
with which the informant described his per-
It is not reasonable to infer, without more infor-
mation, that CI, who was too afraid to allow his 
name to be published in the aftidavit, was not 
also too afraid to give his name to the police 
officer drafting the affidavit. 
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sonal observation' of the [crime]." Bailey, 
675 P.2d at 1206. Here, the affidavit provides 
little more than an outline of what CI told 
McCarthy. We do not know the type of 
relationship CI had with Saddler or how 
often and for what purpose CI visited Sad-
dler. Also, although CI says he saw marijua-
na, cocaine, packaging materials, and scales 
in the home, we do not know how much 
marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he saw 
it, or where it was located.4 Finally, aside 
from the conclusory statement that CI pro-
vided a description of the home, a vehicle 
frequently used by Saddler, and Saddler's 
hours of operation, we do not know anything 
about CI's actual description of these facts. 
II. Information Detail 
[18,19] 1120 "The second Mulcahy factor 
we must consider is whether 'the informant 
gave enough detail about the observed crimi-
nal activity to support a [warrant].' " State 
v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1119, 40 P.3d 
1136 (alteration in original) (citation omitted), 
cerL denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. "It is 
well established that a warrant cannot issue 
solely on the strength of 'a mere conclusory 
statement that gives the magistrate virtually 
no basis at all for making a judgment regard-
ing probable cause.' " State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). 
Moreover, judges should be reluctant to base 
a probable cause determination on poorly 
drafted affidavits. See id. at 992 n. 3 (noting 
the finding of probable cause was "a very 
close question" where the affidavit included 
the witnesses' description of a truck but not 
4. We know that at some point, CI observed what 
he described as three to four pounds of marijua-
na at Saddler's premises. However, we do not 
know when CI made this observation. Although 
the affidavit says CI had been to the house within 
the last seven to ten days, wc cannot reasonably 
infer that it was during this visit that CI saw the 
marijuana 
5. The State argues that probable cause exists 
even though the affidavit fails to provide specific 
dates and time periods because it establishes a 
course of conduct. We disagree. " '[Wjhere the 
affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity 
of a protracted and continuous nature, a course 
of conduct, the passage of time becomes less 
significant.' " Stale v. Siromberg, 783 P.2d 54. 
57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citation omitted). Al-
though CI uses the picsent tense to sav Saddler 
the officer's description of the truck he said 
matched the witnesses' description). "The 
better approach would be to require that an 
affiant take the simple but critical additional 
step of clearly and unambiguously stating" 
the detail provided by the informant. Id. "A 
few short minutes spent in more carefully 
preparing [an] affidavit would have ensured 
the protection of the accused's constitutional 
rights while saving a substantial amount of 
time for the courts and parties." Id. 
[20] 1121 Here, we do not know how 
much detail CI gave. Rather than provide a 
detailed description of CI's statement in the 
affidavit, McCarthy provided a conclusory 
outline of CI's statement. We do not know 
how CI knew Saddler or when and how often 
CI visited Saddler's residence. Nor do we 
know how often or how recently CI observed 
controlled substances in Saddler's residence.5 
We also do not know what detail CI gave 
about Saddler's residence, routine, hours of 
operation, vehicles, clients, or clients' vehi-
cles.6 
III. Confirmation by Police Officer 
[21,22] 1122 "The final Mulcahy factor is 
whether the police officer independently con-
firms the informants' information." State v. 
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1120, 40 P.3d 1136, 
cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Corrob-
oration "means, in light of the circumstances, 
[the officer] confirms enough facts so that he 
may reasonably conclude that the informa-
tion provided is reliable." Kay sH lie City v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct.App. 
"sells controlled substances," see Slaw v. Ander-
ton, 668 P.2d 1258. 1261 (Utah 1983) (holding 
information in search warrant not stale because 
the language used was "couched m the pres-
ent tense which desciibes ongoing criminal con-
duct "), CI only talks about Saddler using and 
selling controlled substances fiom his home in 
the past tense and docs not pro\idc sufficient 
detail for us to ascertain whether the activity was 
of a protracted and continuous nature. 
6. We do know CI said Saddler was home infre-
quently and usually during the late evening 
hours. Although seemingly helpful, this detail 
was discounted by McCarthy's own attempt at 
coiroboration. When McCarthy conducted sur-
veillance of Saddler's home during the late eve-
ning hours (8 00 p.m. to o:00 a m ). he did not 
gather anv corroboi ating information 
1997). A police officer 
the tip either by observing the illegal activity 
or by finding [the material facts] substantial-
ly as described by the informant.' " Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
1123 Here, McCarthy's corroboration was 
not helpful. First, McCarthy conducted sur-
veillance of Saddler's premises during the 
hours CI said Saddler was home. Between 
8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., McCarthy saw noth-
ing to corroborate CI's information. 
11 24 Second, at some point the next day, 
McCarthy says he saw short-term traffic that 
he believed to be drug related.7 One car was 
stopped and one-half ounce of marijuana was 
found on the driver, which McCarthy be-
lieved was purchased at Saddler's home be-
cause no drug paraphernalia was found. 
However, McCarthy provides only conclusory 
information about this corroborative effort. 
See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 
1989) ("It is well established that a warrant 
cannot issue solely on the strength of 'a mere 
conclusory statement that gives the magis-
trate virtually no basis at all for making a 
judgment regarding probable cause.' " (cita-
tion omitted)). He does not state how many 
vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether 
any of these vehicles arrived during Sad-
dler's alleged hours of operation, whether 
any of these vehicles or their drivers were 
described by CI, whether the stopped person 
was a person described by CI or was driving 
a vehicle described by CI, or how long the 
stopped person was at Saddler's home. 
1125 Third, McCarthy observed vehicles 
described by CI at Saddler's premises whose 
registered owner was described by CI. 
Again, McCarthy provides no detail as to 
what type of vehicles were present, how 
many vehicles he observed, whether they 
were part of the short-term traffic, or wheth-
er they were present during Saddler's al-
leged hours of operation. See id. 
126 Finally, McCarthy visited BACI's, 
Saddler's place of employment, where he 
learned Saddler was not at work and the 
person he spoke to did not know when Sad-
dler was scheduled to work next. With more 
7. Although the dissent concludes McCarthy saw 
the short-term traffic during the early morning 
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'may corroborate detail, this information may have provided 
important corroborative detail. However, as 
is, the information is practically useless. Al-
though McCarthy established that Saddler 
worked at BACI's, we do not know who 
McCarthy spoke to or whether that person 
was in a position to know Saddler's schedule. 
We also do not know whether the person 
McCarthy spoke to thought it was unusual 
that Saddler was not currently at work or 
whether the person thought Saddler's work 
schedule in general was unusual. 
CONCLUSION 
[23] 1127 Under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, we are convinced that the search 
warrant affidavit in this case failed to estab-
lish probable cause for the search of Sad-
dler's home. Although the affidavit suffi-
ciently established CI's basis of knowledge, it 
failed to establish CI's veracity and reliabili-
ty. Moreover, the detail and corroboration 
included in the affidavit were not enough to 
establish probable cause in the absence of a 
showing of veracity and reliability. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the trial court erred 
in denying defendant's motion to suppress 
the seized evidence. "Since an error 
amounting to a violation of the federal consti-
tution requires reversal unless it is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse [Sad-
dler's] conviction[ ]." State v. Droneburg, 781 
P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
1128 Saddler's conviction is reversed and 
the case is remanded for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion. 
1129 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge 
(dissenting): 
1130 I respectfully dissent. I would con-
clude that under the "totality-of-the-circum-
stances test" required by Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the magistrate had a 
"substantial basis for . . . [determining] that 
hours, no actual time is provided by the affidavit. 
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probable cause existed." State v. Delutia, 
2001 UT App 401,19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quota-
tions and citations omitted). 
11 31 As a threshold matter, I disagree with 
the majority's application of the facts to con-
trolling law. First, I conclude the affidavit 
establishes CI's reliability. As the majority 
acknowledges, CI's basis of knowledge was 
strong. The affidavit set forth facts person-
ally observed by CI over a one-year period: 
CI observed Saddler using marijuana and 
cocaine; CI used marijuana with Saddler; 
CI within the last ten days observed three to 
four pounds of marijuana; CI observed 
scales in Saddler's home that Saddler alleg-
edly used to weigh and package marijuana 
for re-sale; CI stated that Saddler admitted 
to him that he sells marijuana and cocaine; 
and CI observed Saddler selling controlled 
substances inside the named premises. 
H 32 However, the majority dismisses this 
strong basis of knowledge and claims the 
veracity and reliability prongs are not satis-
fied. I disagree. Veracity and reliability 
can be buttressed by a high degree of detail 
presented by CI in the affidavit and indepen-
dent corroboration of such detail by the po-
lice. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah Ct.App.1992). Both are present here. 
1133 CI admittedly used drugs with Sad-
dler in the past. However, CI was "[neither] 
promised nor paid for any of the information 
provided." This bolsters CI's reliability and 
veracity. See State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 
1034 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("Because the confi-
dential informant here received nothing in 
exchange for information about [the] illegal 
activities, the magistrate properly assumed 
that the informant was reliable/'); State v. 
Purser, 828 P 2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1992) 
(assuming reliability and veracity for citizen 
informant who "receive[dj nothing from the 
police in exchange for the information" (cita-
tions omitted)). 
11 34 I further disagree with the majority's 
claim that we do not know if CI volunteered 
the information to Officer McCarthy. On the 
contrary, a fair reading of the affidavit estab-
lishes that he did. The affidavit plainly 
states that CI told Officer McCarthy the 
information out of "a sense of guilt and a 
desire to stop the sales and usage of con-
trolled substances in the community." Fur-
ther, the majority refuses to acknowledge CI 
told Officer McCarthy CI's name and was 
therefore not anonymous. Where an affida-
vit is ambiguous, we must defer to the magis-
trate where, given the affidavit's language, 
the magistrate could reasonably construe a 
meaning that favors a probable cause deter-
mination. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 
992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of 
an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's 
"reasonable construction" of that ambiguity). 
Although Officer McCarthy did not directly 
state that he knew CI's name, a magistrate 
could reasonably construe Officer McCar-
thy's knowledge of CI's name from the affi-
davit's language. The affidavit clearly asks 
that the court not require Officer McCarthy 
to "publish the CI's name." One cannot 
publish a name one does not know. 
U 35 The majority is hyper-technical1 in 
claiming CI's admission that he used drugs 
with Saddler was not against his penal inter-
est and thus did not bolster his reliability. 
See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 
583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1971) (holding statements "against the infor-
mant's penal interest" "carr[ied] their own 
indicia of credibility"). As previously stated, 
in my view, the affidavit establishes that CI 
did reveal his identity to the officer. I also 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that, 
because there is no other evidence against 
CI, there was no admission against penal 
interest. We simply do not know if there is 
other evidence against CI, nor should we 
expect such evidence in the affidavit. CI 
made incriminating statements with both the 
possibility that such statements could be in-
vestigated and the possibility that other evi-
dence could be found. "People do not lightly 
admit a crime and place critical evidence in 
the hands of police in the form of their own 
admissions." Id. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. In 
Harris, the Supreme Court similarly found, 
without more, that an informant's disclosure 
that he purchased illegal whiskey from the 
defendant over a period of two years was a 
statement against penal interest that 
STATE v. SADDLER 
Cite as 67 P.3d 1025 (Utah App. 2003) 
Utah 1035 
"carried Hits] own indicia of credibility."8 
403 U.S. at 575, 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2078, 2082. 
1136 As the majority acknowledges, an in-
formant's veracity and reliability may be 
"boosted by the detail with which the infor-
mant described his personal observation of 
the [crime]." State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 
1206 (Utah 1984) (quotations and citation 
omitted). However, the majority finds the 
description of the ongoing use and sale of 
drugs over a period of a year, including the 
observation of scales, packaging material, 
and three to four pounds of marijuana within 
the previous ten days,1* to be insufficient de-
tail. The majority requires the affidavit re-
cite, for example, more detail about Saddler's 
residence, such as, presumably, where in the 
house CI saw the materials. The Fourth 
Amendment's search warrant requirements 
are not that burdensome. We "pay great 
deference to the magistrate's determination," 
Vigk 871 P.2d at 1033, because " '[a] grudg-
ing or negative attitude . . . toward warrants' 
is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant." Deluna, 2001 UT 
App 401 at 110, 40 P.3d 1136 (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S. at 236,103 S.Ct. at 2331). 
1137 The majority further complains CI's 
statements are conclusory. Again I dis-
agree. The sufficient details include CI 
knowing Saddler for over one year and ob-
serving cocaine and marijuana in the home, 
including three to four pounds of marijuana 
within the previous ten days; observation of 
scales and packaging material; observation 
of Saddler selling drugs from the home; and 
numerous observations of Saddler using 
drugs in the home. Where, as here, " 'the 
affidavit properly recites facts indicating ac-
tivity of a protracted and continuous nature, 
8. According to the Harris court, "[t]hat the infor-
mant may be paid or promised a 'break' does not 
eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of 
having admitted criminal conduct." United 
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S.Ct. 
2075. 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) Here, CI 
was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the 
information provided." 
'• The majority claims they could not reasonably 
infer CI saw marijuana within the last ten days. 
I disagree. The affidavit provides, "CI has been 
to the premises numerous times, the most recent 
a course of conduct, the passage of time 
becomes less significant.'" State v. Strom-
berg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(citation omitted). In Stromberg, for in-
stance, the court noted with approval under 
similar facts that "[t]he informant observed 
marijuana use and marijuana paraphernalia 
in the home on not one occasion, but on 
numerous visits to the home." Id. 
II 38 Even if veracity and reliability were 
weak, this is not fatal under the totality-of-
the-circumstances test. See State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (noting "an 
informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowl-
edge' are but two relevant considerations, 
among others, in determining the existence 
of probable cause," and concluding "[a] weak-
ness in one [area] or the other is not fatal to 
the warrant so long as" the affidavit, as a 
whole, provides a "substantial basis for find-
ing probable cause"). In sum, however, un-
der the totality-of-the-circumstances, I con-
clude the affidavit established the veracity 
and reliability of CI. 
1139 The majority also faults Officer 
McCarthy's corroboration of CI's informa-
tion. A police officer "may corroborate the 
tip either by observing the illegal activity or 
by finding [the material facts] substantially 
as described by the informant." Kaysville 
City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omit-
ted). The majority finds Officer McCarthy's 
corroboration unhelpful. On the contrary, I 
conclude Officer McCarthy met both prongs 
of the corroboration requirement. 
1140 Officer McCarthy both observed ille-
gal activity and verified the facts as de-
scribed by CI. On June 15, 2000, in early 
morning hours (as described by CI), Officer 
McCarthy observed short term traffic to and 
being within the last week to ten days, and ob-
served approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." 
Although this language arguably does not link the 
observation of marijuana with CI's most recent 
visit to Saddler's premises, we "pay great defer-
ence to the magistrate's determination," Slate v. 
Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct.App.1994), 
and a magistrate could reasonably infer such a 
link. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 
(Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affi-
davit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable 
construction" of that ambiguity). 
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from Saddler's house which, based on his 
nineteen years of experience and training in 
narcotics investigation, he believed indicated 
the sale of drugs in the home. See Purser, 
828 P.2d at 516, 518 (concluding that where 
the detective "described his narcotics experi-
ence" and "observed persons enter defen-
dant's residence and leave after only a few 
minutes, . . . suggesting] narcotics traffick-
ing," such corroboration was helpful in find-
ing probable cause); State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195, 1196-97 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding 
that where the detective stated in his affida-
vit "he had seen vehicles arrive at the [defen-
dant's residencel and stay for a very short 
period of time[,J . . . consistent with the buy-
ing and selling of narcotics," such corrobora-
tion supported the state's case). 
1141 Further, Officer McCarthy had the 
West Valley Pohce stop one of the vehicles 
leaving the premises and the driver pos-
sessed one half ounce of marijuana. Police 
found no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or 
on the driver, and based on his training and 
experience, Officer McCarthy concluded this 
indicated the driver had just purchased mari-
juana in Saddler's house. 
H 42 In verifying the facts described by CI, 
Officer McCarthy observed the vehicles de-
scribed by CI at Saddler's home, verified the 
registered owner of a vehicle was as de-
scribed by CI, and verified that Saddler 
worked at BACI'S. In my opinion, officer 
McCarthy made significant successful efforts 
to corroborate CI's information. 
1 43 In conclusion, I reach a different re-
sult than the majority based on my applica-
tion of the facts to the law. This can often 
happen in the fact sensitive area of the 
Fourth Amendment. However, what trou-
bles me about the majority's analysis is that 
I think it is contrary to the deference wTe 
should afford to the magistrate in determin-
ing whether a search warrant is valid. See 
Vigk 871 P.2d at 1033 (noting the "great 
deference" we pay to the magistrate's deter-
mination). "[T]he lF]ourth [A]mendment 
does not require that the reviewing court 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's 
probable cause determination!.] [I]nstead, it 
requires only that the reviewing court con-
clude that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for .. [determining] that probable 
cause existed." Delwia^ 2001 UT App 401 at 
119, 40 P.3d 1136 (alterations in original) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 1 believe 
the majority conducts a de novo review and 
gives no deference to the magistrate's deter-
mination. 
1144 Furthermore, although the majority 
pays lip service to the "totality-of-the-circum-
stances" standard for the review of search 
warrants, I believe it in reality applies the 
older and stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test. See, 
e.g., State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 
(Utah 1983) (applying two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test requiring an affiant demonstrate 
both basis of knowledge and reliability/verac-
ity). This has not been the law in Utah since 
1983, when State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1253, 
1260-61 (Utah 1983), first applied the "totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances test" required by 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 
See also State u Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 
1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (noting that "veraci-
ty, reliability, and basis of knowledge of con-
fidential informants are no longer strict pre-
requisites for establishing probable cause," 
and are instead " 'relevant considerations, 
among others,'" under the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test (citation omitted)). The ma-
jority's approach undermines what should be 
our preference for searches conducted pursu-
ant to search warrants. See Delmia, 2001 
UT App 401 at H 10, 40 P3d 1136 (observing 
the Fourth Amendment hab a " 'strong pref-
erence for searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant'" (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 
103 S.Ct. at 2331)). 
1! 45 In sum, I would deny Saddler's mo-
tion to suppress and uphold the search, 
which was conducted pursuant to a search 
warrant, because I conclude under the totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances that the affidavit 
supporting the issuance of the search war-
rant established probable cause to search 
Saddler's residence. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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the Supreme Court in its order granting certiorari 
directed that the issue be briefed, where the issue of the 
exclusionary rule modification was not pressed or 
passed upon in the state courts. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4: 28 U.S.C.A. S 1257. 
151 Federal Courts €=^511.1 
170Bk511.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 170Bk511) 
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Fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the 
federal exclusionary rule by suppressing evidence in 
prosecution for violating state drug laws did not alter 
Supreme Court's decision to not consider issue of 
modification of the exclusionary rule when the issue 
was not pressed or passed on below. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257. 
161 Federal Courts €==>508 
170Bk508 Most Cited Cases 
State's repeated opposition to defendant's substantive 
Fourth Amendment claims in drug prosecution did not 
suffice to have raised the question whether the 
exclusionary rule should be modified so that the 
Supreme Court might decide the issue since the 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy and not 
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257. 
121 Federal Courts €=>445 
170Bk445 Most Cited Cases 
Where difficult issues of great public importance are 
involved, there are strong reasons for the Supreme 
Court to adhere scrupulously to the customary 
limitations on its discretion since by doing so the court 
promotes respect for its adjudicatory process and the 
stability of its decisions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257. 
181 Searches and Seizures €>=>117 
349k 117 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k3.6(3)) 
Rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for 
determining whether an informant's tip establishes 
probable-cause for issuance of a warrant would be 
abandoned and a "totality-of-the-circumstances" 
approach that traditionally has informed probable-cause 
determinations would be substituted in its place. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
191 Searches and Seizures C=>113.1 
349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349kl 13, 349k3.6(2)) 
An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the existence of 
probable-cause for issuance of search warrant. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
HOI Searches and Seizures C=>113.1 
349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k 113, 349k3.6(2)) 
Sufficient information must be presented to the 
magistrate to allow that official to determine 
probable-cause for issuance of search warrant; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare 
conclusions of others. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Ill] Searches and Seizures €=>200 
349k200 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k3.9) 
In order to insure that an abdication of the magistrate's 
duty does not occur, courts must continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on 
which warrants are issued. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[121 Drugs and Narcotics €=>188(2) 
138kl 88(2) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 13 8k 188) 
Probable-cause for warrant authorizing search of 
defendants' home and automobile was established by 
anonymous letter indicating that defendants were 
involved in activities in violation of state drug laws and 
predicting future criminal activities where major 
portions of the letter's predictions were corroborated by 
information provided to affiant by federal agents. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[131 Searches and Seizures €=>l 13.1 
349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349kl 13, 349k3.6(2)) 
In making a determination of probable-cause for 
issuance of search warrant the relevant inquiry is not 
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," 
but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular 
types of noncriminal acts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[14] Searches and Seizures £=>H7 
349k 117 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k3.6(3)) 
It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable-cause 
for issuance of search warrant, that corroboration of 
informant's tip through other sources of information 
reduced the chances of reckless or prevaricating tale, 
thus providing substantial basis for crediting the 
hearsay. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[151 Searches and Seizures 0=^117 
349k 117 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k3.6(3)) 
There is no requirement that informants used by the 
police be infallible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
**2319 Syllabus TFN*1 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by 
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience 
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit 
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321.337.26 S.Ct. 282. 
287. 50 L.Ed. 499. 
*213 On May 3, 1978, the Police Department of 
Bloomingdale, 111., received an anonymous letter which 
included statements that respondents, husband and 
wife, were engaged in selling drugs; that the wife 
would drive their car to Florida on May 3 to be loaded 
with drugs, and the husband would fly down in a few 
days to drive the car back; that the car's trunk would be 
loaded with drugs; and that respondents presently had 
over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement. 
Acting on the tip, a police officer determined 
respondents' address and learned that the husband made 
a reservation on a May 5 flight to Florida. 
Arrangements for surveillance for the flight were made 
with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), and the surveillance disclosed that the husband 
took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room 
registered in the wife's name, and left the following 
morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois 
license plate issued to the husband, heading north on an 
interstate highway used by travelers to the 
Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents' 
residence and automobile was then obtained from an 
Illinois state-court judge, based on the Bloomingdale 
police officer's affidavit setting forth the foregoing 
facts and a copy of the anonymous letter. When 
respondents arrived at their home, the police were 
waiting and discovered marihuana and other 
contraband in respondents' car trunk and home. Prior to 
respondents' trial on charges of violating state drug 
laws, the trial court ordered suppression of all the items 
seized, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The 
Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the 
letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a 
determination of probable cause for issuance of the 
search warrant under Aguilarv. Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 
84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723. and Spinelli v. United 
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States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637. 
since they failed to satisfy the "two pronged test" of (1) 
revealing the informant's "basis of knowledge" and (2) 
providing sufficient facts to establish either the 
informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the 
informant's report. 
Held: 
1. The question-which this Court requested the parties 
to address-whether **2320 the rule requiring the 
exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment should be modified 
so as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence 
obtained in the reasonable *214 belief that the search 
and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment will not be decided in this case, since it 
was not presented to or decided by the Illinois courts. 
Although prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed 
or passed on below" rule have not involved a State's 
failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy 
asserted below, the purposes underlying the rule are, 
for the most part, as applicable in such a case as in one 
where a party fails to assert a federal right. The fact 
that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal 
exclusionary rule does not affect the application of the 
"not pressed or passed on below" rule. Nor does the 
State's repeated opposition to respondents' substantive 
Fourth Amendment claims suffice to have raised the 
separate question whether the exclusionary rule should 
be modified. The extent of the continued vitality of 
the rule is an issue of unusual significance, and 
adhering scrupulously to the customary limitations on 
this Court's discretion promotes respect for its 
adjudicatory process and the stability of its decisions, 
and lessens the threat of untoward practical 
ramifications not foreseen at the time of decision. Pp. 
2321-2325. 
2. The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and 
Spinelli for determining whether an informant's tip 
establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is 
abandoned, and the "totality of the circumstances" 
approach that traditionally has informed probable-cause 
determinations is substituted in its place. The elements 
under the "two-pronged test" concerning the 
informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of 
knowledge" should be understood simply as closely 
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the 
common-sense, practical question whether there is 
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence 
is located in a particular place. The task of the issuing 
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magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 
a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court 
is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. This 
flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the 
accommodation of public and private interests that the 
Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach 
that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. Pp. 
2328-2333. 
3. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause to search 
respondents' home and car existed. Under the "totality 
of the circumstances" analysis, corroboration by details 
of an informant's tip by independent police work is of 
significant value. Cf. Prayer v. United States. 358 
U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327. Here, even 
standing alone, the facts obtained through the 
independent investigation of the Bloomingdale police 
officer and the DEA at least suggested that *215 
respondents were involved in drug trafficking. In 
addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter, 
which had been corroborated in major part by the 
police officer's efforts. Pp. 2334-2336. 
85 I11.2d 376. S3 Ill.Dec. 218.423 N.E.2d 887 (19811 
reversed. 
Paul P. Biebel,Jr., First Assistant Attorney General of 
Illinois, reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on 
the briefs on reargument were Tyrone C. Fahner, 
former Attorney General, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney 
General, Michael A. Ficaro and Morton E. Friedman, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Daniel M. Harris, and 
James B. Zagel. With him on the briefs on the original 
argument were Messrs. Fahner and Harris. 
Solicitor General Lee argued the cause on reargument 
for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. 
With him on the brief on reargument were Assistant 
Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General 
Frey, Kathryn A. Oberly, Geoffrey S. Stewart, and 
Robert J. Erickson. With him on the brief on the 
original argument were Mr. Jensen, Alan I. Horowitz, 
and David B. Smith. 
James W. Reilley reargued the cause for respondents. 
With him on the brief on reargument were Barry E. 
Witlin and Thomas Y. Davies. With him on the brief on 
the original argument were Mr. Witlin, Allan A. 
Ackerman, and Clyde W. Woody* 
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by 
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. 
Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William 
D. Stein, Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford K. 
Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the State 
of California; by Fred E. lnbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, 
James P. Manak, Patrick F. Healy, William K. Lambie, 
and James A. Murphy for Americans for Effective Law 
Enforcement, Inc., et al.; by Robert L. Toms, EvelleJ. 
Younger, G. Joseph Bertain, Jr., and LloydF. Dunn for 
Laws at Work et al.; and by Newman A. Flanagan, 
Jack E. Yelverton, James P. Manak, Edwin L. Miller, 
Jr., Austin J. McGuigan, and John M. Massameno for 
the National District Attorneys Association, Inc. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by 
Sidney Bernstein and Howard A. Specter for the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America; by John C. 
Feirich, Melvin B. Lewis, Joshua Sachs, and Michael 
J. Costello for the Illinois State Bar Association; by 
Herman Kaufman and Edward M. Chikofsky for the 
New York Criminal Bar Association; and by James M. 
Doyle for the Legal Internship Program, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Jim Smith, 
Attorney General, and Lawrence A. Kaden and 
Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
the State of Florida et al.; by Gerald Baliles, Attorney 
General, and Jacqueline G. Epps, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; 
by Morris Harrell, William W. Greenhalgh, William J 
Mertens, and Steven H. Goldblatt for the American Bar 
Association; by Charles S. Sims and Burt Neuborne 
for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Peter 
L. Zimroth and Barbara D. Underwood for the 
Committee on Criminal Law of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York; by Marshall W. Krause, 
Quin Denvir, Steffan B. Imhoff, and Paul Edward Bell 
for the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al.; by Kenneth M. Mogill for the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association; by Frank G. 
Carrington, Jr., Griffin B. Bell, Wayne W. Schmidt, 
Alan Dye, Thomas Hendrickson, Courtney A. Evans, 
Rufus L. Edmisten, David S. Crump, Howard A. 
Kramer, Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Wayne 
T Elliott, G. Stephen Parker, and Joseph E. Scuro for 
Seven Former Members of the Attorney General of the 
United States' Task Force on Violent Crime (1981) et 
al.; and by Dan Johnston, pro se, for the County 
Attorney of Polk County, Iowa. 
*216 Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for 
violation of state drug laws after police officers, 
executing a search warrant, discovered marijuana and 
other contraband in their automobile and home. Prior 
to trial the Gates' moved to suppress evidence seized 
during this **2321 search. The Illinois Supreme 
Court, 85 I11.2d 376. 53 Ill.Dec. 218. 423 N.E.2d 887 
0981) affirmed the decisions of lower state courts, 82 
Ill.App.3d 749. 38 Ill.Dec. 62. 403 N.E.2d 77 f 1980) 
granting the motion. It held that the affidavit 
submitted in support of the State's applicationfor a 
warrant to search the Gates' property *217 was 
inadequate under this Court's decisions in Agiiilar v. 
Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1964) and Sninelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 
S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a 
search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated 
anonymous informant's tip. After receiving briefs and 
hearing oral argument on this question, however, we 
requested the parties to address an additional question: 
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a 
criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, Mavp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643.81 
S.Ct. 1684.6L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United 
States. 232 U.S. 383. 34 S.Ct. 341. 58 L.Ed. 652 
(1914). should to any extent be modified, so as, for 
example, not to require the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and 
seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment." 
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue 
we framed for the parties was not presented to the 
Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it. 
Rather, we consider the question originally presented 
in the petition for certiorari, and conclude that the 
Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our 
Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively. 
Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not 
addressing the question regarding modification of the 
exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 
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1982, — U.S. —-. 103 S.Ct. 436. 74 L.Ed.2d 595. 
I 
HI Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state 
courts derives from 28U.S.C. § 1257, which provides 
that "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the 
highest court of a State in which a decision could be 
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as 
follows:... (3) By writ of certiorari,... where any title, 
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or 
claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes *218 
of... the United States." The provision derives, albeit 
with important alterations, see, e.g., Act of December 
23, 1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 
646, 62 Stat. 929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 
20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. 
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning 
of § 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in 
some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that 
§ 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no 
jurisdiction unless a federal question had been both 
raised and decided in the state court below. As Justice 
Story wrote in Crowell v. Randell 10 Pet. 368. 391. 9 
L.Ed. 458 (1836). "If both of these requirements do not 
appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction fails." 
See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee. 5 Cranch. 344. 
3 L.Ed. 120(1809). fFN 11 
FN1. The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, 
supra, that a federal claim have been both 
raised and addressed in state court was 
generally not understood in the literal fashion 
in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson & 
F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States § 60 (1951). 
Instead, the Court developed the rule that a 
claim would not be considered here unless it 
had been either raised or squarely considered 
and resolved in state court. See, e.g., 
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate. 309 
U.S. 430. 435-436. 60 S.Ct. 670. 673. 84 
L.Ed. 849 (1940): State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Duel. 324 U.S. 154. 160.65 
S.Ct. 573. 576. 89 L.Ed. 812(1945). 
More recently, in McGoldrickv. Comvagnie Generate, 
309 U.S. 430. 435-436. 60 S.Ct. 670. 673. 84 L.Ed. 
849(1940). the Court observed: 
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**2322 But it is also the settled practice of this 
Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 
that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in 
cases coming from the federal courts, that it 
considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant 
not pressed or passed upon in the courts below.... In 
cases coming here from state courts in which a state 
statute is assailed as unconstitutional, there are 
reasons of peculiar force which should lead us to 
refrain from deciding questions not presented or 
decided in the highest court of the state whose 
judicial action we are called upon to review. Apart 
from the *219 reluctance with which every court 
should proceed to set aside legislation as 
unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented, 
due regard for the appropriate relationship of this 
Court to state courts requires us to decline to 
consider and decide questions affecting the validity 
of state statutes not urged or considered there. It is 
for these reasons that this Court, where the 
constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in the 
state court, consistently refuses to consider any 
grounds of attack not raised or decided in that court. 
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional 
character of the rule against our deciding claims "not 
pressed nor passed upon" in state court in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel. 324 U.S. 
154. 160. 65 S.Ct. 573. 576. 89 L.Ed. 812 (1945V 
where we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme 
Court did not pass on the question, we may not do so." 
See also Hill v. California. 401 U.S. 797. 805-806.91 
S.Ct. 1106. 111 K 111 Z 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971V 
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of 
our more recent cases have treated the so-called "not 
pressed or passed upon below" rule as merely a 
prudential restriction. In Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 
U.S. 1. 69 S.Ct. 894. 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949V the Court 
reversed a state criminal conviction on a ground not 
urged in state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, 
in Vachon v. New Hampshire. 414 U.S. 478. 94 S.Ct. 
664. 38 L.Ed.2d 666 (1974V the Court summarily 
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not 
raised in state court, or here, that it had been obtained 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court indicated in a 
footnote, id. at 479. n. 3. 94 S.Ct.. at 665. n. 3. that it 
possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in 
state court the question on which it decided the case. 
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of 
the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have 
recognized that it often may be unclear whether the 
particular federal question presented in this Court was 
raised or passed upon below. In Dewey v. Pes 
Moines. 173 U.S. 193.197-198. 19 S.Ct 379.380-381. 
43 L.Ed. 665 (1899V the fullest treatment of the 
subject, the Court said *220 that "if the question were 
only an enlargement of the one mentioned in the 
assignment of errors, or if it were so connected with it 
in substance as to form but another ground or reason 
for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] 
judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the 
assignment sufficient to permit the question to be now 
raised and argued. Parties are not confined here to the 
same arguments which were advanced in the courts 
below upon a Federal question there discussed." [FN2] 
We have not attempted, and **2323 likely would not 
have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between cases 
involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented 
below and those involving entirely new questions. 
FN2. In Dewey, certain assessments had been 
levied against the owner of property abutting 
a street paved by the city; a state trial court 
ordered that the property be forfeited when 
the assessments were not paid, and in 
addition, held appellant personally liable for 
the amount by which the assessments 
exceeded the value of the lots. In state court 
the appellant argued that the imposition of 
personal liability against him violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because he had not received personal notice 
of the assessment proceedings, In this Court, 
he also attempted to argue that the assessment 
itself constituted a taking under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, 
beyond arising from a single factual 
occurrence, the two claims "are not in 
anywise necessarily connected," id. at 198. 
19 S.Ct.. at 381. Because of this, we 
concluded that appellant's taking claim could 
not be considered. 
The application of these principles in the instant case 
is not entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case 
that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the 
Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth 
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the 
Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the 
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officers should be excluded from their trial. It also is 
clear that the State challenged, at every level of the 
Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the 
substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had 
been violated. The State never, however, raised or 
addressed the question whether the federal 
exclusionary rule should be modified in any respect, 
and none of the opinions of the *221 Illinois courts 
give any indication that the question was considered. 
121 The case, of course, is before us on the State's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Since the Act of 
December 23, 1914, c. 2,38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has 
been vested in this Court to review state court decisions 
even when a claimed federal right has been upheld. 
Our prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed or 
passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a 
State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or 
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, 
we can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have 
challenged an asserted federal claim differently from 
the failure of the proponent of a federal claim to have 
raised that claim. 
We have identified several purposes underlying the 
"not pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, 
these are as applicable to the State's failure to have 
opposed the assertion of a particular federal right, as to 
a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First, 
"questions not raised below are those on which the 
record is very likely to be inadequate since it certainly 
was not compiled with those questions in mind." 
Cardinale v. Louisiana. 394 U.S. 437, 439. 89 S.Ct. 
116U 163.22 L.Ed.2d 398 (1969). Exactly the same 
difficulty exists when the state urges modification of an 
existing constitutional right or accompanying remedy. 
Here, for example, the record contains little, if 
anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the 
police officers that searched the Gates' property-which 
might well be an important consideration in 
determining whether to fashion a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of whether 
.to modify the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit 
from a record containing such facts. 
[31[41 Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate 
relationship of this Court to state courts," McGoldrick 
v. Compaxnie Generate. 309 U.S. 430, 435- 436. 60 
S.Ct. 670. 673. 84 L.Ed. 849 (1940), demands that 
those courts be given an opportunity to consider the 
constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, 
equally important, proposed changes in existing 
remedies for unconstitutional *222 actions. Finally, by 
requiring that the State first argue to the state courts 
that the federal exclusionary rule should be modified, 
we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the State 
as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an 
adequate and independent state ground. See 
Cardinale. supra, 394 U.S., at 439, 89 S.Ct., at 1163. 
Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as 
early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp. 307 111. 448, 138 
N.E. 728 (1923). and might adhere to its view even if 
it thought we would conclude that the federal rule 
should be modified. In short, the reasons supporting 
our refusal to hear federal claims not raised in state 
court apply with equal force to the State's failure to 
challenge the availability of a well-settled federal 
remedy. Whether the "not pressed or passed upon 
below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions 
indicate, see 2320, supra, or prudential, as several of 
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character 
might be different in cases like **2324 this from its 
character elsewhere, we need not decide. Whatever 
the character of the rule may be, consideration of the 
question presented in our order of November 29, 1982, 
would be contrary to the sound justifications for the 
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we thus 
decide not to pass on the issue. 
[5] The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively 
applied the federal exclusionary rule-suppressing 
evidence against respondents—does not affect our 
conclusion. In Morrison v. Watson. 154 U.S. 111. 14 
S.Ct. 995. 138 L.Ed. 927 (1894), the Court was asked 
to consider whether a state statute impaired the 
appellant's contractwith the appellee. It declined to 
hear the case because the question presented here had 
not been pressed or passed on below. The Court 
acknowledged that the lower court's opinion had 
restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision 
of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly 
impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held 
that there was no showing that "there was any real 
contest at any stage of this case upon the point," id, at 
115, 14 S.Ct.. at 997, and that without such a contest, 
the routine restatement *223 and application of settled 
law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not 
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the 
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the 
federal exclusionary rule, there was never "any real 
contest" upon the point. The application of the 
exclusionary rule was merely a routine act, once a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment had been found, 
and not the considered judgment of the Illinois courts 
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on the question whether application of a modified rule 
would be warranted on the facts of this case. In such 
circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary 
to apprise the state court of the arguments for not 
applying the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the 
question whether the exclusionary rule should be 
modified. 
[6] Likewise, we do not believe that the State's 
repeated opposition to respondent's substantive Fourth 
Amendment claims suffices to have raised the question 
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. 
The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally" and not "a personal constitutional right of 
the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra. 414 
U.S. 338, 348. 94 S.Ct. 613. 620. 38 L.Ed.2d 561 
(1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's 
remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long 
been regarded as an issue separate from the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police 
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 
620. 100 S.Ct. 1912. 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); United 
States v. Ceccolini. 435 U.S. 268. 98 S.Ct. 1054. 55 
L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); United States v. Calandra. supra: 
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465. 96 S.Ct. 3037. 49 
L.Ed.2d 1067(1976). Because of this distinction, we 
cannot say that modification or abolition of the 
exclusionary rule is "so connected with [the substantive 
Fourth Amendment right at issue] as to form but 
another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of 
the judgment. Dewey v. Day Moines, supra, 173 U.S.. 
at 197-198, 19 S.Ct., at 380-381. Rather, the rule's 
modification was, for purposes of the "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule, a separate claim that had to 
be specifically presented to the State courts. 
[7] *224 Finally, weighty prudential considerations 
militate against our considering the question presented 
in our order of November 29,1982. The extent of the 
continued validity of the rules that have developed 
from our decisions in Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 
383. 34 S.Ct. 341. 58 L.Ed. 652 (1961), and Mapp v. 
Ohio. 367 U.S. 643. 81 S.Ct. 1684. 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 
(1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Sufficient 
evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue 
that members of this Court recently have made, e.g., 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388. 
415. 91 S.Ct. **23251999. 2014. 29 L.Ed.2d 619 
(1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); Coolidze v. New 
Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443.490.91 S.Ct. 2022.2050.29 
L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 
502,91 S.Ct.. at 2056 (Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. 
Powell. 428 U.S. 465. 537-539. 96 S.Ct. 3037, 
3072-3073. 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (WHITE, J., 
dissenting); Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387, 
413-414, 97 S.Ct. 1232, —-, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) 
(POWELL, J., concurring); Robbinsv. California. 453 
U.S. 420. 437. 443-444. 101 S.Ct. 2841. 2851. 
2854-2855. 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (REHNOUIST. J., 
dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public 
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to 
adhere scrupulously to the customary limitations on our 
discretion. By doing so we "promote respect... for the 
Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our] 
decisions." Mapp v. Ohio, supra. 367 U.S.. at 677. 81 
S.Ct.. at 1703 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, 
fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual record will 
be available to us, thereby discouraging the framing of 
broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, 
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. 
In Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens 
the threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id, at 
676. 81 S.Ct., at 1703 (Harlan, J., dissenting), not 
foreseen at the time of decision. The public 
importance of our decisions in Weeks and Mapp and 
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding 
these decisions counsel that we meticulously observe 
our customary procedural rules. By following this 
course, we promote respect for the procedures by 
which our decisions are rendered, as well as confidence 
in the stability of prior decisions. A wise exercise of 
the powers confided in this Court dictates that we 
reserve for another day the question whether the 
exclusionary rule should be modified. 
*225 II 
[8] We now turn to the question presented in the 
State's original petition for certiorari, which requires us 
to decide whether respondents' rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the 
search of their car and house. A chronological 
statement of events usefully introduces the issues at 
stake. Bloomingdale, 111., is a suburb of Chicago 
located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the 
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an 
anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows: 
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in 
your town who strictly make their living on selling 
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on 
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the 
condominiums. Most of their buys are done in 
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Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, 
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then 
Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back 
after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is 
driving down there again and Lance will be flying 
down in a few days to drive it back. At the time 
Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded 
with over $ 100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have 
over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, 
and make their entire living on pushers. 
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will 
make a big catch. They are friends with some big 
drugs dealers, who visit their house often. 
Lance & Susan Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums" 
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the 
Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, 
who decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from 
the office of the Illinois Secretary of State, that an 
Illinois driver's license had *226 been issued to one 
Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in 
Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant, 
whose examination of certain financial records 
revealed a more recent address for the Gates, and he 
also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare 
Airport that "L. Gates" **2326 had made a reservation 
on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West Palm Beach, 
Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 
4:15 p.m. 
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration for surveillance of 
the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later 
reported to Mader that Gates had boarded the flight, 
and that federal agents in Florida had observed him 
arrive in West Palm Beach and take a taxi to the nearby 
Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates went to a 
room registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7:00 
a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified 
woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois 
license plates and drove northbound on an interstate 
frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In 
addition, the DEA agent informed Mader that the 
license plate number on the Mercury registered to a 
Hornet station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also 
advised Mader that the driving time between West 
Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was approximately 22 
to 24 hours. 
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing 
facts, and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of 
DuPage County, together with a copy of the 
anonymous letter. The judge of that court thereupon 
issued a search warrant for the Gates' residence and for 
their automobile. The judge, in deciding to issue the 
warrant, could have determined that the modus 
operandi of the Gates had been substantially 
corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted, 
Lance Gates had flown from Chicago to West Palm 
Beach late in the afternoon of May 5th, had checked 
into a hotel room registered in the name of his wife, 
and, at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, had headed 
north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, *227 
out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used 
by travelers from South Florida to Chicago in an 
automobile bearing a license plate issued to him. 
At 5:15 a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had 
flown out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his wife, 
returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car 
in which they had left West Palm Beach some 22 hours 
earlier. The Bloomingdale police were awaiting them, 
searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered 
approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of 
the Gates' home revealed marijuana, weapons, and 
other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered 
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the 
affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to 
support the necessary determination of probable cause 
to believe that the Gates' automobile and home 
contained the contraband in question. This decision 
was affirmed in turn by the Illinois Appellate Court and 
by a divided vote of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are 
inclined to agree-that, standing alone, the anonymous 
letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department 
would not provide the basis for a magistrate's 
determination that there was probable cause to believe 
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home. 
The letter provides virtually nothing from which one 
might conclude that its author is either honest or his 
information reliable; likewise, the letter gives 
absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's 
predictions regarding the Gates' criminal activities. 
Something more was required, then, before a magistrate 
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe 
that contraband would be found in the Gates' home and 
car. See4gm7flrv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 109.n. 1. 84 
S.Ct. 1509. 1511. n. 1. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964^: 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. IK 
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78 L.Ed. 159(1933). 
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized 
that Detective Mader's affidavit might be capable of 
supplementing *228 the anonymous letter with 
information sufficient to peirmit a determination of 
probable cause. See **2327Whitelevv. Warden, 401 
U.S. 560. 567. 91 S.Ct. 1031. 1036. 28 L.Ed.2d 306 
(197H. In holding that the affidavit in fact did not 
contain sufficient additional information to sustain a 
determination of probable cause, the Illinois court 
applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision 
in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410.89 S.Ct. 584. 
21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969V TFN31 The Illinois Supreme 
Court, like some others, apparently understood Spinelli 
as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each of 
two independent requirements before it could be relied 
on. J.A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as 
supplemented by Mader's affidavit, first had to 
adequately reveal the "basis of knowledge" of the letter 
writer—the particular means by which he came by the 
information given in his report. Second, it had to 
provide *229 facts sufficiently establishing either the 
"veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, 
the "reliability" of the informant's report in this 
particular case. 
FN3. In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. 
Spinelli going to and from a particular 
apartment, which the telephone company said 
contained two telephones with stated 
numbers. The officers also were "informed 
by a confidential reliable informant that 
William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal 
gambling activities|" at the apartment, and 
that he used two phones, with numbers 
corresponding to those possessed by the 
police. The officers submitted an affidavit 
with this information to a magistrate and 
obtained a warrant to search Spinelli's 
apartment. We held that the magistrate could 
have made his determination of probable 
cause only by "abdicating his constitutional 
function." id. at 416. 89 S.Ct.. at 589. The 
Government's affidavit contained absolutely 
no information regarding the informant's 
reliability. Thus, it did not satisfy Aguilar 's 
requirement that such affidavits contain 
"some of the underlying circumstances" 
indicating that "the informant... was 'credible' 
" or that "his information [was] 'reliable.1 " 
Azuilar. supra. 378 U.S.. at 114. 84 S.Ct.. at 
1514. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy 
Aguilar 's requirement that it detail "some of 
the underlying circumstances from which the 
informant concluded that ... narcotics were 
where he claimed they were. We also held 
that if the tip concerning Spinelli had 
contained "sufficient detail" to permit the 
magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying 
on something more substantial than a casual 
rumor circulating in the undei*world or an 
accusation based merely on an individual's 
general reputation," 393 U.S.. at 416. 89 
S.Ct.. at 589, then he properly could have 
relied on it; we thought, however, that the tip 
lacked the requisite detail to permit this 
"self-verifying detail" analysis. 
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal 
rules that have developed among various lower courts 
to enforce the "two-pronged test," [FN4] found that 
the test had not been satisfied. First, the "veracity" 
prong was not satisfied because, "there was simply no 
basis [for]... conclud [ing] that the anon;/mous person 
[who wrote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police 
Department] was credible." J.A., at 7a. The court 
indicated that corroboration by police of details 
contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" 
prong, and in any event, could not do so if, as in the 
present case, only "innocent" details are corroborated. 
**2328 J.A., at 12a. In addition, the letter gave no 
indication of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the 
*230 Gates' activities. The Illinois court understood 
Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip to be 
used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for 
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter 
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an 
inference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of 
probable cause had been made. 
FN4. See, e.g., Stanley v State. 19Md.App. 
507. 313 A.2d 847 (Md.App. 1974V In 
summary, these rules posit that the "veracity" 
prong of the Spinelli test has two "spurs"—the 
informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" 
of his information. Various interpretations 
are advanced for the meaning of the 
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong. 
Both the "basis of knowledge" prong and the 
"veracity" prong are treated as entirely 
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separate requirements, which must be 
independently satisfied in every case in order 
to sustain a determination of probable cause. 
See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary doctrines are 
relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing 
requirements. For example, the "self-
verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis 
of knowledge" requirement, although not the 
"credibility" spur of the "veracity" prong. See 
J.A. 10a. Conversely, corroboration would 
seem not capable of supporting the "basis of 
knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity" 
prong. Id, at 12a. 
The decision in Stanley, while expressly 
approving and conscientiously attempting to 
apply the "two-pronged test" observes that 
"[t]he built-in subtleties [of the test] are such, 
however, that a slipshod application calls 
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 
313 A.2d, at 860 (footnote omitted). The 
decision also suggested that it is necessary "to 
evolve analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules 
employed in trial settings] for the reception of 
hearsay in a probable cause setting." Id, at 
857. 
to make up for a deficit on the other prong." 
See also n. 9, infra. 
Ill 
This totality of the circumstances approach is far more 
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause 
[FN6] than *231 is any rigid demand that specific 
"tests" be satisfied by every informant's tip. Perhaps 
the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the 
probable cause standard is that it is a "practical, 
nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United States. 
338 U.S. 160, 176.69 S.Ct. 1302. 1311.93 L.Ed. 1879 
(1949). "In dealing with probable cause,... as the very 
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id., at 
175, 69 S.Ct., at 1310. Our observation in United 
States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 418. 101 S.Ct. 690. 
695,66L.Ed.2d621 (1981V regarding "particularized 
suspicion," is also applicable to the probable cause 
standard: 
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an 
informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of 
knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the 
value of his report. We do not agree, however, that 
these elements should be understood as entirely 
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly 
exacted in every case, [FN51 which the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as 
detailed below, they should be understood simply as 
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate 
the commonsense, practical question whether there is 
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence 
is located in a particular place. 
FN5. The entirely independent character that 
the Spinelli prongs have assumed is indicated 
both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme 
Court in this case, and by decisions of other 
courts. One frequently cited decision, 
Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App. 507. 313 A.2d 
847. 861 (Md.App.1974), remarks that "the 
dual requirements represented by the 'two-
pronged test' are 'analytically severable' and 
an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over 
FN6. Our original phrasing of the so-called 
"two-pronged test" in Azuilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1969), suggests that the two prongs were 
intended simply as guides to a magistrate's 
determination of probable cause, not as 
inflexible, independent requirements 
applicable in every case. In Aguilar, we 
required only that: 
the magistrate must be informed of some of 
the underlying circumstances from which the 
informant concluded that ... narcotics were 
where he claimed they were, and some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the 
officer concluded that the informant ... was 
'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" Id, at 
114, 84 S.Ct.. at 1514 (emphasis added). 
As our language indicates, we intended 
neither a rigid compartmentalization of the 
inquiries into an informant's "veracity," 
"reliability" and "basis of knowledge," nor 
that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of 
an informant's tip. Rather, we required only 
that some facts bearing on two particular 
issues be provided to the magistrate. Our 
decision in Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 
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214. 85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 n 9651 
demonstrated this latter point. We held there 
that a criminal complaint showed probable 
cause to believe the defendant had attempted 
to evade the payment of income taxes. We 
commented that: 
"Obviously any reliance upon factual 
allegations necessarily entails some degree of 
reliability upon the credibility of the source.... 
Nor does it indicate that each factual 
allegation which the affiant puts forth must be 
independently documented, or that each and 
every fact which contributed to his 
conclusions be spelled out in the complaint.... 
// simply requires that enough information be 
presented to the Commissioner to enable him 
to make the judgment that the charges are not 
capricious and are sufficiently supported to 
justify bringing into play the further steps of 
the criminal process." Id, at 224-225, 85 
S.Ct., at 1371 (emphasis added). 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with probabilities. Long before the law of 
probabilities was articulated **2329 as such, 
practical people formulated certain common-sense 
conclusions about human behavior; jurors as 
factfinders are permitted to do the same-and *232 so 
are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms 
of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by 
those versed in the field of law enforcement. 
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid 
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts~not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. 
Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and 
sizes from many different types of persons. As we said 
in Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 
1921, 1924. 32 L.Ed.2d 612(1972), "Informants' tips, 
like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman 
on the scene may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of 
such diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every 
situation." Ibid TFN71 
FN7. The diversity of informants' tips, as well 
as the usefulness of the totality of the 
circumstances approach to probable cause, is 
reflected in our prior decisions on the subject. 
In Jones v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.271, 
80 S.Ct. 725, 736. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (I960), we 
held that probable cause to search petitioners' 
apartment was established by an affidavit 
based principally on an informamt's tip. The 
unnamed informant claimed to have 
purchased narcotics from petitioners at their 
apartment; the affiant stated that he had been 
given correct information from the informant 
on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that 
petitioners had admitted to police officers on 
another occasion that they were narcotics 
users, sufficed to support the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. 
Likewise, in Ruzendorfv. United States. 376 
U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825. 11 L.Ed.2d 887 
(1964). the Court upheld a magistrate's 
determination that there was probable cause to 
believe that certain stolen property would be 
found in petitioner's apartment. The affidavit 
submitted to the magistrate stated that certain 
furs had been stolen, and that a confidential 
informant, who previously had furnished 
confidential information, said that he saw the 
furs in petitioner's home. Moreover, another 
confidential informant, also claimed to be 
reliable, stated that one Schweuhs had stolen 
the furs. Police reports indicated that 
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' 
company and a third informant stated that 
petitioner was a fence for Schweihs. 
Finally, in Ker v, California. 374 U.S. 23, 83 
S.Ct. 1623. 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). we held 
that information within the knowledge of 
officers who searched the Ker's apartment 
provided them with probable cause to believe 
drugs would be found there. The officers 
were aware that one Murphy had previously 
sold marijuana to a police officer; the 
transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to 
which Murphy had led the police. The night 
after this transaction, police observed Ker and 
Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy 
approached Ker's car, and, although police 
could see nothing change hands, Murphy's 
modus operandi was identical to what it had 
been the night before. Moreover, when 
police followed Ker from the scene of the 
meeting with Murphy he managed to lose 
them after performing an abrupt U-turn. 
Finally, the police had a statement from an 
informant who had provided reliable 
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information previously, that Ker was engaged 
in selling marijuana, and that his source was 
Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this 
coincidence of information was sufficient to 
support a reasonable belief of the officers that 
Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana 
is to indulge in understatement." M, at 36.83 
S.Ct..atl631. 
*233 Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs 
analysis into two largely independent channels-the 
informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of 
knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5 supra. There are 
persuasive arguments against according these two 
elements such independent status. Instead, they are 
better understood as relevant considerations in the 
totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has 
guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in 
one maybe compensated for, in determining the overall 
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, 
or by some other indicia of reliability. See, e.g., 
Adams v, Williams, supra. 407 U.S., at 146-147. 92 
S.CU at 1923-1924; Harris v. United States. 403 U.S. 
573. 91 S.Ct. 2075. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971V 
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the 
unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of 
criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a 
particular case, to thoroughlyset forth the basis of his 
knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to 
a finding of probable **2330 cause based on his tip. 
See United States v. Sellers. 483 F.2d 37 (CA5 1973V 
[FN81 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen 
comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which 
if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we 
have found *234 rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his 
knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams, supra. 
Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an 
informant's motives, his explicit and detailed 
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
statement that the event was observed first-hand, 
entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise 
be the case. Unlike a totality of circumstances 
analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the 
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability 
(and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, the 
"two-pronged test" has encouraged an excessively 
technical dissection of informants' tips, [FN91 with 
undue attention *235 being focused on isolated issues 
that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts 
presented to the magistrate. 
FN8. Compare Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App. 
507. 313 A.2d 847. 861 (Md.App. 1974). 
reasoning that "Even assuming 'credibility' 
amounting to sainthood, the judge still may 
not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and 
known and trusted police-affiant." 
FN9. Some lower court decisions, brought to 
our attention by the State, reflect a rigid 
application of such rules. In Bridzer v. State. 
503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974V the 
affiant had received a confession of armed 
robbery from one of two suspects in the 
robbery; in addition, the suspect had given 
the officer $800 in cash stolen during the 
robbery. The suspect also told the officer 
that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in 
the other suspect's apartment. A warrant 
issued on the basis of this was invalidated on 
the ground that the affidavit did not 
satisfactorily describe how the accomplice 
had obtained his information regarding the 
gun. 
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 55 IU.App.3d 
1028. 13 Ill.Dec. 752. 371 N.E.2d 687 
(111.App. 1978V the affidavit submitted in 
support of an application for a search warrant 
stated that an informant of proven and 
uncontested reliability had seen, in 
specifically described premises, "a quantity of 
a white crystalline substance which was 
represented to the informant by a white male 
occupant of the premises to be cocaine. 
Informant has observed cocaine on numerous 
occasions in the past and is thoroughly 
familiar with its appearance. The informant 
states that the white crystalline powder he 
observed in the above described premises 
appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant 
issued on the basis of the affidavit was 
invalidated because "There is no indication as 
to how the informant or for that matter any 
other person could tell whether a white 
substance was cocaine and not some other 
substance such as sugar or salt." Id., 13 
Ill.Dec. at 754. 371 N.E.2& at 689. 
Finally, in People v. Brethauer. 174 Colo. 29. 
482 P.2d 369 (Colo.l971V an informant, 
stated to have supplied reliable information in 
the past, claimed that L.S.D. and marijuana 
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were located on certain premises. The affiant 
supplied police with drugs, which were tested 
by police and confirmed to be illegal 
substances. The affidavit setting forth these, 
and other, facts was found defective under 
both prongs of SpinellL 
As early as Locke v. United States. 1 Cranch. 339,348, 
3 L.Ed. 364 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, 
in a closely related context, that "the term 'probable 
cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less 
than evidence which would justify condemnation.... It 
imports a seizure made under circumstances which 
warrant suspicion." More recently, we said that "the 
quanta ... of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial 
proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a 
warrant. Brinezar. supra, 338 U.S., at 173,69 S.Ct., at 
1309. Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the 
evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 
magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix some 
general, numerically precise degree of certainty 
corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, 
it is clear that "only the probability, and not a prima 
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause." Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 419, 89 
S.Ct., at 590. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft 1972); W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.2(3) (1978). 
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a 
criminal investigation. Technical requirements of 
elaborate specificity once exacted under common law 
**2331 pleading have no proper place in this area." 
Ventresca. supra. 380 U.S., at 108, 85 S.Ct.. at 745. 
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been 
issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, 
and who certainly do not remain abreast of each 
judicial refinement of the nature of "probable cause." 
See Shadwick v. City of Tampa. 407 U.S. 345. 
348-350. 92 S.Ct. 2119. 2121-2122, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 
(1972). The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs 
and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and 
analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our 
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact 
that many warrants are-quite properly, ibid, -issued on 
the basis of nontechnical, *236 common-sense 
judgments of laymen applying a standard less 
demanding than those used in more formal legal 
proceedings. Likewise, given the informal, often 
hurried context in which it must be applied, the 
"built-in subtleties," Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App. 507. 
313 A.2d 847. 860 fMd.App.1974). of the 
"two-pronged test" are particularly unlikely to assist 
magistrates in determining probable cause. 
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit 
should not take the form of de noyo review. A 
magistrate's "determination of probable cause should be 
paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli. 
supra, 393 U.S.. at 419, 89 S.Ct.. at 590. "A grudging 
or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants," Ventresca. supra. 380 U.S.. at 108.85 S.Ct., 
at 745, is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant "courts should not invalidate .. warrants] by 
interpreting affidavit [s] in a hypertechnical, rather than 
a commonsense, manner." Id. at 109, 85 S.Ct., at 746. 
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are 
subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have 
deemed appropriate, police might well resort to 
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on 
consent or some other exception to the warrant clause 
that might develop at the time of ihe search. In 
addition, the possession of a warrant by officers 
conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the 
perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by 
assuring "the individual whose property is searched or 
seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, 
his need to search, and the limits of his power to 
search." United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 9. 97 
S.Ct. 2476. 2482, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). Reflecting 
this preference for the warrant process, the traditional 
standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable 
cause determination has been that so long as the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for... concluding]" 
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, 
the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. 
United States. 362 U.S. 257,271. 80 S Ct. 725. 736.4 
L.Ed.2d 697 (I960). See *231United States v. 
Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 577-583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2079-
2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). [FN 101 We think 
reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose 
of encouraging recourse to the warranl procedure and 
is more consistent with our traditional deference to the 
probable cause determinations of magistrates than is 
the "two-pronged test." 
FN10. We also have said that "Although in a 
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particular case it may not be easy to determine 
when an affidavit demonstrates the existence 
of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful 
or marginal cases in this area should be 
largely determined by the preference to be 
accorded to warrants," Ventresca, supra 380 
U.S., at 109, 85 S.Ct., at 746. This reflects 
both a desire to encourage use of the warrant 
process by police officers and a recognition 
that once a warrant has been obtained, 
intrusion upon interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment is less severe than 
otherwise may be the case. Even if we were 
to accept the premise that the accurate 
assessment of probable cause would be 
furthered by the "two- pronged test," which 
we do not, these Fourth Amendment policies 
would require a less rigorous standard than 
that which appears to have been read into 
Aguilar and Spinelli. 
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following 
Spinelli poorly serves "the **2332 most basic function 
of any government": "to provide for the security of the 
individual and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona. 
384 U.S. 436, 539, 86 S.Ct. 1602. 1661, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The strictures 
that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged test" 
cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law 
enforcement, see, e.g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois 
Supreme Court apparently thought, that test must be 
rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips 
seldom would be of greatly diminished value in police 
work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see 
Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Committee 
Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive 
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. 
Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in 
this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous 
tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and 
unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom 
could survive a rigorous application of either of the 
Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when 
supplemented by *238 independent police 
investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of 
otherwise "perfect crimes." While a conscientious 
assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is 
required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that 
leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen 
informants is not. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to 
abandon the "two- pronged test" established by our 
decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. FFN111 In its place 
we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis 
that traditionally has informed probable cause 
determinations. See Jones v. United States, supra: 
United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegarv. United 
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and 
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for... 
conclud[ing]" that probable cause *239 existed. Jones 
v. United States, supra. 362 U.S., at 271, 80 S.Ct., at 
736. We are convinced that this flexible, easily 
applied standard will better achieve the accommodation 
of public and private interests that the Fourth 
Amendment requires than does the approach that has 
developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. 
FN11. The Court's decision in Spinelli has 
been the subject of considerable criticism, 
both by members of this Court and others. 
Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in United 
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 585-586, 91 
S.Ct. 2075, 2082-2083, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1971), noted his long-held view "that Spinelli 
... was wrongly decided" by this Court. 
Justice Black similarly would have overruled 
that decision. Ibid. Likewise, a noted 
commentator has observed that "[t]he 
Aguilar-Spinelli formulation has provoked 
apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's 
Federal Practice % 41.04 (1981). 
Whether the allegations submitted to the 
magistrate in Spinelli would, under the view 
we now take, have supported a finding of 
probable cause, we think it would not be 
profitable to decide. There are so many 
variables in the probable cause equation that 
one determination will seldom be a useful 
"precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that 
while we in no way abandon Spinelli 's 
concern for the trustworthiness of informers 
and for the principle that it is the magistrate 
who must ultimately make a finding of 
probable cause, we reject the rigid 
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categorization suggested by some of its 
language. 
r91T 1 Oin I! Our earlier cases illustrate the limits 
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing 
a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that "he has 
cause to suspect and does believe that" liquor illegally 
brought into the United States is located on certain 
premises will not do. Nathanson v. United States. 290 
U.S. 41.54 S.Ct. 11,78 L.Ed. 159(1933). An affidavit 
must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
determining the existence of probable cause, and the 
wholly conclusory statement at issue in Nathanson 
failed to meet this requirement. An **2333 officer's 
statement that "affiants have received reliable 
information from a credible person and believe" that 
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. 
Amilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a mere 
conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually 
no basis at all for making a judgment regarding 
probable cause. Sufficient information must be 
presented to the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere 
ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order 
to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's 
duty does not occur, courts must continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on 
which warrants are issued. But when we move beyond 
the "bare bones" affidavits present in cases such as 
Nathanson and Aguilar, this area simply does not lend 
itself to a prescribed set of rules, like that which had 
developed from Spinelli. Instead, the flexible, 
common-sense standard articulated in Jones, 
Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 
Justice BRENN AN's dissent suggests in several places 
that the approach we take today somehow downgrades 
the *240 role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar 
and Spinelli "preserve the role of magistrates as 
independent arbiters of probable cause...." Post, at 
2357. Quite the contrary, we believe, is the case. The 
essential protection of the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United 
States. 333 U.S. 10,68 S.Ct. 367.92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), 
is in "requiring that [the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id., at 13-14. 68 
S.Ct., at 369. Nothing in our opinion in any way 
lessens the authority of the magistrate to draw such 
reasonable inferences as he will from the material 
supplied to him by applicants for a warrant; indeed, he 
is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to 
draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is 
so minded. 
The real gist of Justice BRENNAN's criticism seems 
to be a second argument, somewhat at odds with the 
first, that magistrates should be restricted in their 
authority to make probable cause determinations by the 
standards laid down in Aguilar and Spinelli, and that 
such findings "should not be authorized unless there is 
some assurance that the information on which they are 
based has been obtained in a reliable waiy by an honest 
or credible person." However, under our opinion 
magistrates remain perfectly free to exact such 
assurances as they deem necessary, as well as those 
required by this opinion, in making probable cause 
determinations. Justice BRENNAN would apparently 
prefer that magistrates be restricted in their findings of 
probable cause by the development of an elaborate 
body of case law dealing with the "veracity" prong of 
the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken down into two 
"spurs"—the informant's "credibility" and the 
"reliability" of his information, together with the "basis 
of knowledge" prong of the Spinelli test. See n. 4, 
supra. That such a labyrinthine body of judicial 
refinement bears any relationship to familiar definitions 
of *241 probable cause is hard to imagine. Probable 
cause deals "with probabilities. These are not 
technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," Brinegar 
v. United States. 338 U.S. 160. 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 
1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879(1949). 
Justice BRENNAN's dissent also suggests that "words 
such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common sense,' 
as used in the Court's opinion, are but code words for 
an overly-permissive attitude towards police practices 
in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth 
Amendment." Infra, p. 2359. An easy, but not a 
complete, answer to this rather florid statement would 
be that nothing we know about Justice **2334 
Rutledge suggests that he would have used the words 
he chose in Brinegar in such a manner. More 
fundamentally, no one doubts that "under our 
Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment may be employed by government to cure 
[the horrors of drug trafficking]," post, at 2359; but 
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this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which 
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment. "Fidelity" to the 
commands of the Constitution suggests balanced 
judgment rather than exhortation. The highest 
"fidelity" is achieved neither by the judge who 
instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most 
bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any 
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively 
goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of 
governmental authorities. The task of this Court, as of 
other courts, is to "hold the balance true," and we think 
we have done that in this case. 
IV 
[121 Our decisions applying the totality of 
circumstances analysis outlined above have 
consistently recognized the value of corroboration of 
details of an informant's tip by independent police 
work. In Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S.. at 
269, 80 S.Ct.. at 735. we held that an affidavit relying 
on hearsay "isnot to *242 be deemed insufficient on 
that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting 
the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that even 
in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may rely 
upon information received through an informant, rather 
than upon his direct observations, so long as the 
informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by 
other matters within the officer's knowledge." Ibid. 
Likewise, we recognized the probative value of 
corroborative efforts of police officials in Aguilar — the 
source of the "two-pronged test"-by observing that if 
the police had made some effort to corroborate the 
informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case" 
would have been presented. Aguilar. supra. 378 U.S.. 
at 109. n. 1.84S.Ct..atl5U.n. 1. 
Our decision in Drapery. United States. 358 U.S. 307. 
79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). however, is the 
classic case on the value of corroborative efforts of 
police officials. There, an informant named Hereford 
reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train 
from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be 
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also 
supplied a fairly detailed physical description of 
Draper, and predicted that he would be wearing a light 
colored raincoat, brown slacks and black shoes, and 
would be walking "real fast." Id. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 
331. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his 
information. [FN 121 
FN 12. The tip in Draper might well not have 
survived the rigid application of the 
"two-pronged test" that developed following 
Spineili. The only reference to Hereford's 
reliability was that he had "been engaged as a 
'special employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics 
at Denver for about six months, and from time 
to time gave information to [the police] for 
small sums of money, and that [the officer] 
had always found the information given by 
Hereford to be accurate and reliable." 358 
U.S.. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. Likewise, the 
tip gave no indication of how Hereford came 
by his information. At most, the detailed and 
accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, 
however Hereford obtained his information, it 
was reliable. 
On one of the stated dates police officers observed a 
man matching this description exit a train arriving from 
Chicago; his attire and luggage matched Hereford's 
report and he was *243 walking rapidly. We 
explained in Draper that, by this point in his 
investigation, the arresting officer "had personally 
verified every facet of the information given him by 
Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished 
his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his 
person or in his bag. And surely, with every other bit 
of Hereford's information being thus personally 
verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable grounds' to 
believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's 
information-that Draper would have the heroin with 
him-was likewise true," id. at 313. 79 S.Ct.. at 333. 
**2335 The showing of probable cause in the present 
case was fully as compelling as that in Draper. Even 
standing alone, the factsobtained through the 
independent investigation of Mader and the DEA at 
least suggested that the Gates were involved in drug 
trafficking. In addition to being a popular vacation 
site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics and 
other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall. 
446 U.S. 544. 562. 100 S.Ct. 1870. 1881. 64 L.Ed.2d 
497 H980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA, 
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs 
to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic 
Sources 10(1979). Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach, 
his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent 
immediate return north to Chicago in the family car, 
conveniently awaiting him in West Palm Beach, is as 
suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of an 
ordinary vacation trip. 
[131fl41 In addition, the magistrate could rely on the 
anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in 
major part by Mader's efforts-just as had occurred in 
Draper. [TNI 31 The Supreme Court *244 of Illinois 
reasoned that Draper involved an informant who had 
given reliable information on previous occasions, while 
the honesty and reliability of Ihe anonymous informant 
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. 
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time 
the police department received the anonymous letter, it 
became far less significant after Mader's independent 
investigative work occurred. The corroboration of the 
letter's predictions that the Gates' car would be in 
Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the 
next day or so, and that he v/ould drive the car north 
toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with 
certainty, that the informant's other assertions also were 
true. "Because an informant is right about some things, 
he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli, 
sunra. 393 U.S.. at 427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594 (WHITE, J., 
concurring)--including the claim regarding the Gates' 
illegal activity. This may well not be the type of 
"reliability" or "veracity" necessary to satisfy some 
views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we think 
it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment 
called for in making a probable cause determination. 
It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, 
that "corroboration through other sources of 
information reduced the *245 chances of a reckless or 
prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis 
for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United States, 
supra. 362 U.S.. at 269. 271.. 80 S.Ct.. at 735. 736. 
FN13. The Illinois Supreme Court thought 
that the verification of details contained in the 
anonymous letter in this case amounted only 
to "the corroboration of innocent activity," 
J.A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause. We are 
inclined to agree, however, with the 
observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting 
opinion that "In this case, just as in Draper, 
seemingly innocent activity became 
suspicious in the light of the initial tip." J.A. 
18a. And it bears noting that all of the 
corroborating detail established in Draper, 
supra, was of entirely innocent activity~a fact 
later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. 
United States. 362 U.S. 257. 269-270. 80 
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S.Ct. 725. 735-736. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960V 
and Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23. 36. 83 
S.Ct. 1623. 1631. 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963V 
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed 
previously, probable cause requires only a 
probability or substantial chance of criminal 
activity, not an actual showing of such 
activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent 
behavior frequently will provide the basis for 
a showing of probable cause; to require 
otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a 
drastically more rigorous definition of 
probable cause than the security of our 
citizens demands. We think the Illinois court 
attempted a too rigid classification of the 
types of conduct that may be relied upon in 
seeking to demonstrate probable cause. See 
Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47. 52. n. 2. 99 
S.Ct. 2637. 2641. n. 2. 61 L.Ed.2d 357 
(1979). In making a determination of 
probable cause the relevant inquiry is not 
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or 
"guilty," but the degree of suspicion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal 
acts. 
[151 Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of 
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and 
conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future 
**2336 actions of third parties ordinarily not easily 
predicted. The letter writer's accurate information as 
to the travel plans of each of the GEites was of a 
character likely obtained only from the Gates 
themselves, or from someone familiar with their not 
entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had 
access to accurate information of this type a magistrate 
could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he 
also had access to reliable information of the Gates' 
alleged illegal activities. [TNI41 Of *246 course, the 
Gates' travel plans might have been learned from a 
talkative neighbor or travel agent; under the 
"two-pronged test" developed from Spinelli, the 
character of the details in the anonymous letter might 
well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding 
the letter writer's "basis of knowledge." But, as 
discussed previously, supra, 2332, probsible cause does 
not demand the certainty we associate with formal 
trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that 
the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his 
entire story either from the Gates or someone they 
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the 
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letter's predictions provides just this probability. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant 
had a "substantial basis for ... concluding]" that 
probable cause to search the Gates' home and car 
existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois therefore must be 
he probably also had a reliable basis for his 
statements that the Gates' kept a large quantity 
of drugs in their home and frequently were 
visited by other drug traffickers there. 
Reversed. 
FN 14. The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in 
the anonymous informant's letter—its 
statement that Sue Gates would fly from 
Florida to Illinois, when in fact she 
drove—and argues that the probative value of 
the entire tip was undermined by this 
allegedly "material mistake." We have never 
required that informants used by the police be 
infallible, and can see no reason to impose 
such a requirement in this case. Probable 
cause, particularly when police have obtained 
a warrant, simply does not require the 
perfection the dissent finds necessary. 
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's 
argument that the Gates' action in leaving their 
home unguarded undercut the informant's 
claim that drugs were hidden there. Indeed, 
the line-by-line scrutiny that the dissent 
applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that 
we find inappropriate in reviewing 
magistrate's decisions. The dissent 
apparently attributes to the magistrate who 
issued the warrant in this case the rather 
implausible notion that persons dealing in 
drugs always stay at home, apparently out of 
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by 
criminals. If accurate, one could not help 
sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation 
of people so situated. In reality, however, it 
is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever 
thought that the anonymous tip "kept one 
spouse" at home, much less that he relied on 
the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter 
simply says that Sue would fly from Florida to 
Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates' 
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in 
their house, or those in their car, unguarded. 
The magistrate's determination that there 
might be drugs or evidence of criminal 
activity in the Gates' home was 
well-supported by the less speculative theory, 
noted in text, that if the informant could 
predict with considerable accuracy the 
somewhat unusual travel plans of the Gates, 
Justice WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
In my view, the question regarding modification of the 
exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 
1982, — U.S. — (1982), is properly before us and 
should be addressed. I continue to believe that the 
exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy where law 
enforcement officials act in the reasonable belief that a 
search and seizure was consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment-a position I set forth in Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465. 537-539. 96 S.Ct. 3027, 3032-3033, 49 
L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). In this case, it was fully 
reasonable for the Bloomingdale, Illinois police to 
believe that their search of respondents' house and 
automobile comported with the Fourth Amendment as 
the search was conducted pursuant to a 
judicially-issued warrant. The *247 exclusion of 
probative evidence where the constable has not 
blundered not only sets the criminal free but also fails 
to serve any constitutional interest in securing 
compliance with the important requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. On this basis, I **2337 concur in 
the Court's judgment that the decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court must be reversed. 
I 
The Court declines to address the exclusionary rule 
question because the Illinois courts were not invited to 
modify the rule in the first instance. The Court's refusal 
to face this important question cannot be ascribed to 
jurisdictional limitations. I fully agree that the statute 
which gives us jurisdiction in this cause, 18 U.S.C. § 
1257(3), prevents us from deciding federal 
constitutional claims raised here for the first time on 
review of state court decisions. Cardinale v. 
Louisiana 394 U.S. 437. 438-439. 89 S.Ct. 1161. 
1162-1163. 22 L.Ed.2d 398 (1969). But it is equally 
well-established that "[n]o particular form of words or 
phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity 
and the ground therefore be brought to the attention of 
the state court with fair precision and in due time." 
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Street v. New York. 394 U.S. 576, 584, 89 S.Ct. 1354. 
1361.22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969) (quoting New York ex rei 
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67. 49 S.Ct. 61. 
63. 73 L.Ed. 184 (1928)). Notwithstanding the select 
and controversial instances in which the Court has 
reversed a state court decision for "plain error," TFN11 
we have consistently dismissed for want of jurisdiction 
where the federal claim asserted in this Court was not 
raised below. But this obviously is not such a case. 
As the Court points out, "It is clear in this case that 
respondents expressly raised, at every level of the 
Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth 
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the 
Illinois *248 police and that the evidence seized by the 
officers should be excluded from their trial." Ante, at 
2323. Until today, we have not required more. 
FN1. See e.g., Eddinss v. Oklahoma. 455 
U.S. 104.102 S.Ct. 869.71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982): 
Woodv. Georxia. 450 U.S. 261. 101 S.Ct. 
1097.67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1980); Vachon v. New 
Hampshire. 414 U.S. 478. 94 S.Ct. 664. 38 
L.Ed.2d 666 (1974) (per curiam ). Of 
course, to the extent these cases were 
correctly decided, they indicate a fortiori that 
the exclusionary rule issue in this case is 
properly before us. 
We have never suggested that the jurisdictional 
stipulations of § 1257 require that all arguments on 
behalf of, let alone in opposition to, a federal claim be 
raised and decided below. TFN21 See R. Stern & E. 
Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 230 (1978). Dewey 
v. Pes Moines. 173 U.S. 193. 19 S.Ct. 379. 43 L.Ed. 
665 (1898) distinguished the raising of constitutional 
claims and the making of arguments in support of or in 
opposition to those claims. 
considered: "we dispose of the case on the 
constitutional premise raised below, reaching 
the result by a method of analysis readily 
available to the state court. For the same 
reason, the strictures of Cardinale... and Hill, 
have been fully observed." 405 U.S., at 658. 
n. 10, 92 S.Ct., at 1216, n. 10. The dissent 
argued that the Court was deciding a due 
process claim instead of an equal protection 
one, but there was no suggestion that it 
mattered at all that the Court had relied on a 
different type of equal protection argument. 
"If the question were only an enlargement of the one 
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were 
so connected with it in substance as to form but 
another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity 
of the personal judgment, we should have no 
hesitation in holding the assignment sufficient to 
permit the question to be now raised and argued. 
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments 
which were advanced in the courts below upon a 
federal question there discussed* *2338" 173 U.S.. 
at 197-198, 19 S.Ct., at 380-381 (emphasis added). 
TFN31 
FN3. As the Court explains, ante, at 2322, n. 
2, in Dewey, appellant argued only that the 
imposition of personal liability against him 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not 
received personal notice of the assessment 
proceedings. In this Court, appellant sought 
to raise a takings argument for the first time. 
The Court declined to pass on the issue 
because, although arising from a single factual 
occurrence the two claims "are not in anywise 
necessarily connected," 173 U.S.. at 198, 19 
S.Ct., at 380. 
FN2. The Court has previously relied on 
issues and arguments not raised in the state 
court below in order to dispose of a federal 
question that was properly raised. In Stanley 
v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 658. 92 S.Ct. 1208. 
1216.3lL.Ed.2d551 (1972), the Court held 
that unmarried fathers could not be denied a 
hearing on parental fitness that was afforded 
other Illinois parents. Although this issue 
was not presented in the Illinois courts, the 
Court found that it could properly be 
*249 Under Dewey, which the Court hails as the 
"fullest treatment of the subject," ante, at 2322, the 
exclusionary rule issue is but another argument 
pertaining to the Fourth Amendment question squarely 
presented in the Illinois courts. 
The presentation and decision of respondent's Fourth 
Amendment claim fully embraces the argument that 
due to the nature of the alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation, the seized evidence should not be excluded. 
Our decisions concerning the scope of the 
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exclusionary rule cannot be divorced from the Fourth 
Amendment; they rest on the relationship of Fourth 
Amendment interests to the objectives of the criminal 
justice system. See, e.g. United States v. Ceccolini. 
435 U.S. 268. 98 S.Ct. 1054. 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); 
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465. 96 S.Ct. 3037. 49 
L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). TFN41 Similarly, the issues 
surrounding a proposed good faith modification are 
intricately and inseverably tied to the nature of the 
Fourth Amendment violation: the degree of probable 
cause, the presence of a warrant, and the clarity of 
previously announced Fourth Amendment principles all 
inform the *250 good faith issue. The Court's own 
holding that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for 
concluding that probable cause existed, ante, at 2334, 
is itself but a variation on the good-faith theme. See 
Brief of Petitioner on Reargument at 4-26. 
FN4. The Court relies on these cases for the 
surprising assertion that the Fourth 
Amendment and exclusionary rule questions 
are "distinct." I had understood the very 
essence of Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 99 
S.Ct. 421. 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) to be that 
standing to seek exclusion of evidence could 
not be divorced from substantive Fourth 
Amendment rights. Past decisions finding that 
the remedy of exclusion is not always 
appropriate upon the finding of a Fourth 
Amendment violation acknowledge the close 
relationship of the issues. For example, in 
United States v. Ceccolini it was said: "The 
constitutional question under the Fourth 
Amendment was phrased in Wong Sun v. 
United States. 371 U.S. 471. 83 S.Ct. 407. 9 
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), as whether 'the 
connection between the lawless conduct of the 
police and the discovery of the challenged 
evidence has become so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint.'" 435 U.S.. at 275-276.98 
S.Ct.. at 1059-1060. It is also surprising to 
learn that the issues in Stone v. Powell are 
"distinct" from the Fourth Amendment. 
As a jurisdictional requirement, I have no doubt that 
the exclusionary rule question is before us as an 
indivisible element of the claim that the Constitution 
requires exclusion of certain evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a prudential 
matter, I am unmoved by the Court's lengthy discourse 
as to why it must avoid the question. First, the Court 
turns on its head the axiom that" 'due regard for the 
appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts,' 
McGoldrick v. Comyaznie Generate. 309 U.S. 430. 
434- 435. 60 S.Ct. 670. 672-673. 84 L.Ed. 849 (1940). 
demands that those courts be given an opportunity to 
consider the constitutionality of the actions of state 
officials" ante, at 2323. This statement, written to 
explain why a state statute should not be struck down 
on federal grounds not raised in the state courts, [FN51 
**2339 hardly applies when the question is whether a 
rule of federal law articulated by this Court should now 
be narrowed to reduce the scope of federal intrusion 
into the state's administration of criminal justice. 
Insofar as modifications of the federal exclusionary 
*251 rule are concerned, the Illinois courts are bound 
by this Court's pronouncements. Cf. Oregon v. Hass. 
420 U.S. 714. 719. 95 S.Ct. 1215. 1219. 43 L.Ed.2d 
570 (1975). I see little point in requiring a litigant to 
request a state court to overrule or modify one of this 
Court's precedents. Far from encouraging the stability 
of our precedents, the Court's proposed practice could 
well undercut stare decisis. Either the presentation of 
such issues to the lower courts will be a completely 
futile gesture or the lower courts are now invited to 
depart from this Court's decisions whenever they 
conclude such a modification is in order. [FN61 
FN5. Consider the full context of the 
statement in McGoldrick: 
"In cases coming here from state courts in 
which a state statute is assailed as 
unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar 
force which should lead us to refrain from 
deciding questions not presented or decided in 
the highest court of the state whose judicial 
action we are called upon to review. Apart 
from the reluctance with which every court 
should proceed to set aside legislation as 
unconstitutional on grounds not properly 
presented, due regard for the appropriate 
relationship of this Court to state courts 
requires us to decline to consider and decide 
questions affecting the validity of state 
statutes not urged or considered there. It is 
for these reasons that this Court, where the 
constitutionality of a statute has been upheld 
in the state court, consistently refuses to 
consider any grounds of attack not raised or 
decided in that court." 309 U.S.. at 434. 60 
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S.Ct., at 672. 
FN6. The Court observes that "although the 
Illinois courts applied the federal exclusionary 
rule, there was never 'any real contest' upon 
the point." Ante, at 2324. But the proper 
forum for a "real contest" on the continued 
vitality of the exclusionary rule that has 
developed from our decisions in Weeks v. 
United States. 232 U.S. 383,34 S.Ct. 341, 58 
L.Ed. 652 H914) and Mappv. Ohio. 367 U.S. 
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) is 
this Court. 
The Court correctly notes that Illinois may choose to 
pursue a different course with respect to the state 
exclusionary rule. If this Court were to formulate a 
"good faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule, 
the Illinois Supreme Court would be free to consider on 
remand whether the state exclusionary rule should be 
modified accordingly. The possibility that it might 
have relied upon the state exclusionary rule had the 
"good-faith" question been posed does not constitute 
independent and adequate state grounds. "The 
possibility that the state court might have reached the 
same conclusion if it had decided the question purely as 
a matter of state law does not create an adequate and 
independent state ground that relieves this Court of the 
necessity of considering the federal question." United 
Air Lines v. Mahin. 410 U.S. 623. 630-631. 93 S.Ct. 
1186. 1191-1192. 35 L.Ed.2d 545 (1973); Beecher v. 
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35.37. n. 3. 88 S.Ct. 189,190, n. 3. 
19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967): C. Wright, Federal Courts § 
107, pp. 747-748 (4th ed. 1983). Nor does having the 
state court first decide whether the federal exclusionary 
rule should be modified—and presentation of the 
federal question does not insure that the equivalent 
state law issue will be *252 raised or decided 
[FN71—avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal 
question. The Court still must reach a federal question 
to decide the instant case. Thus, in today's opinion, the 
Court eschews modification of the exclusionary rule in 
favor of interring the test established by Azuilar v. 
Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 
S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Nor is the 
exclusionary rule question avoided-it is simply 
deferred until "another day." 
FN7. Nor is there any reason for the Illinois 
courts to decide that question in advance of 
this Court's decision on the federal 
exclusionary rule. Until the federal rule is 
modified, the state law question is entirely 
academic. The state courts should not be 
expected to render such purely advisory 
decisions. 
It also appears that the Court, in disposing of the case, 
does not strictly follow its own prudential advice. The 
Illinois Supreme Court found not only a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment but also of Article I, § 6 of the 
Illinois Constitution which also provides assurance 
against unreasonable searches and sei2:ures. Taking 
the Court's new prudential standards on their own 
terms, the Illinois courts should be given the 
opportunity to consider in the first instance whether a 
"totality of the circumstances" test should replace the 
more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli. The 
Illinois Supreme Court may decide to retain the 
established test for purposes **2340 of its state 
constitution just as easily as it could decide to retain an 
unmodified exclusionary rule. TFN8] 
FN8. Respondents press this very argument. 
Brief of Respondent at 24-27; Brief for 
Respondent on Reargument, at 6. Of course, 
under traditional principles the possibility that 
the state court might reach a different 
conclusion in interpreting its state constitution 
does not make it improper for us to decide the 
federal issue. Delaware v. Pronse. 440 U.S. 
648, 651-653. 99 S.Ct. 1391. 1394-1395. 59 
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979): Zacchini v. 
Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co.. 433 U.S 
562, 568, 97 S.Ct. 2849. 2854. 53 L.Ed.2d 
965(1977). 
Finally, the Court correctly notes that a 
fully-developed record is helpful if not indispensable 
for the decision of many issues. 1 too resist the 
decision of a constitutional question *253 when such 
guidance is necessary, but the question of whether the 
exclusionary rule should be modified is an issue of law 
which obviously goes far beyond and depends little on 
the subjective good faith of the police officers that 
searched the Gates' property. Moreover, the case 
comes here with a fully developed record as to the 
actions of the Bloomingdale, Illinois police. If further 
factual development of whether the officers in this case 
acted in good faith were important, that issue should 
logically be considered on remand, following this 
Court's statement of the proper legal standards. [FN91 
FN9. It also should be noted that the 
requirement that the good faith issue be 
presented to the Illinois courts has little to do 
with whether the record is complete. I doubt 
that the raising of the good faith issue below 
would have been accompanied by any 
different record. And this Court may dismiss 
a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted 
when the record makes decision of a federal 
question unwise. See, e.g., Minnickv. Calif 
Department of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 
101 S.Ct. 221L 68 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981). 
The Court's straining to avoid coming to grips with the 
exclusionary rule issue today may be hard for the 
country to understand-particularly given earlier 
statements by some members of the Court. TFN10] The 
question has been fully briefed and argued by the 
parties and amici curiae, including the United States. 
[FN111 The issue is central to the enforcement of law 
and the administration of justice throughout the nation. 
The Court of Appeals for the second largest federal 
circuit *254 has already adopted such an exception, 
United States v. Williams. 622 F.2d 830 (CA5 1980) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1127,101 S.Ct. 946, 
67L.Ed.2d 114(1981), and the new Eleventh Circuit 
is presumably bound by its decision. Several members 
of this Court have for some time expressed the need to 
consider modifying the exclusionary rule, ante, at 2325, 
and Congress as well has been active in exploring the 
question. See The Exclusionary Rule Bills, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong.; 1st and 2d 
Sess. At least one state has already enacted a good 
faith exception. Colo.Rev.Stat.Tit. 16, Art. 3, § 308. 
Of course, if there is a jurisdictional barrier to deciding 
the issue, none of these considerations are relevant. 
But if no such procedural obstacle exists, I see it as our 
responsibility to end the uncertainty and decide 
whether the rule will be modified. The question of 
whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a 
warrant and whether the evidence seized must be 
excluded in this case should follow our reconsideration 
of the framework by which such issues, as they **2341 
Page 23 
arise from the Fourth Amendment, are to be handled. 
FN 10. In California v. Mini ares. 443 U.S. 
916. 928. 100 S.Ct. 9. 15. 61 L.Ed.2d 892 
(1979) (REHNQUIST, J., joined by THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting from the denial 
of stay), the author of today's opinion for the 
Court urged that the parties be directed to 
brief whether the exclusionary rule should be 
retained. In Minjares, like this case, 
respondents had raised a Fourth Amendment 
claim but petitioners had not attacked the 
validity of the exclusionary rule in the state 
court. See also Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420. 437, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2851, 69 
L.Ed.2d 744 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) 
(advocating overruling of Maw v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 
(1961)). 
FN11. Ironically, in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 
petitioners did not ask the Court to partially 
overrule Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69 
S.Ct. 1359. 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). The sole 
argument to apply the exclusionary rule to the 
states is found in a single paragraph in an 
amicus brief filed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union. 
II 
The exclusionary rule is a remedy adopted by this 
Court to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
citizens "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures 
..." Although early opinions suggested that the 
Constitution required exclusion of all illegally obtained 
evidence, the exclusionary rule "has never been 
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all 
persons." Stone v Powell. 428 U.S. 465,486,96 S.Ct. 
3037, 3048. 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Because of the 
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence 
and the resulting social costs from its loss through 
suppression, application *255 of the exclusionary rule 
has been carefully "restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
observed." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338. 
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348. 94 S.Ct. 613, 620.38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974V Even 
at criminal trials the exclusionary rule has not been 
applied indiscriminately to ban all illegally obtained 
evidence without regard to the costs and benefits of 
doing so. Infra, at 2341. These developments, borne 
of years of experience with the exclusionary rule in 
operation, forcefully suggest that the exclusionary rule 
be more generally modified to permit the introduction 
of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief 
that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
This evolvement in the understanding of the proper 
scope of the exclusionary rule embraces several lines of 
cases. First, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule 
has been limited to situations where the Government 
seeks to use such evidence against the victim of the 
unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 
223.93 S.Ct. 1565.36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973V Alderman 
v. United States. 394 U.S. 165. 89 S.Ct. 961. 22 
L.Ed.2d 176(1969); Worn Sun v. United States. 371 
U.S. 471. 491-492. 83 S.Ct. 407. 419-420. 9 L.Ed.2d 
441 (1963V. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 99 S.Ct. 
421. 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978V 
Second, the rule has not been applied in proceedings 
other than the trial itself. In United States v. 
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338.94 S.Ct. 613.38 L.Ed.2d 561 
(1974V the Court refused to extend the rule to grand 
jury proceedings. "Any incremental deterrent effect 
which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand 
jury proceedings is uncertain at best.... We therefore 
decline to embrace a view that would achieve a 
speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the 
deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of 
substantially impeding the role of the grand jury." Id.. 
at 348. 94 S.Ct.. at 620. Similarly, in United States v. 
Janis. 428 U.S. 433. 96 S.Ct. 3021. 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 
£1976}, the exclusionary rule was not extended to 
forbid the use in the federal civil proceedings of 
evidence illegally seized by state officials, since the 
likelihood of deterring unlawful police conduct was not 
sufficient to outweigh the social costs imposed by the 
exclusion. 
*256 Third, even at a criminal trial, the same analysis 
has led us to conclude that the costs of excluding 
probative evidence outweighed the deterrence benefits 
in several circumstances. We have refused to prohibit 
the use of illegally seized evidence for the purpose of 
impeaching a defendant who testifies in his own behalf. 
UnitedStates v. Havens. 446 U.S. 620. lOOS.Ct. 1912. 
64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980V Walderv. United States. 347 
U.S. 62. 74 S.Ct. 354. 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954V We have 
also declined to adopt a "per se or 'but for' rule" that 
would make inadmissible any evidence which comes to 
light through a chain of causation that began with an 
illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois. All U.S. 590. 603. 95 
S.Ct. 2254. -—. 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975V And we have 
held that testimony of a live witness may be admitted, 
notwithstanding that the testimony was derived from a 
concededly unconstitutional search. United States v. 
Ceccolini. 435 U.S. 268.98 S.Ct. 1054.55 L.Ed.2d 268 
(1978). Nor is exclusion required **2342 when law 
enforcement agents act in good-faith reliance upon a 
statute or ordinance that is subsequently held to be 
unconstitutional. United States v. Peltier. All U.S. 
531. 95 S.Ct. 2313. 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1977V Michigan 
v. DeFillivvo. 443 U.S. 31. 99 S.Ct. 2627. 61 L.Ed.2d 
343 (1979V [FN 121 Cf United States v. Caceres. 440 
U.S. 741. 754-757. 99 S.Ct. 1465. 1472-1474. 59 
L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (exclusion not *257 required of 
evidence tainted by violation of an executive 
department's rules concerning electronic 
eavesdropping). 
FN 12. To be sure, Peltier and DeFillippo did 
not modify the exclusionary rule itself. 
Peltier held that Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States. 413 U.S. 266. 93 S.Ct. 2535. 37 
L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). was not to be given 
retroactive effect; DeFillippo upheld the 
validity of an arrest made in good-faith 
reliance on an ordinance subsequently 
declared unconstitutional. The effect of these 
decisions, of course, was that evidence was 
not excluded because of the officer's 
reasonable belief that he was acting lawfully, 
and the Court's reasoning, as I discuss below, 
infra, at 2343-2344, leads inexorably to the 
more general modification of the exclusionary 
rule I favor. Indeed, Justice BRENNAN 
recognized this in his dissent in Peltier. All 
U.S.. at 551-552. 95 S.Ct.. at 2324-2325. 
I recognize that we have held that the 
exclusionary rule required suppression of 
evidence obtained in searches carried out 
pursuant to statutes, not previously declared 
unconstitutional, which purported to authorize 
the searches in question without probable 
cause and without a valid warrant. See, e.g., 
Torres v. Puerto Rico. AA1 U.S. 465. 99 S.Ct. 
2425.61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez 
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v. United States, supra; Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889. 20 L.Ed.2d 917 
(1968); Berzer v. New York, 388 U.S. 41. 87 
S.Ct. 1873. 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). The 
results in these cases may well be different 
under a "good-faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule. 
A similar balancing approach is employed in our 
decisions limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy 
for Fifth Amendment violations, Oregon v. Hass. 420 
U.S. 714. 95 S.Ct. 1215. 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975): 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222. 91 S.Ct. 643. 28 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433. 
94 S.Ct. 2357. 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). and our cases 
considering whether Fourth Amendment decisions 
should be applied retroactively, United States v. Peltier, 
supra. 422 U.S.. at 538-539. 95 S.Ct.. at 2318; 
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646. 654-655. 91 
S.Ct. 1148. 1153-1154. 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971) 
(plurality opinion); Desist v. United States. 394 U.S.. 
at 244. 249- 250. 89 S.Ct.. at 1030. 1033-1034. 22 
L.Ed.2d 248: Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618. 
636-639. 85 S.Ct. 1731. 1741-1743. 14 L.Ed.2d 601. 
But see United States v. Johnson, — U.S. — , 102 
S.Ct. 2579. 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). 
These cases reflect that the exclusion of evidence is 
not a personal constitutional right but a remedy, which, 
like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and 
benefits of its imposition. The trend and direction of 
our exclusionary rule decisions indicate not a lesser 
concern with safeguarding the Fourth Amendment but 
a fuller appreciation of the high costs incurred when 
probative, reliable evidence is barred because of 
investigative error. The primary cost, of course, is that 
the exclusionary rule interferes with the truthseeking 
function of a criminal trial by barring relevant and 
trustworthy evidence. [FN 131 We will never know 
how many guilty defendants go free as a result of the 
rule's operation. But any rule of evidence that denies 
the jury access to clearly probative and reliable 
evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, 
*258 and must be carefully limited to the circumstances 
in which it will pay its way by deterring official 
lawlessness. I do not presume that modification of the 
exclusionary rule will, by itself, significantly reduce the 
crime rate-but that **2343 is no excuse for 
indiscriminate application of the rule. 
FN 13. The effects of the exclusionary rule are 
often felt before a case reaches trial. A 
recent study by the National Institute of 
Justice of felony arrests in California during 
the years 1976-1979 "found a major impact of 
the exclusionary rule on state prosecutions." 
National Institute of Justice, The Effects of 
the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 
2 (1982). The study found that 4.8% of the 
more than 4,000 felony cases declined for 
prosecution were rejected because of search 
and seizure problems. The exclusionary rule 
was found to have a particularly pronounced 
effect in drug cases; prosecutors rejected 
approximately 30% of all felony drug arrests 
because of search and seizure problems. 
The suppression doctrine entails other costs as well. 
It would be surprising if the suppression of evidence 
garnered in good-faith, but by means later found to 
violate the Fourth Amendment, did not deter legitimate 
as well as unlawful police activities. To the extent the 
rule operates to discourage police from reasonable and 
proper investigative actions, it hinders the solution and 
even the prevention of crime. A tremendous burden is 
also placed on the state and federal judicial systems. 
One study reveals that one-third of federal defendants 
going to trial file Fourth Amendment suppression 
motions, and 70% to 90% of these involve formal 
hearings. Comptroller General of the United States, 
Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal 
Prosecutions 10(1979). 
The rule also exacts a heavy price in undermining 
public confidence in the reasonableness of the 
standards that govern the criminal justice system. 
"[Although the [exclusionary] rule is thought to deter 
unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of 
respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied 
indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of 
generating disrespect for the law and the administration 
of justice." Stone v. Powell 428 U.S.. at 490-491. 96 
S.Ct.. at 3050-3051. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
observed in his separate opinion in Stone v. Powell. 
428 U.S.. at 490. 96 S.Ct.. at 3050: "The disparity in 
particular cases between the error committed by the 
police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty 
defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the 
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of 
justice." 
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For these reasons, "application of the [exclusionary] 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served." *259United States v. Calandra. supra. 414 
U.S.. at 348,94 S.Ct.. at 620. TFN141 The reasoning of 
our recent cases strongly suggests that there is 
insufficient justification to suppress evidence at a 
criminal trial which was seized in the reasonable belief 
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. The 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule **2344 has 
never been established by empirical evidence, despite 
*260 repeated attempts. United States v. Jam's. 428 
U.S.. at 449-453. 96 S.Ct.. at 3029- 3031; Irvine v. 
California. 347 U.S. 128. 136. 74 S.Ct. 381. 385. 98 
L.Ed. 561 (1954). But accepting that the rule deters 
some police misconduct, it is apparent as a matter of 
logic that there is little if any deterrence when the rule 
is invoked to suppress evidence obtained by a police 
officer acting in the reasonable belief that his conduct 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As we initially 
observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.. at 447. 94 
S.Ct.. at 2365, and reiterated in United States v. Peltier. 
422 U.S.. at 539. 95 S.Ct.. at 2318: 
FN 14. Our decisions applying the 
exclusionary rule have referred to the 
"imperative of judicial integrity," Elkins v. 
United States. 364 U.S. 206. 222. 80 S.Ct. 
1437.1446.4L.Ed.2d 1669(1960). although 
recent opinions of the Court make clear that 
the primary function of the exclusionary rule 
is to deter violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.. at 
486.96 S.Ct., at 3048; United States v. Janis. 
428 U.S. 433. 446. 96 S.Ct. 3021. 3028. 49 
L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338. 348. 94 S.Ct. 613. 
620.38L.Ed.2d561(1974). I do not dismiss 
the idea that the integrity of the courts may be 
compromised when illegally seized evidence 
is admitted, but I am convinced that the force 
of the argument depends entirely on the type 
of search or seizure involved. At one 
extreme, there are lawless invasions of 
personal privacy that shock the conscience 
and the admission of evidence so obtained 
must be suppressed as a matter of Due 
Process, entirely aside from the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Rochin v. California. 
342 U.S. 165. 72 S.Ct. 205. 96 L.Ed. 183 
(1952). Also deserving of exclusionary 
treatment are searches and seizures 
perpetrated in intentional and flagrant 
disregard of Fourth Amendment principles. 
But the question of exclusion must be viewed 
through a different lens when a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs because the 
police have reasonably erred in assessing the 
facts, mistakenly conducted a search 
authorized under a presumably valid statute, 
or relied in good-faith upon a warrant not 
supported by probable cause, In these 
circumstances, the integrity of the courts is 
not implicated. The violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is complete before the evidence 
is admitted. Thus, "[t]he primary meaning of 
'judicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary 
rules is that the courts must not commit or 
encourage violations of the Constitution." 
United States v. Janis. suvra. 428 U.S.. at 
458. n. 35. 96 S.Ct.. at 3034, n. 35. Cf. 
United States v. Peltier. All U.S., at 537, 95 
S.Ct., at 2317 ("The teaching of these 
retroactivity cases is that if the law 
enforcement officers reasonably believed in 
good faith that evidence they had seized was 
admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial 
integrity' is not offended by the introduction 
into evidence of that material even if 
decisions subsequent to the search or seizure 
have broadened the exclusionary rule to 
encompass evidence seized in that manner.") 
I am content that the interests in judicial 
integrity run along with rather than counter to 
the deterrence concept, and that to focus upon 
the latter is to promote, not denigrate, the 
former. 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which 
has deprived the defendant of some right. By 
refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such 
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular 
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, 
a greater degree of care toward the: rights of an 
accused. Where the official action was pursued in 
complete good faith, however, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force." 
The Court in Peltier continued, 422 U.S., at 542, 95 
S.Ct.. at 2320: 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
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unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from 
a search should be suppressed only if it can be said 
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or 
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment." 
See also United States v. Janis. 428 U.S., at 459. n. 35. 
96 S.Ct.. at 3034. n. 35 ("[T]he officers here were 
clearly acting in good faith ... a factor that the Court 
has recognized reduces significantly the potential 
deterrent effect of exclusion.") The deterrent value of 
the exclusionary sanction is most effective when 
officers engage in searches and seizures under 
circumstances "so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois. 411 U.S. 590. 
610-611. 95 S.Ct. 2254. 2265-2266. 45 L.Ed.2d 416 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). On the *261 other 
hand, when officers perform their tasks in the 
good-faith belief that their action comported with 
constitutional requirements, the deterrent function of 
the exclusionary rule is so minimal, if not non-existent, 
that the balance clearly favors the rule's modification. 
rFN151 
FN 15. It has been suggested that the 
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule 
has been understated by viewing the rule as 
aimed at special deterrence, when, in fact, the 
exclusionary rule is directed at "affecting the 
wider audience of law enforcement officials 
and society at large." W. LaFave, 1 Search 
and Seizure 6 (1983 Supp.). See also W. 
Mertens and S. Wasserstrom, "The Good 
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: 
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the 
Law," 70 Georgetown L.J. 365, 399-401 
(1981). I agree that the exclusionary rule's 
purpose is not only, or even primarily, to deter 
the individual police officer involved in the 
instant case. It appears that this objection 
assumes that the proposed modification of the 
exclusionary rule will turn only the subjective 
"good-faith" of the officer. Grounding the 
modification in objective reasonableness, 
however, retains the value of the exclusionary 
rule as an incentive for the law enforcement 
profession as a whole to conduct themselves 
in accord with the Fourth Amendment. 
Dunawav v. New York 442 U.S. 200.221.99 
S.Ct. 2248. 2261. 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring). 
Indeed, the present indiscriminate application 
of the exclusionary rule may hinder the 
educative and deterrent function of the 
suppression remedy. "Instead of disciplining 
their employees, police departments generally 
have adopted the attitude that the courts 
cannot be satisfied, that the rules are 
hopelessly complicated and subject to change, 
and that the suppression of evidence is the 
court's problem and not the departments'." J. 
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 
26 Stan.L.Rev. 1027, 1050 (1974). If 
evidence is suppressed only when a law 
enforcement officer should have known that 
he was violating the Fourth Amendment, 
police departments may look more seriously at 
the officer's misconduct when suppression is 
invoked. Moreover, by providing that 
evidence gathered in good-faith reliance on a 
reasonable rule will not be excluded, a 
good-faith exception creates an incentive for 
police departments to formulate rules 
governing activities of officers in the search 
and seizure area. Many commentators, 
including proponents of the exclusionary 
sanction, recognize that the formulation of 
such rules by police departments, and the 
training necessary to implement these 
guidelines in practice, is perhaps the most 
effective means of protecting Fourth 
Amendment rights. See K. Davis, 
Discretionary Justice (1971); McGowan, 
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mich.L.Rev. 
659 (1972); A. Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 
416-431(1974). 
*262 **2345 B 
There are several types of Fourth Amendment 
violations that may be said to fall under the rubric of 
"good faith." "There will be thoseoccasions where the 
trial or appellate court will disagree on the issue of 
probable cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds 
for arrest appeared to the officer and though reasonable 
men could easily differ on the question. It also 
happens that after the events at issue have occurred, the 
law may change, dramatically or ever so slightly, but in 
any event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold 
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that there was not probable cause to make the arrest and 
to seize the evidence offered by the prosecution...." 
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S., at 539- 540, 96 S.Ct.. at 
3073-3074. (WHITE, J., dissenting). The argument 
for a good-faith exception is strongest, however, when 
law enforcement officers have reasonably relied on a 
judicially-issued search warrant. 
This Court has never set forth a rationale for applying 
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant; it has simply done so 
without considering whether Fourth Amendment 
interests will be advanced. It is my view that they 
generally will not be. When officers have dutifully 
obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate, 
and execute the warrant as directed by its terms, 
exclusion of the evidence thus obtained cannot be 
expected to deter future reliance on such warrants. 
The warrant is prima- facie proof that the officers acted 
reasonably in conducting the search or seizure; "once 
the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the 
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law." 
Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S.. at 498, 96 S.Ct.. at 3054 
(BURGER, C.J., concurring). TFN161 As Justice 
STEVENS *263 put it in writing for the Court in 
United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 823, n. 32. 102 
S.Ct. 2157. 2172. n. 32. 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982): "A 
warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish," that a law enforcement officer has "acted in 
good faith in conducting the search." Nevertheless, the 
warrant may be invalidated because of a technical 
defect or because, as in this case, the judge issued a 
warrant on information later determined to fall short of 
probable cause. Excluding evidence for these reasons 
can have no possible deterrent effect on future police 
conduct, unless it is to make officers less willing to do 
their duty. Indeed, applying the exclusionary rule to 
warrant searches may well reduce incentives for police 
to utilize the preferred warrant procedure when a 
warrantless search may be permissible under one of the 
established exceptions to the warrant requirement. See 
ante, at 2331; Brown v. Illinois. All U.S., at 611. and 
n. 3. 95 S.Ct.. at 2266. and n. 3 (POWELL, J., 
concurring); P. Johnson, New Approaches to 
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 11 (Working Paper, 
1978). See also United States v. United States District 
Court. 407 U.S. 297. 316- 317. 92 S.Ct. 2125. 
2136-2137, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); United States v. 
Ventresca. 380 U.S. 102, 106-107, 85 S.Ct. 741. 
744-745. 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 
FN 16. The Attorney General's Task Force on 
Violent Crime concluded that the situation in 
which an officer relies on a duly authorized 
warrant "is a particularly compelling example 
of good faith. A warranl: is a judicial 
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or 
make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn 
duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, 
we believe that there should be a rule which 
states that evidence obtained pursuant to and 
within the scope of a warrant: is prima facie 
the result of good faith on the part of the 
officer seizing the evidence." 
Final Report 55 (1981). 
**2346 Opponents of the proposed "reasonable belief 
exception suggest that such a modification would allow 
magistrates and judges to flout the probable cause 
requirements in issuing warrants. This is a novel 
concept: the exclusionary rule was adopted to deter 
unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of 
magistrates and judges. Magistrates must be neutral 
and detached from law enforcement operations and I 
would not presume that a modification of the 
exclusionary rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their 
responsibility to apply the law. [FN 171 In any event, I 
would apply the exclusionary *264 rule when it is 
plainly evident that a magistrate or judge had no 
business issuing a warrant. See, e.g., Azuilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); 
Nathanson v. United States. 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. 11, 
78 L.Ed. 159 H933V Similarly, the good-faith 
exception would not apply if the material presented to 
the magistrate or judge is false or misleading, Franks v. 
Delaware. 438 U.S. 154. 98 S.Ct. 2674. 57 L.Ed.2d 
667, or so clearly lacking in probable cause that no 
well-trained officer could reasonably have thought that 
a warrant should issue. 
FN 17. Much is made of Shadwick v. City of 
Tampa. 407 U.S. 345. 92 S.Ct. 2119. 32 
L.Ed.2d 783 (1971). where we held that 
magistrates need not be legally trained. 
Shadwick's holding was quite narrow. First, 
the Court insisted that "an issuing magistrate 
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and 
detached, and he must be capable of 
determining whether probable cause exists for 
the requested arrest or search." 407 U.S., at 
345. 92 S.Ct., at 2119. Second, in Shadwick, 
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the court clerk's authority extended only to the 
relatively straightforward task of issuing 
arrest warrants for breach of municipal 
ordinances. To issue search warrants, an 
individual must be capable of making the 
probable cause judgments involved. In this 
regard, I reject the Court's insinuation that it is 
too much to expect that persons who issue 
warrants remain abreast of judicial 
refinements of probable cause. Ante, at 2330. 
Finally, as indicated in text, I do not propose 
that a warrant clearly lacking a basing in 
probable cause can support a "good-faith" 
defense to invocation of the exclusionary rule. 
Another objection is that a reasonable belief exception 
will encompass all searches and seizures on the frontier 
of the Fourth Amendment, that such cases will escape 
review on the question of whether the officer's action 
was permissible, denying needed guidance from the 
courts and freezing Fourth Amendment law in its 
present state. These fears are unjustified. The 
premise of the argument is that a court must first decide 
the reasonable belief issue before turning to the 
question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred. I see no need for such an inflexible practice. 
When a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel 
question of law whose resolution is necessary to guide 
future action by law enforcement officers and 
magistrates, there is sufficient reason for the Court to 
decide the violation issue before turning to the 
good-faith question. Indeed, it may be difficult to 
*265 determine whether the officers acted reasonably 
until the Fourth Amendment issue is resolved. TFN181 
**2347 In other circumstances, however, a suppression 
motion poses no Fourth Amendment question of broad 
import-the issue is simply whether the facts in a given 
case amounted to probable cause-in these cases, it 
would be prudent for a reviewing court to immediately 
turn to the question of whether the officers acted in 
good faith. Upon finding that they had, there would 
generally be no need to consider the probable cause 
question. I doubt that our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence would suffer thereby. It is not entirely 
clear to me that the law in this area has benefitted from 
the constant pressure of fully-litigated suppression 
motions. The result usually has been that initially 
bright-line rules have disappeared in a sea of ever-finer 
distinctions. Moreover, there is much to be said for 
having Fourth Amendment jurisprudence *266 evolve 
in part, albeit perhaps at a slower pace, in other 
settings. fFN 191 
FN18. Respondents and some amici contend 
that this practice would be inconsistent with 
the Article III requirement of an actual case or 
controversy. I have no doubt that a defendant 
who claims that he has been subjected to an 
unlawful search or seizure and seeks 
suppression of the evidentiary fruits thereof 
raises a live controversy within the Article III 
authority of federal courts to adjudicate. It is 
fully appropriate for a court to decide whether 
there has been a wrong before deciding what 
remedy to impose. When questions of 
good-faith immunity have arisen under 42 
U.S.C. $ 1983, we have not been constrained 
to reach invariably the immunity question 
before the violation issue. Compare 
O'Connor v. Donaldson. All US . 563. 95 
S.Ct. 2486. 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (finding 
constitutional violation and remanding for 
consideration of good-faith defense) with 
Procnnier v. Navarette. 434 U.S. 555,566, n. 
14, 98 S.Ct. 855. 862, n. 14. 55 L.Ed.2d 24 
(1978) (finding good-faith defense first). 
Similarly, we have exercised discretion in at 
times deciding the merits of a claim even 
though the error was harmless, while on other 
occasions resolving the case solely by reliance 
on the harmless error doctrine. Compare 
Milton v, Wainwrizht. 407 U.S. 371. 372, 92 
S.Ct. 2174, 2175. 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) 
(declining to decide whether admission of 
confession was constitutional violation 
because error, if any, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt), with Coleman v. Alabama, 
399 U.S. 1. 90 S.Ct. 1999. 26 L.Ed.2d 387 
(1970) (upholding right to counsel at 
preliminary hearing and remanding for 
harmless error determination). 
FN 19. For example, a pattern or practice of 
official conduct that is alleged to violate 
Fourth Amendment rights may be challenged 
by an aggrieved individual in a suit for 
declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e.g., 
lurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547. 98 
S.Ct. 1970. 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). (Of 
course, there are limits on the circumstances 
in which such actions will lie. Rizzo v. 
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Goode. 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598. 46 
L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Los Angeles v. Lyons. 
461 U.S. 95. 103 S.Ct. 1660. 75 L.Ed.2d 675 
£]983}). Although a municipality is not 
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of 
respondeat superior, local governing bodies 
are subject to suit for constitutional torts 
resulting from implementation of local 
ordinances, regulations, policies, or even 
customary practices. Monellv. Department of 
Social Services. 436 U.S. 658.98 S.Ct. 2018. 
56L.Ed.2d611 (1978). Such entities enjoy 
no immunity defense that might impede 
resolution of the substantive constitutional 
issue. Owen v. City of Independence. 445 
U.S. 622. 100 S.Ct. 1398. 63 L.Ed.2d 673 
(1980). In addition, certain state courts may 
continue to suppress, as a matter of state law, 
evidence in state trials for any Fourth 
Amendment violation. These cases would 
likely provide a sufficient supply of state 
criminal cases in which to resolve unsettled 
questions of Fourth Amendment law. As a 
final alternative, I would entertain the 
possibility of according the benefits of a new 
Fourth Amendment rule to the party in whose 
case the rule is first announced. See Stovall 
v. Pernio. 388 U.S. 293. 301. 87 S.Ct. 1967. 
1972. 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). 
reasonableness, 1 would measure the reasonableness of 
a particular search or seizure only by objective 
standards. Even for warrantless searches, the 
requirement should be no more difficult to apply than 
the closely related good-faith test which governs civil 
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the burden 
will likely be offset by the reduction in the number of 
cases which will require elongated considerations of 
the probable cause question, and will be greatly 
outweighed by the advantages in limiting the bite of the 
exclusionary rule to the field in which it is most likely 
to have its intended effects. 
Ill 
Since a majority of the Court deems it inappropriate to 
address the good faith issue, I briefly address the 
question that the Court does reach-whether the warrant 
authorizing the search and seizure of respondents' car 
and home was constitutionally **2348 valid. 
Abandoning the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 
(1964). and Spinelliv. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 
S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). the Court upholds 
the validity of the warrant under a new "totality of the 
circumstances" approach. Although I agree that the 
warrant should be upheld, I reach this conclusion in 
accordance with the Aguilar-Spinelli framework. 
Finally, it is contended that a good-faith exception will 
be difficult to apply in practice. This concern appears 
grounded in the assumption that courts would inquire 
into the subjective belief of the law enforcement 
officers involved. I would eschew such investigations. 
"Sending state and federal courts into the minds of 
police officers would produce a grave and fruitless 
mis-allocation of judicial resources." Massachusetts v. 
Painten. 389 U.S. 560. 565. 88 S.Ct. 660. 663. 19 
L.Ed.2d 770 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not make 
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." 
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128.98 S.Ct. 1717. 56 
L.Ed.2d 168(1978). Just last Term, we modified the 
qualified immunity public officials enjoy in suits 
seeking damages against federal officials for alleged 
deprivations of constitutional rights, eliminating the 
subjective component of the standard. See Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800. 102 S.Ct. 2727. 73 L.Ed.2d 
396 (1982). Although *267 searches pursuant to a 
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into 
For present purposes, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules can be 
summed up as follows. First, an affidavit based on an 
informer's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable 
cause for issuance of a warrant unless the tip includes 
information that apprises the magistrate of the 
informant's basis for concluding that the contraband is 
where he claims it is (the "basis of know ledge" prong), 
and the affiant informs the magistrate of his basis for 
believing that the informant is credible (the "veracity" 
prong). Azuilar. supra. 378 U.S.. at 114. 84 S.Ct.. at 
1514; *268SpinellL supra. 393 U.S.. at412-413.416. 
89 S.Ct.. at 586-587.589. IFN201 Second, if a tip fails 
under either or both of the two prongs, probable cause 
may yet be established by independent police 
investigatory work that corroborates the tip to such an 
extent that it supports "both the inference that the 
informer was generally trustworthy and that he made 
his charge on the basis of information obtained in a 
reliable way." Spinelli. supra, at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at 589. 
In instances where the officers rely on corroboration, 
the ultimate question is whether the corroborated tip "is 
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as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar 's tests 
without independent corroboration." Id. at 415. 89 
S.Ct. at 588. 
FN20. The "veracity" prong is satisfied by a 
recitation in the affidavit that the informant 
previously supplied accurate information to 
the police, see McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 
300. 303-304. 87 S.Ct. 1056. 1058-1059. 18 
L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), or by proof that the 
informant gave his information against his 
penal interest, see United States v. Harris. 
403 U.S. 573. 583-584. 91 S.Ct. 2075. 
2082-2083. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (plurality 
opinion). The "basis of knowledge" prong is 
satisfied by a statement from the informant 
that he personally observed the criminal 
activity, or, if he came by the information 
indirectly, by a satisfactory explanation of 
why his sources were reliable, or, in the 
absence of a statement detailing the manner in 
which the information was gathered, by a 
description of the accused's criminal activity 
in sufficient detail that the magistrate may 
infer that the informant is relying on 
something more substantial than casual rumor 
or an individual's general reputation. Spinelli 
v. United States. 393 U.S. 410.416. 89 S.Ct. 
584. 589. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the anonymous 
tip, by itself, did not furnish probable cause. The 
question is whether those portions of the affidavit 
describing the results of the police investigation of the 
respondents, when considered in light of the tip, 
"would permit the suspicions engendered by the 
informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime 
was probably being committed." Spinelli. supra, at 
418. 89 S.Ct.. at 590. The Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that the corroboration was insufficient to 
permit such a ripening. App. 9a. The court reasoned 
as follows: 
"[T]he nature of the corroborating evidence in this 
case would satisfy neither the "basis of knowledge" 
nor the *269 "veracity" prong of Aguilar. Looking 
to the affidavit submitted as support for Detective 
Mader's request that a search warrant issue, we note 
that the corroborative evidence here was only of 
innocent activity. Mader's independent investigation 
revealed only that Lance and Sue Gates lived on 
Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates booked passage 
on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving he entered 
a room registered to his wife; and that he and his 
wife left the hotel together by car. The 
corroboration of innocent activity is insufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause." App. 12a. 
In my view, the lower court's characterization of the 
Gates' activity here as totally "innocent" is dubious. In 
fact, the behavior was quite suspicious. I agree with the 
**2349 Court, ante, at 2333, that Lance Gates' flight to 
Palm Beach, an area known to be a source of narcotics, 
the brief overnight stay in a motel, and apparent 
immediate return North, suggest a pattern that trained 
law-enforcement officers have recognized as indicative 
of illicit drug-dealing activity. [FN211 
FN21. See ante, at 2333; United States v. 
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544. 562. 100 S.Ct. 
1870. 1881. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
Even, however, had the corroboration related only to 
completely innocuous activities, this fact alone would 
not preclude the issuance of a valid warrant. The 
critical issue is not whether the activities observed by 
the police are innocent or suspicious. Instead, the 
proper focus should be on whether the actions of the 
suspects, whatever their nature, give rise to an 
inference that the informant is credible and that he 
obtained his information in a reliable manner. 
Thus, in Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307. 79 
S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). an informant stated 
on Sept. 7 that Draper would be carrying narcotics 
when he arrived by train in Denver on the morning of 
Sept. 8 or Sept. 9. The informant also provided the 
police with a detailed physical description *270 of the 
clothes Draper would be wearing when he alighted 
from the train. The police observed Draper leaving a 
train on the morning of Sept. 9, and he was wearing the 
precise clothing described by the informant. The Court 
held that the police had probable cause to arrest Draper 
at this point, even though the police had seen nothing 
more than the totally innocent act of a man getting off 
a train carrying a briefcase. As we later explained in 
Spinelli, the important point was that the corroboration 
showed both that the informant was credible,i.e. that he 
"had not been fabricating his report out of whole 
cloth," Spinelli. supra. 393 U.S.. at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at 
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589, and that he had an adequate basis of knowledge 
for his allegations, "since the report was of the sort 
which in common experience may be recognized as 
having been obtained in a reliable way." Id, at 
417-418, 89 S.Ct., at 589-590. The fact that the 
informer was able to predict, two days in advance, the 
exact clothing Draper would be wearing dispelled the 
possibility that his tip was just based on rumor or "an 
off-hand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." Id, at 
417, 89 S.Ct., at 589. Probably Draper had planned in 
advance to wear these specific clothes so that an 
accomplice could identify him. A clear inference 
could therefore be drawn that the informant was either 
involved in the criminal scheme himself or that he 
otherwise had access to reliable, inside information. 
TFN221 
FN22. Thus, as interpreted in Spinelli, the 
Court in Draper held that there was probable 
cause because "the kind of information related 
by the informant [was] not generally sent 
ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to 
those who are intimately connected with 
making careful arrangements for meeting 
him." Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 426, 89 
S.Ct., at 594 (WHITE, J., concurring). As I 
said in Spinelli, the conclusion that Draper 
itself was based on this fact is far from 
inescapable. Prior to Spinelli, Draper was 
susceptible to the interpretation that it stood 
for the proposition that "the existence of the 
tenth and critical fact is made sufficiently 
probable to justify the issuance of a warrant 
by verifying nine other facts coming from the 
same source." Spinelli, supra, at 426-427, 89 
S.Ct., at 594-595 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
But it now seems clear that the Court in 
Spinelli rejected this reading of Draper. 
Justice BRENNAN, post, at 2354-2355, 
erroneously interprets my Spinelli 
concurrence as espousing the view that 
"corroboration of certain details in a tip may 
be sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the 
basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar." 
Others have made the same mistake. See, e.g., 
Comment, 20 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 99, 105 
(1982). I did not say that corroboration could 
never satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. 
My concern was, and still is, that the prong 
might be deemed satisfied on the basis of 
corroboration of information that does not in 
any way suggest that the informant had an 
adequate basis of knowledge for his report. 
If, however, as in Draper, the police 
corroborate information from which it can be 
inferred that the informant's tip was grounded 
on inside information, this corroboration is 
sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge 
prong. Spinelli, supra, at 426, 89 S.Ct., at 
594 (WHITE, J., concurring). The rules 
would indeed be strange if, as Justice 
BRENNAN suggests, post, at 2356, the basis 
of knowledge prong could be satisfied by 
detail in the tip alone, but not by independent 
police work. 
*271 **2350 As in Draper, the police investigation in 
the present case satisfactorily demonstrated that the 
informant's tip was as trustworthy as one that would 
alone satisfy the Aguilar tests. The tip predicted that 
Sue Gates would drive to Florida, that Lance Gates 
would fly there a few days after May 3, and that Lance 
would then drive the car back. After the police 
corroborated these facts, [FN231 the magistrate could 
reasonably have inferred, as he apparently did, that the 
informant, who had specific knowledge of these 
unusual travel plans, did not make up his story and that 
he obtained his information in a reliable way. It is 
theoretically possible, as respondents insist, that the tip 
could have been supplied by a "vindictive travel agent" 
and that the Gates' activities, although unusual, might 
not have been unlawful. [PN24] But Aguilar and 
Spinelli, like our other cases, do not require that certain 
guilt be established before a warrant may properly be 
issued. "[Ojnly the probability, and not a prima facie 
showing, *272 of criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause." Spinelli, supra, at 419, 89 S.Ct., at 
590 (citing Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89,96,85 S.Ct. 223, 
228,13 L.Ed.2d 142(1964)). I therefore conclude that 
the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court invalidating 
the warrant must be reversed. 
FN23. Justice STEVENS is correct, post, at 
2360, that one of the informant's predictions 
proved to be inaccurate. However, I agree 
with the Court, ante, at 2335, n. 14, that an 
informant need not be infallible. 
FN24. It is also true, as Justice STEVENS 
points owl,post, at 2360, n. 3, that the fact that 
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respondents were last seen leaving West Palm 
Beach on a northbound interstate highway is 
far from conclusive proof that they were 
heading directly to Bloomington. 
B 
The Court agrees that the warrant was valid, but, in the 
process of reaching this conclusion, it overrules the 
Aguilar-Spinelli tests and replaces them with a "totality 
of the circumstances" standard. As shown above, it is 
not at all necessary to overrule Aguilar-Spinelli in order 
to reverse the judgment below. Therefore, because I 
am inclined to believe that, when applied properly, the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules play an appropriate role in 
probable cause determinations, and because the Court's 
holding may foretell an evisceration of the probable 
cause standard, I do not join the Court's holding. 
The Court reasons, ante, at 2329, that the "veracity" 
and "basis of knowledge" tests are not independent, 
and that a deficiency as to one can be compensated for 
by a strong showing as to the other. Thus, a finding of 
probable cause may be based on a tip from an 
informant "known for the unusual reliability of his 
predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest 
citizen," even if the report fails thoroughly to set forth 
the basis upon which the information was obtained. 
Ibid. If this is so, then it must follow a fortiori that 
"the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to 
be honest and experienced, stating that [contraband] is 
located in a certain building" must be acceptable. 
SDinelli. 393 U.S.. at 424,89 S.Ct.. at 593 (WHITE, J., 
concurring). It would be "quixotic" if a similar 
statement from an honest informant, but not one from 
an honest officer, could furnish probable cause. Ibid. 
But we have repeatedly held that the unsupported 
assertion or belief of an officer does not satisfy the 
probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Whitelev v. 
Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 564-565. 91 S.Ct. 1031. 
1034-1035. 28 L.Ed.2d 306: *273 Jones v. United 
States. 362 U.S. 257.269.80 S.Ct. 725.735.4 L.Ed.2d 
697(1960); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41. 
54 S.Ct. 11. 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). fFN251 Thus, this 
portion of today's holding can be read as implicitly 
rejecting the teachings of these prior holdings. 
FN25. I have already indicated my view, 
supra, at 2329-2330, that such a "bare-bones" 
affidavit could not be the basis for a 
good-faith issuance of a warrant. 
**2351 The Court may not intend so drastic a result. 
Indeed, the Court expressly reaffirms, ante, at 2332, 
the validity of cases such as Nathanson that have held 
that, no matter how reliable the affiant-officer may be, 
a warrant should not be issued unless the affidavit 
discloses supporting facts and circumstances. The 
Court limits these cases to situations involving 
affidavits containing only "bare conclusions" and holds 
that, if an affidavit contains anything more, it should be 
left to the issuing magistrate to decide, based solely on 
"practicality]" and "common-sense," whether there is 
a fair probability that contraband will be found in a 
particular place. Ibid. 
Thus, as I read the majority opinion, it appears that the 
question whether the probable cause standard is to be 
diluted is left to the common-sense judgments of 
issuing magistrates. I am reluctant to approve any 
standard that does not expressly require, as a 
prerequisite to issuance of a warrant, some showing of 
facts from which an inference may be drawn that the 
informant is credible and that his information was 
obtained in a reliable way. The Court is correctly 
concerned with the fact that some lower courts have 
been applying Aguilar- Spinelli in an unduly rigid 
manner. [FN261 I believe, however, that with 
clarification of the rule of corroborating *274 
information, the lower courts are fully able to properly 
interpret Aguilar-Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid 
applications. I may be wrong; it ultimately may prove 
to be the case that the only profitable instruction we 
can provide to magistrates is to rely on common sense. 
But the question whether a particular anonymous tip 
provides the basis for issuance of a warrant will often 
be a difficult one, and I would at least attempt to 
provide more precise guidance by clarifying 
Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those cases 
with Draper before totally abdicating our responsibility 
in this area. Hence, I do not join the Court's opinion 
rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli rules. 
FN26. Bridzer v. State. 503 S.W.2d 801 
(Tex.Cr.App.1974). and People v. Palanza, 
55 Ill.Anp.3d 1028. 13 Ill.Dec. 752. 371 
N.E.2d 687 (111.ADD. 1978V which the Court 
describes ante, at 2330, n. 9, appear to me to 
be excellent examples of overly-technical 
applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard. 
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The holdings in these cases could easily be 
disapproved without reliance on a "totality of 
the circumstances" analysis. 
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL 
joins, dissenting. 
Although I join Justice STEVENS' dissenting opinion 
and agree with him that the warrant is invalid even 
under the Court's newly announced "totality of the 
circumstances" test, see post, at 2361-2362, and n. 8,1 
write separately to dissent from the Court's unjustified 
and ill-advised rejection of the two-prong test for 
evaluating the validity of a warrant based on hearsay 
announced in Aeuilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 
1509.12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and refined in Spinelliv. 
United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 
637(1969). 
I 
The Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
as reflected by today's unfortunate decision, patently 
disregards Justice Jackson's admonition in Brinegar v. 
United States. 338 U.S. 160. 69 S.Ct. 1302. 93 L.Ed. 
1879(1949): 
"[Fourth Amendment rights] ... are not mere 
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of 
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of 
rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, 
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror 
in every heart. *275 Uncontrolled search and 
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons 
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.... "But 
the right to be secure against searches and seizures is 
one of the most difficult to protect. Since the 
officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no 
enforcement outside of court." Id. at 180-181. 69 
S.Ct.. at 1313 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
**2352 In recognition of the judiciary's role as the 
only effective guardian of Fourth Amendment rights, 
this Court has developed over the last half century a set 
of coherent rules governing a magistrate's consideration 
of a warrant application and the showings that are 
necessary to support a finding of probable cause. We 
start with the proposition that a neutral and detached 
magistrate, and not the police, should determine 
whether there is probable cause to support the issuance 
of a warrant. In Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 
10.68 S.Ct. 367.92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). the Court stated: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies 
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences 
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.... 
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to 
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a 
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent." Id^ at 13-14. 68 S.Ct.. at 
368-369 (footnote omitted). 
See also Whitelev v. Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 564. 91 
S.Ct. 1031. 1034. 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971V. Svinelli v. 
United States, supra, 393 U.S.. at 415.89 S.Ct., at 588; 
United States v. Ventresca. 380 U.S. 102.109. 85 S.Ct. 
741. 746. 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965): Asniilar v. Texas, 
supra. 378 U.S.. at 111, 84 S.Ct.. at 1512: *276Jones 
v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.270-271. 80 S.Ct. 725, 
736-737,4L.Ed.2d697 (1960): Giordenellov. United 
States. 357 U.S. 480. 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250. 2 
L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); United States v. Lefkowitz. 285 
U.S. 452,464. 52 S.Ct. 420.423. 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932). 
In order to emphasize the magistrate's role as an 
independent arbiter of probable cause and to insure that 
searches or seizures are not effected on less than 
probable cause, the Court has insisted that police 
officers provide magistrates with the underlying facts 
and circumstances that support the officers' 
conclusions. In Nathamon v. United States. 290 U.S. 
41. 54 S.Ct. 11. 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). the Court held 
invalid a search warrant that was based on a customs 
agent's "mere affirmation of suspicion and belief 
without any statement of adequate supporting facts." 
Id. at 46,54 S.Ct., at 12. The Court stated that "[u]nder 
the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly 
issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he 
can find probable cause therefor from facts or 
circumstances presented to him under oath or 
affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is 
not enough." Id. at 47, 54 S.Ct., at 13. 
In Giordenello v. United States, supra, the Court 
reviewed an arrest warrant issued under the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure based on a complaint 
sworn to by a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent. Id.. 
357 U.S., at 481. 78 S.Ct.. at 1247. fFNll Based on 
the agent's testimony at the suppression hearing, the 
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Court noted that "until the warrant was issued ... [the 
agent's] suspicions of petitioner's guilt derived entirely 
from information given him by law enforcement 
officers and other persons in Houston, none of whom 
either appeared before the Commissioner or submitted 
affidavits." Id. at 485, 78 S.Ct., at 1249. The Court 
found it unnecessary to decide whether a warrant could 
be based solely on hearsay information, for the 
complaint was "defective in not providing a sufficient 
basis upon which a *277 finding of probable cause 
could be made." Ibid. In particular, the **2353 
complaint contained no affirmative allegation that the 
agent spoke with personal knowledge nor did it indicate 
any sources for the agent's conclusion. Id, at 486, 78 
S.Ct., at 1250. The Court expressly rejected the 
argument that these deficiencies could be cured by "the 
Commissioner's reliance upon a presumption that the 
complaint was made on the personal knowledge of the 
complaining officer." Ibid. 
FN1. Although the warrant was issued under 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
Court stated that "[t]he provisions of these 
Rules must be read in light of the 
constitutional requirements they implement." 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480. 
485. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 1249. 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 
0958V SQeAznilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 
112. n. 3. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 1512, n. 3. 12 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) ("The principles 
announced in Giordenello derived... from the 
Fourth Amendment, and not from our 
supervisory power"). 
As noted, the Court did not decide the hearsay 
question lurking in Giordenello. The use of hearsay 
to support the issuance of a warrant presents special 
problems because informants, unlike police officers, 
are not regarded as presumptively reliable or honest. 
Moreover, the basis for an informant's conclusions is 
not always clear from an affidavit that merely reports 
those conclusions. If the conclusory allegations of a 
police officer are insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause, surely the conclusory allegations of an 
informant should a fortiori be insufficient. 
In Jones v. United States, supra, the Court considered 
"whether an affidavit which sets out personal 
observations relating to the existence of cause to search 
is to be deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it 
sets out not the affiant's observations but those of 
another." 362 U.S.. at 269. 80 S.Ct., at 735. The 
Court held that hearsay information can support the 
issuance of a warrant "so long as a substantial basis for 
crediting the hearsay is presented." Ibid. The Court 
found that there was a substantial basis for crediting the 
hearsay involved in Jones. The informant's report was 
based on the informant's personal knowledge, and the 
informant previously had provided accurate 
information. Moreover, the informant's story was 
corroborated by other sources. Finally, the defendant 
was known to the police to be a narcotics user. Id, at 
271, 80 S.Ct.. at 736. 
Azuilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), merely made explicit what was 
implicit in Jones. In considering a search warrant 
based on hearsay, the Court reviewed Nathanson *278 
and Giordenello and noted the requirement established 
by those cases that an officer provide the magistrate 
with the underlying facts or circumstances that support 
the officer's conclusion that there is probable cause to 
justify the issuance of a warrant. The Court stated: 
"The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great 
as in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here, the 'mere 
conclusion' that petitioner possessed narcotics was 
not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an 
unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only 
'contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant 
spoke with personal knowledge of the matters 
contained therein,' it does not even contain an 
'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's unidentified 
source 'spoke with personal knowledge.' For all that 
appears, the source here merely suspected, believed 
or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's 
possession. The magistrate here certainly could not 
'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts 
relied on... to show probable cause.' He necessarily 
accepted 'without question' the informant's 
'suspicion,' 'belief or 'mere conclusion.'" Id. at 113-
114, 84 S.Ct., at 1513-1514 (footnote omitted). 
TFN21 
FN2. The Court noted that approval of the 
affidavit before it "would open the door to 
easy circumvention of the rule announced in 
Nathanson and Giordenello." Aguilar v. 
Texas, supra, at 114, n. 4,84 S.Ct., at 1514, n. 
4. The Court stated: 
"A police officer who arrived at the 
'suspicion,' 'belief or 'mere conclusion' that 
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narcotics were in someone's possession could 
not obtain a warrant. But he could convey 
this conclusion to another police officer, who 
could then secure the warrant by swearing that 
he had 'received reliable information from a 
credible person' that the narcotics were in 
someone's possession." Ibid. 
While recognizing that a warrant may be based on 
hearsay, the Court established the following standard: 
"[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the informant 
concluded *279 that **2354 the narcotics were 
where he claimed they were, and some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the officer 
concluded that the informant, whose identity need 
not be disclosed ... was 'credible' or his information 
'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts 
which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a 
neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitution 
requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime' ... or, as in this case, by an unidentified 
informant." Id. at 114-115. 84 S.Ct. at 1513-1514 
(footnote omitted). 
The Aguilar standard was refined in Spinelliv. United 
States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 
(1969). In Spinelli, the Court reviewed a search 
warrant based on an affidavit that was "more ample," 
id., at 413, than the one in Aguilar. The affidavit in 
Spinelli contained not only a tip from an informant, but 
also a report of an independent police investigation that 
allegedly corroborated the informant's tip. Ibid. Under 
these circumstances, the Court stated that it was 
"required to delineate the manner in which Aguilar 's 
two-pronged test should be applied...." Ibid. 
The Court held that the Aguilar test should be applied 
to the tip, and approved two additional ways of 
satisfying that test. First, the Court suggested that if 
the tip contained sufficient detail describing the 
accused's criminal activity it might satisfy Aguilar 's 
basis of knowledge prong. Id. at416,89S.Ct.,at589. 
Such detail might assure the magistrate that he is 
"relying on something more substantial than a casual 
rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation 
based merely on an individual's general reputation." 
Ibid. Although the tip in the case before it did not meet 
this standard, "[t]he detail provided by the informant in 
Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329.3 
L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), provide[d] a suitable benchmark," 
ibid, because "[a] magistrate, when confronted with 
such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant 
*280 had gained his information in a reliable way." Id, 
at 417, 89 S.Ct.. at 589 (footnote omitted). TFN31 
FN3. There is some tension between Draper 
v. United States. 358 U.S. 307. 79 S.Ct. 329. 
3 L.Ed.2d 327 (\9S9\ and Aguilar. In 
Draper, the Court considered the validity of a 
warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip 
and police corroboration of certain details of 
the tip. The informant, who in the past had 
always given accurate and reliable 
information, told the police that Draper was 
peddling narcotics. The informant later told 
the police that Draper had left for Chicago by 
train to pick up some heroin and would return 
by train on the morning of one of two days. 
The informant gave the police a detailed 
physical description of Draper and of the 
clothing he was wearing. The i tiformant also 
said that Draper would be carrying a tan 
zipper bag and that he walked very fast. 358 
U.S.. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. 
On the second morning specified by the 
informant, the police saw a man "having the 
exact physical attributes and wearing the 
precise clothing described by [the informant], 
alight from an incoming Chicago train and 
start walking 'fast* toward the exit." Id, at 
309-310. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. The man was 
carrying a tan zipper bag. The police arrested 
him and searched him incident to the arrest. 
Ibid. 
The Court found that the arrest had been 
based on probable cause. Having verified 
every detail of the tip "except whether 
[Draper] had accomplished his mission and 
had the three ounces of heroin on his person 
or in his bag," id. at 313. 79 S.Ct.. at 333, the 
police "had 'reasonable grounds' to believe 
that the remaining unverified bit of [the 
informant's] information ... was likewise 
true." Ibid. 
There is no doubt that the tip satisfied 
Aguilar's veracity prong. The informant had 
given accurate information in the past. 
Moreover, under Spinelli, the police 
corroborated most of the details of the 
informant's tip. See Spinelli v. United States. 
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393 U.S.. at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at 589: id. at 
426-427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594-595 (WHITE, J., 
concurring); infra, at 2354, and n. 4. There is 
some question, however, about whether the 
tip satisfied Aguilar fs basis of knowledge 
prong. The fact that an informant is right 
about most things may suggest that he is 
credible, but it does not establish that he has 
acquired his information in a reliable way. 
See Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 
426-427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594-595 (WHITE, J., 
concurring). Spinelli's "self-verifying detail" 
element resolves this tension. As one 
commentator has suggested, "under Spinelli, 
the Draper decision is sound as applied to its 
facts." Note, The Informer's Tip As Probable 
Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 Cornell L.Rev. 
958, 964, n. 34 (1969). 
**2355 Second, the Court stated that police 
corroboration of the details of a tip could provide a 
basis for satisfying Aguilar. Id, at 417, 89 S.Ct.. at 
589. *281 The Court's opinion is not a model of 
clarity on this issue since it appears to suggest that 
corroboration can satisfy both the basis of knowledge 
and veracity prongs of Aguilar. Id., at 417-418. 89 
S.Ct, at 589-590. TFN41 Justice WHITE'S concurring 
opinion, however, points the way to a proper reading of 
the Court's opinion. After reviewing the Court's 
decision in Draper v. United States, supra, Justice 
WHITE concluded that "[t]he thrust of Draper is not 
that the verified facts have independent significance 
with respect to proof of [another unverified fact]." Id. 
at 427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594. In his view, "[t]he argument 
instead relates to the reliability of the source: because 
an informant is right about some things, he is more 
probably right about other facts, usually the critical, 
unverified facts." Ibid. Justice WHITE then pointed 
out that prior cases had rejected "the notion that the 
past *282 reliability of an officer is sufficient reason 
for believing his current assertions." Ibid. Justice 
WHITE went on to state: 
FN4. The Court stated that the FBI's 
independent investigative efforts could not 
"support both the inference that the informer 
was generally trustworthy and that he had 
made his charge against Spinelli on the basis 
of information obtained in a reliable way." 
Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 417. 89 
S.Ct.. at 589. The Court suggested that 
Draper again provided "a relevant 
comparison." Ibid. Once the police had 
corroborated most of the details of the tip in 
Draper "[i]t was ... apparent that the 
informant had not been fabricating his report 
out of whole cloth; since the report was of 
the sort which in common experience may be 
recognized as having been obtained in a 
reliable way, it was perfectly clear that 
probable cause had been established." Id., at 
417-418. 89 S.Ct.. at 589-590. 
It is the Court's citation of Draper which 
creates most of the confusion. The 
informant's credibility was not at issue in 
Draper irrespective of the corroboration of 
the details of his tip. See n. 3, supra. The 
Court's opinion, therefore, might be read as 
suggesting that corroboration also could 
satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge test. I 
think it is more likely^ however, especially in 
view of the discussion infra, at 2356, that the 
Court simply was discussing an alternative 
means of satisfying Aguilar's veracity prong, 
using the facts of Draper as an example, and 
relying on its earlier determination that the 
detail of the tip in Draper was self-verifying. 
See 393 U.S.. at 416-417. 89 S.Ct.. at 
589-590. It is noteworthy that although the 
affiant in Spinelli had sworn that the informer 
was reliable, "he [had] offered the magistrate 
no reason in support of this conclusion." Id. 
at 416. 89 S.Ct.. at 589. Aguilar 's veracity 
prong, therefore, was not satisfied. Ibid. 
"Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable 
informant states there is gambling equipment in 
Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in 
detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified 
before applying for the warrant. He was right about 
201, but that hardly makes him more believable 
about the equipment in 607. But what if he states 
that there are narcotics locked in a safe in Apartment 
300, which is described in detail, and the apartment 
manager verifies everything but the contents of the 
safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics is 
made appreciably more believable by the 
verification. The informant could still have gotten 
his information concerning the safe from others 
about whom nothing is known or could have inferred 
the presence of narcotics from circumstances which 
a magistrate would find unacceptable." Id. at 427. 
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89 S.Ct.. at 594. 
I find this reasoning persuasive. Properly understood, 
therefore, Spinelli stands for the proposition that 
corroboration of certain details in a tip may be 
sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the basis of 
knowledge, prong of Aguilar. As noted, Spinelli also 
suggests that in some limited circumstances 
considerable detail in an informant's tip may be 
adequate to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of 
Aguilar. [FN51 
FN5. After concluding that the tip was not 
sufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause, the Court stated: 
"This is not to say that the tip was so 
insubstantial that it could not properly have 
counted in the magistrate's determination. 
Rather, it needed some further support. 
When we look to the other parts of the 
application, however, we find nothing alleged 
which would permit the suspicions 
engendered by the informant's report to ripen 
into a judgment that a crime was probably 
being committed." Spinelli v. United States. 
393 U.S.. at 418. 89 S.Ct.. at 590. 
The Court went on to suggest that 
corroboration of incriminating facts would be 
needed. See ibid. 
*283 **2356 Although the rules drawn from the cases 
discussed above are cast in procedural terms, they 
advance an important underlying substantive value: 
Findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, 
should not be authorized unless there is some assurance 
that the information on which they are based has been 
obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible 
person. As applied to police officers, the rules focus on 
the way in which the information was acquired. As 
applied to informants, the rules focus both on the 
honesty or credibility of the informant and on the 
reliability of the way in which the information was 
acquired. Insofar as it is more complicated, an 
evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a 
more difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure 
the inquiry in an effort to insure greater accuracy. The 
standards announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli, 
fulfill that need. The standards inform the police of 
what information they have to provide and magistrates 
of what information they should demand. The 
standards also inform magistrates of the subsidiary 
findings they must make in order to arrive at an 
ultimate finding of probable cause. Spinelli, properly 
understood, directs the magistrate's attention to the 
possibility that the presence of self-verifying detail 
might satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong and 
that corroboration of the details of a tip might satisfy 
Aguilar 's veracity prong. By requiring police to 
provide certain crucial information to magistrates and 
by structuring magistrates' probable cause inquiries, 
Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate's role as an 
independent arbiter of probable cause, insure greater 
accuracy in probable cause determinations, and 
advance the substantive value identified above. 
Until today the Court has never squarely addressed the 
application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips 
from anonymous informants. Both Aguilar and 
Spinelli dealt with tips from informants known at least 
to the police. See also, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143. 146. 92 S.Ct. 1921. 1923. 32 L.Ed.2d 612 
(1972): United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573.575.91 
S.Ct. 2075. 2078. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 0 9 7 0 ; Whitelev v. 
Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 565. 91 S.Ct. 1031. 1035. 28 
L.Ed.2d 306 f 1971V. *2S4McCravv. Illinois. 386 U.S. 
300. 302. 87 S.Ct. 1056. 1057. 18 L.Ed 2d 62 (1967V 
Jones v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.268-269.80 S.Ct. 
725. 735. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960V And surely there is 
even more reason to subject anonymous informants' 
tips to the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli. 
By definition nothing is known about an anonymous 
informant's identity, honesty, or reliability. One 
commentator has suggested that anonymous informants 
should be treated as presumptively unreliable. See 
Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and 
Probable Cause: Reconciling The Spinelli/Draper 
Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 99, 
107(1982). See also Adams v. Williams, supra. 407 
U.S.. at 146. 92 S.Ct.. at 1923 (suggesting that an 
anonymous telephone tip provides a weaker case for a 
Terry stop than a tip from an informant known to the 
police who had provided information in the past); 
United States v. Harris, supra. 403 U.S.. at 599. 91 
S.Ct.. at 2089 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("We cannot 
assume that the ordinary law-abiding citizen has 
qualms about [appearing before a magistrate]"). In any 
event, there certainly is no basis for treating anonymous 
informants as presumptively reliable. Nor is there any 
basis for assuming that the information provided by an 
anonymous informant has been obtained in a reliable 
way. If we are unwilling to accept conclusory 
allegations from the police, who are presumptively 
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reliable, or from informants who are known, at **2357 
least to the police, there cannot possibly be any rational 
basis for accepting conclusory allegations from 
anonymous informants. 
To suggest that anonymous informants' tips are subject 
to the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli is not to 
suggest that they can never provide a basis for a finding 
of probable cause. It is conceivable that police 
corroboration of the details of the tip might establish 
the reliability of the informant under Aguilar's veracity 
prong, as refined in Spinelli, and that the details in the 
tip might be sufficient to qualify under the "self-
verifying detail" test established by Spinelli as a means 
of satisfying Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong. The 
Aguilar and Spinelli tests must be applied to 
anonymous informants' tips, however, if we are to 
continue to insure *285 that findings of probable cause, 
and attendant intrusions, are based on information 
provided by an honest or credible person who has 
acquired the information in a reliable way. [FN61 
FN6. As noted, supra, at 2353-2356, Aguilar 
and Spinelli inform the police of what 
information they have to provide and 
magistrates of what information they should 
demand. This advances the important 
process value, which is intimately related to 
substantive Fourth Amendment concerns, of 
having magistrates, rather than police, or 
informants, determine whether there is 
probable cause to support the issuance of a 
warrant. We want the police to provide 
magistrates with the information on which 
they base their conclusions so that magistrates 
can perform their important function. When 
the police rely on facts about which they have 
personal knowledge, requiring them to 
disclose those facts to magistrates imposes no 
significant burden on the police. When the 
police rely on information obtained from 
confidential informants, requiring the police 
to disclose the facts on which the informants 
based their conclusions imposes a more 
substantial burden on the police, but it is one 
that they can meet because they presumably 
have access to their confidential informants. 
In cases in which the police rely on 
information obtained from an anonymous 
informant, the police, by hypothesis, cannot 
obtain further information from the informant 
regarding the facts and circumstances on 
which the informant based his conclusion. 
When the police seek a warrant based solely 
on an anonymous informants' tip, therefore, 
they are providing the magistrate with all the 
information on which they have based their 
conclusion. In this respect, the command of 
Aguilar and Spinelli has been met and the 
process value identified above has been 
served. But Aguilar and Spinelli advance 
other values which argue for their application 
even to anonymous informants' tips. They 
structure the magistrate's probable cause 
inquiry and, more importantly, they guard 
against findings of probable cause, and 
attendant intrusions, based on anything other 
than information which magistrates 
reasonably can conclude has been obtained in 
a reliable way by an honest or credible person. 
In light of the important purposes served by Aguilar 
and Spinelli, I would not reject the standards they 
establish. If anything, I simply would make more clear 
that Spinelli, properly understood, does not depart in 
any fundamental way from the test established by 
Aguilar. For reasons I shall next state, I do not find 
persuasive the Court's justifications for rejecting the 
test established by Aguilar and refined by Spinelli. 
*286 II 
In rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli standards, the Court 
suggests that a "totality of the circumstances approach 
is far more consistent with our prior treatment of 
probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific 
'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip." Ante, at 
2328 (footnote omitted). In support of this proposition 
the Court relies on several cases that purportedly reflect 
this approach, ante, at 2328, n. 6, n. 7, and on the 
"practical, nontechnical," ante, at 2329, nature of 
probable cause. 
Only one of the cases cited by the Court in support of 
its "totality of the circumstances" approach, Jaben v. 
UnitedStates. 381 U.S. 214.85 S.Ct. 1365,14L.Ed.2d 
345 (1965V was decided subsequent to Aguilar. It is 
by no means inconsistent with Aguilar. JFN]} The 
other three cases TFN81 cited by the **2358 Court as 
supporting its *287 totality of the circumstances 
approach were decided before Aguilar. In any event, 
it is apparent from the Court's discussion of them, see 
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ante, at 2329, n. 7, that they are not inconsistent with 
Aguilar. 
FN7. In Jabenv. United States, 381 U.S. 214. 
85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 (19651 the 
Court considered whether there was probable 
cause to support a complaint charging 
petitioner with willfully filing a false tax 
return. Id, at 221, 85 S.Ct., at 1369. After 
reviewing the extensive detail contained in the 
complaint, id, at 223. 85 S.Ct., at 1370. the 
Court expressly distinguished tax offenses 
from other types of offenses: "Some offenses 
are subject to putative establishment by blunt 
and concise factual allegations, e.g., 'A saw 
narcotics in B 's possession,' whereas XA saw B 
file a false tax return' does not mean very 
much in a tax evasion case. Establishment of 
grounds for belief that the offense of tax 
evasion has been committed often requires a 
reconstruction of the taxpayer's income from 
many individually unrevealing facts which are 
not susceptible of a concise statement in a 
complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics 
informants, for example, whose credibility 
may often be suspect, the sources in this tax 
evasion case are much less likely to produce 
false or untrustworthy information. Thus, 
whereas some supporting information 
concerning the credibility of informants in 
narcotics cases or other common garden 
varieties of crime may be required, such 
information is not so necessary in the context 
of the case before us." Id, at 223-224. 85 
S.Ct.. at 1370-1371. 
Obviously, Jaben is not inconsistent with 
Aguilar and involved no general rejection of 
the Aguilar standards. 
FNS. Rwendorfv. United States, 376 U.S. 
528. 84 S.Ct. 825. 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964V 
Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23.83 S.Ct. 1623. 
10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257,80 S.Ct. 725.4 L.Ed.2d 
697(1960). 
In addition, one can concede that probable cause is a 
"practical, nontechnical" concept without betraying the 
values that Aguilar and Spinelli reflect. As noted, see 
supra, at 2347, Aguilar and Spinelli require the police 
to provide magistrates with certain crucial information. 
They also provide structure for magistrates' probable 
cause inquiries. In so doing, Aguilar and Spinelli 
preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters 
of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable 
cause determinations, and advance the substantive 
value of precluding findings of probable cause, and 
attendant intrusions, based on anything less than 
information from an honest or credible person who has 
acquired his information in a reliable way. Neither the 
standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a 
"practical, nontechnical" conception of probable cause. 
Once a magistrate has determined that he has 
information before him that he can reasonably say has 
been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he 
has ample room to use his common sense and to apply 
a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause. 
It also should be emphasized that cases such as 
Nathanson v. United States. 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. 11, 
78 L.Ed. 159 (1933V and Giordenellov United States. 
357 U.S. 480. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958), 
discussed supra, at 2352, directly contradict the Court's 
suggestion, ante, at 2329, that a strong showing on one 
prong of the Aguilar test should compensate for a 
deficient showing on the other. If the conclusory 
allegations of a presumptively reliable police officer 
are insufficient to establish probable cause, there is no 
conceivable reason why the conclusory allegations of 
an anonymous informant should not be insufficient as 
well. Moreover, contrary to the Court's implicit 
suggestion, Aguilar and Spinelli do not stand as an 
insuperable barrier to the use *288 of even anonymous 
informants' tips to establish probable cause. See 
supra, at 2330. It is no justification for rejecting them 
outright that some courts may have employed an overly 
technical version of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards, see 
ante, at 2330, and n. 9. 
The Court also insists that the Aguilar-Spinelli 
standards must be abandoned because they are 
inconsistent with the fact that non-lawyers frequently 
serve as magistrates. Ante, at 2332. To the contrary, 
the standards help to structure probable cause inquiries 
and, properly interpreted, may actually help a 
non-lawyer magistrate in making a probable cause 
determination. Moreover, the Aguilar and Spinelli 
tests are not inconsistent with deference to magistrates' 
determinations of probable cause. Aguilar expressly 
acknowledged that reviewing courts "will pay 
substantial deference to judicial determinations of 
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probable cause...." 378 U.S., at 11 1,84 S.Ct.. at 1512. 
In Spinelli, the Court noted that it was not retreating 
from the proposition **2359 that magistrates' 
determinations of probable cause "should be paid great 
deference by reviewing courts...." 393 U.S.. at 419.89 
S.Ct. at 590. It is also noteworthy that the language 
from United States v. Venlresca, 380 U.S. 102. 
108-109. 85 S.Ct. 741. 745-746. 13 L.Ed.2d 684 
(1965). which the Court repeatedly quotes, see ante, at 
2330,2331, and n. 10, brackets the following passage, 
which the Court does not quote: 
"This is not to say that probable cause can be made 
out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating 
only the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable 
cause exists without detailing any of the 'underlying 
circumstances' upon which that belief is based. See 
Aguilar v. Texas, supra. Recital of some of the 
underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential 
if the magistrate is to perform his detached function 
and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. 
However, where these circumstances are detailed, 
where reason for crediting the source of the 
information is given, and when a magistrate has 
found probable cause, the courts should not *289 
invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in 
a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, 
manner." 380 U.S.. at 108-109.85 S.Ct., at 745-746. 
fFN91 
FN9. The Court also argues that "[i]f the 
affidavits submitted by police officers are 
subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts 
have deemed appropriate, police might well 
resort to warrantless searches, with the hope 
of relying on consent or some other exception 
to the warrant clause that might develop at the 
time of the search." Ante, at 2331. If the 
Court is suggesting, as it appears to be, that 
the police will intentionally disregard the law, 
it need only be noted in response that the 
courts are not helpless to deal with such 
conduct. Moreover, as was noted in 
Coolidze v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443. 
91 S.Ct. 2022. 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (197H: 
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this 
area is that 'searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to 
a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.' The exceptions 
are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there 
must be 'a showing by those who seek 
exemption ... that the exigencies of the 
situation made that course imperative.' '[T]he 
burden is on those seeking the exemption to 
show the need for it.' " Id. at 454-455. 91 
S.Ct.. at 2031-2032 (plurality opinion) 
(footnotes omitted). 
It therefore would appear to be not only 
inadvisable, but also unavailing, for the police 
to conduct warrantless searches in "the hope 
of relying on consent or some other exception 
to the warrant clause that might develop at the 
time of the search." Ante, at 2331. 
At the heart of the Court's decision to abandon Aguilar 
and Spinelli appears to be its belief that "the direction 
taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves 'the 
most basic function of any government: to provide for 
the security of the individual and of his property.' " 
Ante, at 2331. This conclusion rests on the judgment 
that Aguilar and Spinelli "seriously impedfe] the task of 
law enforcement," ibid, and render anonymous tips 
valueless in police work. Ibid. Surely, the Court 
overstates its case. See supra, at 2331. But of 
particular concern to all Americans must be that the 
Court gives virtually no consideration to the value of 
insuring that findings of probable cause are based on 
information that a magistrate can reasonably say has 
been obtained in a reliable *290 way by an honest or 
credible person. I share Justice WHITE'S fear that the 
Court's rejection of Aguilar and Spinelli and its 
adoption of a new totality of the circumstances test, 
ante, at 2332, "may foretell an evisceration of the 
probable cause standard...." Ante, at 2334 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
Ill 
The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive 
reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly 
reflects impatience with what it perceives to be "overly 
technical" rules governing searches and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment. Words such as "practical," 
"nontechnical," and "commonsense," as used in the 
Court's opinion, are but codewords for an overly 
permissive attitude towards police practices in 
derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth 
Amendment. Everyone shares the Court's concern 
over the **2360 horrors of drug trafficking, but under 
our Constitution only measures consistent with the 
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Fourth Amendment may be employed by government 
to cure this evil. We must be ever mindful of Justice 
Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443. 91 S.Ct. 2022. 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1970. 
that M[i]n times of unrest, whether caused by crime or 
racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic 
law and the values that it represents may appear 
unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values 
were those of the authors of our fundamental 
constitutional concepts." Id. at 455.91 S.Ct.. at 2032 
(plurality opinion). In the same vein, Glasser v. 
United States. 315 U.S. 60.62 S.Ct. 457. 86 L.Ed. 680 
(1942), warned that "[s]teps innocently taken may, one 
by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of 
substantial liberties." Id. at 86.62 S.Ct.. at 472. 
Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are 
particularly difficult to protect because their "advocates 
are usually criminals." Drapery. United States. 358 
U.S. 307.314.79 S.Ct. 329., 333.3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But the rules "we fashion 
[are] for the innocent and guilty alike." Ibid. See also 
Kolender v. Lawson, — U.S. — , — , 103 S.Ct. 1855. 
1861. 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring); Brinezarv. United States. 338 U.S. 160. 
181. 69 S.Ct. 1302. 1313. 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). *291 By replacing Aguilar 
and Spinelli with a test that provides no assurance that 
magistrates, rather than the police, or informants, will 
make determinations of probable cause; imposes no 
structure on magistrates' probable cause inquiries; and 
invites the possibility that intrusions may be justified 
on less than reliable information from an honest or 
credible person, today's dec ision threatens to "obliterate 
one of the most fundamental distinctions between our 
form of government, where officers are under the law, 
and the police-state where they are the law." Johnson 
v. United States. 333 U.S. 10. 17.68 S.Ct. 367.370.92 
L.Ed. 436 (1948). 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN 
joins, dissenting. 
The fact that Lance and Sue Gates made a 22-hour 
nonstop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida, to 
Bloomingdale, Illinois, only a few hours after Lance 
had flown to Florida provided persuasive evidence that 
they were engaged in illicit activity. That fact, 
however, was not known to the magistrate when he 
issued the warrant to search their home. 
What the magistrate did know at that time was that the 
anonymous informant had not been completely accurate 
in his or her predictions. The informant had indicated 
that "Sue drives their car to Florida where she leaves it 
to be loaded up with drugs.... Sue flies back after she 
drops the car off in Florida" App. la (emphasis 
added). Yet Detective Mader's affidavit reported that 
she "left the West Palm Beach area driving the Mercury 
northbound." App. 12a. 
The discrepancy between the informant's predictions 
and the facts known to Detective Mader is significant 
for three reasons. First, it cast doubt on the 
informant's hypothesis that the Gates already had "over 
$100,000 worth of drugs in their basement," App. la. 
The informant had predicted an itinerary that always 
kept one *292 spouse in Bloomingdale, suggesting that 
the Gates did not want to leave their home unguarded 
because something valuable was hidden within. That 
inference obviously could not be drawn when it was 
known that the pair was actually together over a 
thousand miles from home. 
Second, the discrepancy made the Gates* conduct seem 
substantially less unusual than the informant had 
predicted it would be. It would have been odd if, as 
predicted, Sue had driven down to Florida on 
Wednesday, left the car, and flown right back to 
Illinois. But the mere facts that **2361 Sue was in 
West Palm Beach with the car. fFNll that she was 
joined by her husband at the Holiday Inn on Friday, 
FFN21 and that the couple drove north together the next 
morning FFN31 are neither unusual nor probative of 
criminal activity. 
FN1. The anonymous note suggested that she 
was going down on Wednesday, App. la, but 
for all the officers knew she had been in 
Florida for a month. App. 10b-13b. 
FN2. Lance does not appear to have behaved 
suspiciously in flying down to Florida. He 
made a reservation in his own name and gave 
an accurate home phone number to the 
airlines. Compare Florida v. Royer, —U.S. 
—9 _ n . 2, 103 S.Ct. 1319. 1322. n. 2. 75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. 
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544. 548. 100 S.Ct. 
1870. 1874. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Stewart, 
J., announcing the judgment). And Detective 
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Mader's affidavit does not report that he did 
any of the other things drug couriers are 
notorious for doing, such as paying for the 
ticket in cash, Rover, supra, 460 U.S.. at — . 
n. 2. 103 S.Ct.. at 1322, n. 2. dressing 
casually, ibid, looking pale and nervous, 
ibid; Mendenhall. supra. 446 U.S.. at 548. 
100 S.Ct.. at 1874. improperly filling out 
baggage tags, Rover, supra. 460 U.S.. at — . 
n. 2. 103 S.Ct.. at 1322. n. 2. carrying 
American Tourister luggage, ibid, not 
carrying any luggage, Mendenhall. supra. 446 
U.S.. at 564-565. 100 S.Ct.. at 1882-1883 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment), or changing 
airlines en route, ibid. 
FN3. Detective Mader's affidavit hinted 
darkly that the couple had set out upon "that 
interstate highway commonly used by 
travelers to the Chicago area." But the same 
highway is also commonly used by travelers 
to Disney World, Sea World, and Ringling 
Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus 
World. It is also the road to Cocoa Beach, 
Cape Canaveral, and Washington, D.C. I 
would venture that each year dozens of 
perfectly innocent people fly to Florida, meet 
a waiting spouse, and drive off together in the 
family car. 
*293 Third, the fact that the anonymous letter 
contained a material mistake undermines the 
reasonableness of relying on it as a basis for making a 
forcible entry into a private home._[FN4] 
FN4. The Court purports to rely on the 
proposition that "if the [anonymous] 
informant could predict with considerable 
accuracy the somewhat unusual travel plans 
of the Gates, he probably also had a reliable 
basis for his statements that the Gates kept a 
large quantity of drugs in their home." Ante, 
at 2336, n. 14 (emphasis added). Even if this 
syllogism were sound, but see Spinelli v. 
United States. 393 U.S. 410. 427. 89 S.Ct. 
584.594.21 L.Ed.2d 637 0969) (WHITE, J., 
concurring), its premises are not met in this 
case. 
Of course, the activities in this case did not stop when 
the magistrate issued the warrant. The Gates drove all 
night to Bloomingdale, the officers searched the car 
and found 400 pounds of marijuana, and then they 
searched the house. TFN51 However, none of these 
subsequent events may be considered in evaluating the 
warrant. [FN61 and the search of the house was legal 
only if the warrant was valid. Vale v. Louisiana. 399 
U.S. 30. 33-35. 90 S.Ct. 1969. 1971-1972.26 L.Ed.2d 
409 (1970). I cannot accept the Court's casual 
conclusion that, before the Gates arrived in 
Bloomingdale, there was probable cause to justify a 
valid entry and search of a private home. No one 
knows who the informant in this case was, or what 
motivated him or her to write the note. Given that the 
note's predictions were faulty in one *294 significant 
respect, and were corroborated by nothing except 
ordinary **2362 innocent activity, I must surmise that 
the Court's evaluation of the warrant's validity has been 
colored by subsequent events. [FN71 
FN5. The officers did not enter the 
unoccupied house as soon as the warrant 
issued; instead, they waited until the Gates 
returned. It is unclear whether they waited 
because they wanted to execute the warrant 
without unnecessary property damage or 
because they had doubts about whether the 
informant's tip was really valid. In either 
event their judgment is to be commended. 
FN6. It is a truism that "a search warrant is 
valid only if probable cause has been shown 
to the magistrate and that an inadequate 
showing may not be rescued by post-search 
testimony on information known to the 
searching officers at the time of the search." 
Rice v. Wolff. 513 F.2d 1280 (CA8 1975). 
See Coolidze v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 
443. 450-451. 91 S.Ct. 2022. 2029-2030. 29 
L.Ed.2d 564 (1971): Whitelev v. Warden. 401 
U.S. 560.565. n. 8.91 S.Ct. 1031.1035. n. 8. 
28L.Ed.2d306(1971): Amilarv. Texas. 378 
U.S. 108. 109. n. 1.84 S.Ct. 1509. 151 l.n. 1. 
12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964V. Jones v. United 
States. 357U.S. 493.497-498.78 S.Ct. 1253. 
1256-1257. 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958); 
Giordenello v. United States. 357 U.S. 480. 
486. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 
(1958); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1. 
6. 52 S.Ct. 466. 467. 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932): 
Amello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20. 33.46 
S.Ct. 4. 6. 70 L.Ed. 145(1925). 
FN7. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307. 
79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.EdL2d 327 (1959). affords 
no support for today's holding. That case did 
not involve an anonymous informant. On the 
contrary, as the Court twice noted, Mr. 
Hereford was "employed for that purpose and 
[his] information had always been found 
accurate and reliable." Id, at 313.79 S.Ct.. at 
333; see id, at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. In this 
case, the police had no prior experience with 
the informant, and some of his or her 
information in this case was unreliable and 
inaccurate. 
Although the foregoing analysis is determinative as to 
the house search, the car search raises additional issues 
because "there is a constitutional difference between 
houses and cars." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42. 
52. 90 S.Ct. 1975. 1981. 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). Cf. 
Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573. 589-590. 100 S.Ct. 
1371. 1381-1382. 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). An officer 
who has probable cause to suspect that a highly 
movable automobile contains contraband does not need 
a valid warrant in order to search it. This point was 
developed in our opinion in United States v. Ross. 456 
U.S. 798. 102 S.Ct. 2157. 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). 
which was not decided until after the Illinois Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in this case. Under Ross, 
the car search may have been valid if the officers had 
probable cause after the Gates arrived. 
In apologizing for its belated realization that we should 
not have ordered reargument in this case, the Court 
today shows high regard for the appropriate 
relationship of this Court to state courts. Ante, at 2323. 
When the Court discusses the merits, however, it 
attaches no weight to the conclusions of the Circuit 
Judge of DuPage County, Illinois, of the three judges 
of the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court, 
or of the five justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, all 
of whom concluded that the warrant was not based on 
probable cause. In a fact-bound inquiry of this sort, 
the judgment of three levels of state courts, all of whom 
are better able to evaluate the probable reliability of 
Page 44 
anonymous informants in *295 Bloomingdale, Illinois, 
than we are, should be entitled to at least a presumption 
of accuracy. TFN81 I would simply vacate the 
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remand the 
case for reconsideration in the light of our intervening 
decision in United States v. Ross. 
FN8. The Court holds that what were 
heretofore considered two independent 
"prongs"—"veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge"—are now to be considered 
together as circumstances whose totality must 
be appraised. Ante, at 2329. "A deficiency in 
one may be compensated for, in determining 
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong 
showing as to the other, or by some other 
indicia of reliability." Ibid. Yet in this case, 
the lower courts found neither factor present. 
App. 12a. And the supposed "other indicia" 
in the affidavit take the form of activity that is 
not particularly remarkable. I do not 
understand how the Court can find that the 
"totality" so far exceeds the sum of its 
"circumstances." 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a 
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front 
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front 
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all 
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, basements, 
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession 
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute. 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed 
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently 
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been 
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring 
in West Valley City and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification 
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has 
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in 
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike 
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of 
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training 
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well 
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug 
recognition, identification and investigative techniques. Your 
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb 
Technician. 
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and 
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and 
cocaine. Your affiant received information from a confidential 
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the 
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your 
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were 
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on 
numerous occasions during the last year, 
3. CI has used marij.uana with the suspect on several 
occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent 
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 
4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the 
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with 
packaging material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on 
his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells 
marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
substances, inside the named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently 
purchased the listed premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of 
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City 
restaurant, BACCI's, 
12. CI staters that the suspect sells controlled substances to 
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle 
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and 
hours of operation for the suspect, 
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and 
usually during the late evening hours, 
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his 
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial 
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence, 
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some 
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. 
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic 
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During 
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for 
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of 
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the 
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and 
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the 
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would 
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the 
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was 
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no 
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel. 
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are 
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons. 
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used 
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has 
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI 
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to 
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the 
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even 
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises, 
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales 
operation is ongoing and has been long term. 
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named 
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your 
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic, 
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short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises. 
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in 
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of 
cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with any 
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which 
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from 
the listed premises. 
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently 
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was 
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on 
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he 
was scheduled to return. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for 
marijuana, cocaine and associated packaging material and 
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been 
told that all these items have been observed inside the -listed 
premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should be 
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and 
carries controlled substances on his person. 
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of 
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually 
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's 
observations have confirmed this. 
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy 
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben 
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced 
authority of service. 
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) in the day time. 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the 
officer's authority or purpose because: 
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or 
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted. 
N/A 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / 5 day of ^^7^2000. 
Time Vh^ tb, > ^ ° 
JUDGi 
IN THE fTHiKD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the state of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det. 
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family 
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the 
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the 
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, 
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence 
described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are ther^pre commanded: 
tgt) in the day time^ 
7$tf at any time of the day or night (good cause having been shown) 
( J to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.) 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property 
in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this /S day of 
> = 
2000. 
